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Contributeur : Eliane DaphyIntroduction
The Quest for Certaintŕes
"Transition" from planned to market economy or
"transformation" of planned into market economies is the subject most
written about in social and economic sciences since the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Most writings departed from a clear-cut opposition of "plan" to
"market" or from the assumption of a simple linear evolution of the
first into the latter. Underlying these writings was the idea of a binary
opposition and a clearcut difference between societies with functioning
market economies in the West and societies aspiring to market
economies in the East.
The lecture series in the autum and winter of 1994/95 at the
Centre Marc Bloch brought to Berlin social researchers from Eastern
and Western Europe who were questioning precisely these opposites.
They had all done longterm qualitative research in factories and among
entrepreneurs and managers in Eastern and Western Europe. Their
research challenges the view en vogue since 1989 of market economy
as a coherent attainable aim that followes clearly defined predictable
laws. They criticize existing theories that failed to study the changes in
Eastern Europe as a political process with an economic dimension that
had its own sui generis dynamics (for example Burawoy). The papers
show that labour relations in the market economies of East and West
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undergo similar developments. The papers on labour relations in the
West analyse in a historical perspective the profound changes by which
these relations were affected in the last thirty years. These are shown
to have been inextricably linked to politics (for example Beynon,
Pialoux). The papers giving a detailed account of relations on the
shopfloor in Eastern Europe point to the continuities in mechanisms of
social interaction in the face of a radical change in the economic
framework (for example Cl ėmens, Müller) and to the growth of
existential uncertainties.
Some of the papers discussing the impact of Western
management consultancy and expertise in Eastern Europe analyse the
Western market economic models as an ideology or even religion linked
to the exercise of power and control (for example Kostera, Müller).
Others look at the mechanisms of assimilation and resistance to these
models (for example Zaleska). Others analyse how political positions,
networks and cultural patterns from the past influence the economic
and social positions of managers and entrepreneurs of the. new private
enterprises in Eastern Europe (for example Chmatko, Sampson). This
view is complemented by Ray Pahl's paper demystifying the idealized
image of happy progressive managers in the West.
Michael Burawoy's papers draws theoretical conclusions from
the extensive fieldwork he undertook recently together with Pavel
Krotov in the timber and mining industry in Russia and from the research
he has undertaken since long before 1989 in various factories in
Hungary. He analyses the transition processes in Eastern Europe and
especially in Russia as "industrial involution" as an antithesis to
evolution and development. His point is that the rapid introduction of
market mechanisms drained ressources from the productive industry
to transform them into merchant capital which is hardly reinvested.
The big "privatized" Russian industry survives on an extremely low
level of productivity and capitalisation only thanks to continuing links
with the state. Attempts of the state to tighten budget constraints on
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industry leads to a move of growing sectors of the economy into the
shadow and to increasing regionalisation.
Based on extensive interviews with small and large entrepreneurs
in Russia Natacha Chmatko's paper distinguishes between those new
entrepreneurs who had an important economic position in the past and
those who were dominated in the past and who now try to make a
fortune in the new system. The first mostly control large enterprises
and openly emphasize their economic activities, often combining a
public position with a private entrepreneurial activity. The latter owning
mostly small businesses don't make their activities public, hiding them
from tax obligations and state control. Operating in an isolated way
they do not profit from joint business activities and from government
programmes. To their different ways of operating their businesses
correspond different consumption patterns and ways of socialising.
Economic capital, Chmatko shows is strongly linked to the possession
of social and cultural capital.
The same distinction between state bureaucrats becoming
entrepreneurs- he calls them "parachutists" - and those who can not
draw on positions in the former system - he calls them "freelancers" -
is made by Steven Sampson. In his research in Romania he saw these
two groups of nouveaux riches in competition not only for economic
success but also for "the right to be rich", justified by "good taste".
Sampson claims the rich search the company of those who have culture,
so that the "magic dust" of culture would rub off on them. Especially
the "parachutists" talk about converting money into culture by starting
a foundation, restoring old buildings and the like. Owners of economic
capital, Sampson demonstrates, try to distinguish themselves from the
non-owners by acquiring cultural capital.
"Shadowing" British managers Ray Pahl found out a change in
attitude toward work since the 1960s. While managers in the 1960s
appeared to have internalized an ideology of self-coercion, in th ė 1970s
there were growing reservations to total commitment among British
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managers. Succes appeared to be short lived and uncertain. While
management textbooks suggested that failure to suceed was self-made,
managers started to internalize this view and to show signs of fatalism,
alienation and anomie.
An optimistic reading of Western managers offers Krystyna
Joanna Zaleskas paper. She maintains that American managers
introduce an optimistic and trusting view of human nature into the old
Polish system. She opposes American management behaviour to the
Polish one. Polish managers, she says, need formal rules and guidelines
and emphasize the dignity of their position of authority. From the old
days they are used to look for problems and to think in a negative
pessimistic way. American corporate culture, on the contrary, creates
a sense of obligation while emphasizing informality. It meshes the need
for results with the concern for the individual thereby creating strong
psychological links with the firm and with the working team.
This view is opposed by Monika Kostera. In her ironical essay
she makes the uncritical acceptance of the Western ideology of
economic rationality responsible for the loss of values and meaning in
contemporary Polish society. In a biting critique of Western economic
consultancy agencies she draws parallels between their teachings and
the discourses of Christian missions supporting Western colonization
throughout the world. The communication between East and West,
Kostera claims, is not a "conversation" but a "sermon" delivered by
the Westerners who claim that "salvation will be possible" through
hard work, free market and economizing. In the face of a growing loss
of meaning and certainties, the consultants - she calls them "missionaries
of management" - promote rational economic organisations as offering
their participants rewards also of an existential and perhaps spiritual
nature.
The confrontation and coexistence of the economic rationality
of market economy with the worldviews and practices of the planned
economy inside a Moscow joint venture is the research Birgit Müller
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undertook together with her Russian colleagues Elena Mechtcherkina,
Kirill Levinson and Andrej Onikienko and her French colleague Isabelle
Cribler. At the time of the research in 1993 the Russian workers and
employees of the joint venture were still unaware of mechanisms of
profit accumulation in the enterprise. For them an increase in individual
productivity meant to have the right to a proportional increase in pay.
The enterprise was seen as a "pot for all" that should care and provide
for all its members. The authors analyse the strategy of the international
combine to accompany the introduction of market economic structures
by an intensive effort at convincing the workforce and especially the
management of the principles of performance and profit and they
describe in detail the mechanisms of resistance to and reinterpretation.
of the message the Westerners wish to convey.
A pessimistic account of the loss of meaning and cultural identity
gives Huy Beynon describing the process of decay of the British mining
industry. As a nationalized industry the mines were an important
stronghold of the labour movement and the miner represented the image
of the powerful heroic worker for the British Left. The collaboration of
management and syndicats of the mine industry in the 1960 together
with an evocative productivist language remind the discourses and
practices of the planned economy. Because of its left wing political
tradition and the low level of productivity the conservative political
forces came to see the mining industry as "the internal enemy of the
state". With the unsuccessful strikes against the Thatcherite politics of
privatization that ultimately brought the end of the British mining
industry the British Left not only lost an economically motivated
struggle but also part of a political and cultural identity.
Work as meaning of life, is the topic of Petra Clemens paper
about a cloth industry in an East German mining district. She presents
two labour biographies of women who linked their lives closely to the
work in the factory. The workplace is presented as a place of dense
social interaction where the women find support and recognition and
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where they found a security which is now endangered by the
introduction of market economy.
Loss of securities, the feeling of vulnerability and the fear to fail
are the feelings that move the workers of the modernized workshops
of the Peugeot factory that Michel Pialoux presents in his paper. Pialoux
analyses the failed attempt by management to introduce a Japanese
model of work organization into modernized workshops with high
technology and to promote a new culture of work. The attempts fail
because the workers refuse to be separated from their established
workteaıns and to adapt to a new code of behaviour. However, the fear
of an uncertain future remains and the workers oscillate between two
teınptations: to play the game of the enterprise and to accept the new
competitive individualized identity or to fall back on the old models of
workers resistance and to turn back to the tradeunion delegates who
have lost much of their symbolique authority since the 1980s.
In the papers presented here not much is to be felt of the optimism
that the political changes of 1989 arose in East and West. The changes
in Eastern Europe that should bring about a new era of wealth and
prosperity recall on the shopfloor the industrial decline in the West.
The problems encountered by managers and workers in Eastern Europe
are not the problems of transition but the problems of liberal market
economy itself. It is the strength of the social anthropological approach
to be able to question the idea of unilinear economic and social progress




Contributeur : Eliane DaphyIndustrial Involution:
the Russia/1 Road to Capitalism*
Michael Burawoy
For the second time this century Russia is being subjected to
utopian experiment. Compared to the conditions for the transition to
socialism after the October Revolution which could not have been more
unfavorable — a raging civil war in a largely peasant society, encircled
by enemies from a hostile capitalist world — the conditions for the
transition to capitalism seventy four years later are auspicious. The
majority of Soviet citizens have been happy to leave socialism behind,
the capitalist world embraced Russia in its new garb of democracy and
markets, and the economy was much more developed. Nevertheless,
the first three years of the post-Soviet era have witnessed a precipitous
decline in GNP, industrial output, and investment. Inflation although
it has fallen remains high (table 1). How can we explain this headlong
descent and will it continue?
*This paper is based on research from 1991 to 1994, conducted in the Russian
Republic of Komi in collaboration with Pavel Krotov and financed by the
MacArthur and National Science Foundations. I have learnt much from Zsuzsa
Gille, Patrick Heller, Suava Salameh and David Woodruff. After Erik Wright
had revealed my real argument, Peter Evans and Mark Gould pointed to its
flaws. This version of the paper is a response to their comments. Thanks to the
participants at the SSRC Worskshop on Rational Choice Theory and Post-
Soviet Studies held at Harriman Institute and to the participants at the seminar
organized by Birgit Muller at the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin. http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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TABLE I: MACRO-ECONOMIC DATA FOR RUSSIA*
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992 1993 1994**
%CHANGE IN GNP
3.0	 -2.1	 -12.9	 -18.5 -12.0 -17.0
%CHANGE IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
2.0	 -2.2	 -8.0	 -18.8 -16.2 -21.0
%INFLATION IN CONSUMER PRICES
	
4.0	 5.0	 92.6	 1,354	 880	 180
%CHANGE IN FIXED INVESTMENT
	
4.0	 0.1	 -15.5	 -39.7	 -15	 -25
*Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Russia,
3rd.Quarter, 1994; Economic Survey of Europe, 1993-94 (Secretariat
of the Economic Commission);Izvestia
**Data for 1994 estimated
There are, in fact, quite a number of theories that purport to
explain these figures. For political theorists who regard the collapse of
the Soviet Union as the collapse of a totalitarian order, the disintegration
had to be total and the destruction of the economy inevitable. Only out
of the rubble could a new order be created. Neo-liberal economists,
who prescribed shock therapy to destroy the old economy, are rubbing
their hands in self-congratulation. In their view recovery depended on
the rapid, surgical removal of all its cancerous organs. The figures
suggest that the operation was successful even if the patient is barely
surviving. Where totalitarian theory conspires with neo-liberal
orthodoxy to celebrate revolutionary rejection of the past, evolutionary
theory looks askance at the attempt to demolish everything Soviet. For
these more cautious pundits the economic nose dive is the product of
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irresponsible policies. Finally, for those who instead of total collapse
see institutional legacies, decline is the result of rearguard resistance
from unextinguished forces in civil society.
For all their differences, and we shall examine them in greater
detail below, these four theories share two assumptions: a faith in the
virtues of a market economy and the attribution of present malaise to
defects of the Soviet order. The theory I propose in this paper takes the
opposite view: that markets can, and in Russia do, accelerate the decline
of an economy by siphoning resources from the sphere of production
into the sphere of exchange, leaving the former structurally unchanged
and quantitatively diminished. Therefore, instead of revolution or
evolution I propose a theory of industrial involution — an economic
"regression" which is not preparatory for a future resurgence but is
chronic and persistent. We are not witnessing a "transformational
recession" (Kornai, 1994), that is an interlude of anomie between
socialism and capitalism, but systemic underdevelopment.
The economic indicators are consistent with the euphoric view
that the quicker the Russian economy "bottoms out" the better, as well
as with the pessimistic view that sustained recovery will be problematic.
Macro statistics cannot discriminate between these two views since
economic indicators conceal the variegated and uneven processes of
which they are the effects. Nor can we distill these underlying processes
from political crisis and economic propaganda, which again are only
the tip of the iceberg. Instead, we must leave the helter skelter of
Moscow and St. Petersburg and venture into the regions, studying the
noisy sphere of trade and finance but also entering the hidden abode of
production. I do not apologize, therefore, for taking industrial case
material from one of the most northerly regions of European Russia —
the Komi Republic — where together with Pavel Krotov i have been
conducting research since 1991.
With the land size of California and a population of two million,
Komi is known for its raw materials and for its long history of labor
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camps that stretches back into the last century. I propose to focus on
the fortunes of two of Komi's main industries: the timber industry which
spreads throughout the territory but has its headquarters in Syktyvkar
and the coal industry which is concentrated in the most northerly part
of the Republic, beyond the Arctic Circle in and around the city of
Vorkuta. Any theory of transition must not only explain the macro
indicators but also the combined and uneven character of the transition
as, for example, displayed in these two industries.
I.Combined Involution. The effects of market forces cannot
be understood outside the pre-existing social and economic relations
that receive them. The result is a transition that so far can be divided
into three successive phases: disintegration ofthe party state when barter
flourishes; economic reform when inter-enterprise relations are
monetized; further regression when barter is restored.
2.Uneven involution. Economic decline works itself out
differently in different sectors. Although the demand for timber is much
greater than the demand for coal, and the costs of timber production
less than those of coal, the timber industry has collapsed much more
rapidly than coal. Moreover, the collapse occurs not with the
disintegration of the party state but with the onset of economic reforms.
I shall argue that these features of the transition can only be
comprehended by (I) viewing the transition as a path dependent process
in the sense that one phase sets limits on the possibilities of the next;
(2) comparing both the political implications of economic differences
and the economic implications of political differences between sectors
and (3) examining the relationship between exchange and production.
In the next part of the paper I consider the failure of conventional models
to fulfil these three requirements while in the second part I develop an
alternative theory of industrial involution.
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I: Models of Transition
When Hungarians joke that the worst thing about communism
is post-communism, they are, of course, not joking. They are saying
that the communist past has an iron grip on the present, choking off the
radiant future. This is particularly surprising since, of all the former
communist countries, Hungary was the best equipped, institutionally,
to take off into capitalism. During the thirty years before the collapse
of communism Hungarians dismantled physical planning, promoted a
thriving and legal second economy, lifted price controls and opened
up a market in consumer goods. They are now mocking their immediate
post-communist illusions that the past can be wiped out and a Western
market economy installed overnight. With their eyes rivetted on the
capitalist peaks that seemed so close, they didn't realize they were
already stumbling into the valley of post-communist depression. Still,
they have no doubt that Hungary's present malaise is due to the legacies
of communism and not to the defects of an already arrived capitalism.
As they wade through the undergrowth, they retain their faith in a
capitalist utopia, at present, beyond their reach.
Theories of the transition from socialism to capitalism diverge
in many respects but they are all caught on the horns of the Hungarian
dilemma— between visions of a capitalist future that cannot be realized
and of a socialist past that cannot be overcome. In approaching the
transition either from the standpoint of its origins or from the standpoint
of its futures they cannot comprehend the transition as sui generis
process that takes off in one direction, reverses and takes off in another
direction. Nor can they explain the unevenness of changes as between
regions or within regions between sectors of the economy.
Moreover, appearances to the contrary, debates about the future
are not about feasible scenarios but about the virtues of capitalism just
as debates about the past concentrate on the political defects of the
former Soviet Union. Russia is measured against stereotypes of Western
liberal capitalism. instead of empirically examining what it is and where
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it might be going, instead ofendowing it with theoretical and analytical
integrity of its own, too often Russia becomes "Other" — a mirror to
celebrate our own imagined distinction.
Thus, capitalism by design has two models. The first is based
on a neoclassical model of markets in which state socialism becomes
an irrational system cursed by allocational inefficiency. The appropriate
recipe, therefore, is a sufficiently big shock that shatters the remnants
of the old order. into the vacuum would rush new market institutions.
The second model is based on the new evolutionary economics which
criticizes neoclassical representations of capitalism for their static
character. Instead of allocational inefficiency the real shortcoming of
the Soviet economy was its dynamic inefficiency, its inability to
continually reconstitute itself. In this view stable external institutions
are necessary to create the framework for dynamic capitalism and the
appropriate recipe for transition is not shock therapy but piecemeal
social engineering.
Arguments about the hold of the past also revolve around two
models of political liberalism. In the first model of "polyarchy" the
virtues of the West are reduced to electoral democracy so that the Soviet
Union is condemned as totalitarian. The second model challenges the
totalitarian perspective by arguing that the stability of any political
order—Soviet or capitalist — depends on an autonomous civil society.
In this view the domination of the party state was far from complete —
it both created and depended on spontaneous organization outside its
control. The collapse of the party state left behind institutions of society.
Instead of "aftermath" and "collapse" we have "legacies" of the past.
We can present these four approaches to the transition as
dominant and challenger theories within origin and destination driven
perspectives, but they can also be distinguished by their understanding
of the relation between politics and economics. In rejecting the past
and embracing the future, totalitarian and neoliberal models separate
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00461236_v1 
Contributeur : Eliane DaphyThe Russian Road to Capitalism	 17
politics from economics whereas the challenger models focus on
continuity with the past or evolution into the future and therefore tend
not to differentiate between politics and economics.























While all these theories can explain Russia's unlininear decline
to-date they have much greater difficulty grasping the combined and
uneven character of the transition. Crude political theories of total
collapse are all thumbs, while neo-liberal economic theories of shock
therapy are handicapped by unexplicated relations between markets
and production as well as a primitive understanding of politics as deus
ex machina. Evolutionary theories are better because in condemning
shock therapy they give credence to the peculiarities of the old regime
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but they too concentrate on equally untenable prescriptions at the
expense of understanding the rythm of change and variation. Only the
society centered models which eschew normative solutions and have a
sufficiently nuanced grasp of the old order come near to regarding the
transition as a suí generis process. But in succumbing to the burdens of
the past, they overlook the simultaneous constitution of the new. It is
the distinctive combination of old and new that gives rise to the ziz-
zags of successive phases and to the divergent paths of different sectors
of the economy. For this we need a model of involution.
1. Totahtaríaп Models
in the unrevised totalitarian model the party state or what Martin
Malia (1994) calls the "ideocratíc partocracy" swallowed up the entire
life of the nation and when it disappeared the entire social order turned
to rubble. The trajectory of the Soviet Union began with the original
sin of the Bolshevik seizure of power. it was an attempt to coerce history
into the impossible task of "building socialism". From the beginning
communism was inscribed with a genetic code that entailed its inevitable
demise. "If in the end Communism collapsed like a house of cards, it
was because it had always been a house of cards" (p.496). "After the
Soviet deluge there was only a void." (p.497).
No less sweeping in his indictment of communism, Richard
Pipes (1994) is nevertheless more optimistic about the future. Whereas
the Bolsheviks exploited the past — "the country's patrimonial culture
with its acceptance of unlimited state powers, animosity to private
property ... and disrespect for the law" — postcommunist Russia shows
signs of renouncing the past — its claims to uniqueness, its missionary
zeal, its resort to violent solutions of political crises and above all its
patrimonial heritage (Pipes, 1994: 19; 49-52). Their differences
notwithstanding, for both Malia and Pipes, there is no transition —
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only a thick line between the collapse of the old and the construction
of the new.'-
Writing in the same genre Ken Jowitt (1992) also dispenses
with "transition" in favor of the biological metaphors of extinction and
genesis. The Lėninist extinction creates chaos and disorder on the one
side and possibilities for something entirely new on the other. "The
truly remarkable feature of turbulent, dislocating, traumatic Genesis
environments is the dissolution of boundaries and related identities
and the corresponding potential to generate novel ways of life" (p.266).
Pulling back from radical discontinuity, however, Jowitt appeals to a
Leninist legacy, "understood as the impact of Party organization,
practice, and ethos, and the initial charismatic ethical opposition to it
[which] favor an authoritarian, not a liberal democratic capitalist, way
of life" (p.293). In short, the collapse of the old order created an
institutional vacuum bridged by cultural legacies. Such a perspective
explains discontinuity and continuity separately but not in that
complicated combination that lends distinctiveness to the transition.
For these commentators "collapse of communism" is a platform
for their philosophies of history. None of them pay much attention to
what is going on in Russia today. Bunce and Csanadi (1993) are
different. They give more substance to the state of flux and fluidity
that engulfs communist societies caught between the aftermath of
collapse and aspirations for revolutionary transition to capitalism and
liberal democracy. They operate with a Western accounting system —
the economic and political monopoly of the party creates "deficits" in
private property, a bourgeoisie, organized interest groups, political
parties, unions, and informal associations and organizations (pp.246-
7). The transition, therefore, is replete with "contradictions, weak and
partial institutions, poorly defined interests and considerable levels of
uncertainty" (p.242). We need a special social science of liminality in
which "idiosyncratic factors" play a powerful role, "everyone feels
bereft of defenses and therefore bombarded by the environment," and
"strategic behavior" is difficult. Simply put, there can be no logic to
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the transition because the old order has collapsed and the new one has
yet to be born. These societies are in a state of anomie.'
As scholars follow transitions over time, as they examine the
regions as well as the center, subordinate as well as dominant groups,
it becomes obvious that the party did not hold the central place political
scientists accorded to it. The continuity of social order points to realms
beyond the party or only weakly controlled by the party — realms
which at least partially shape trajectories into the future. As we shall
see these moves toward a societal perspective, like the "totalitarian"
models to which they are a response, overlook the specificity of the
economic. Let us turn, then, to economic formulations of the transition.
2. Neolŕberal Theory
On the face of it, totalitarian theory's account of total collapse
is the natural bedfellow of neoliberal theory's promise of immediate
reconstruction through shock therapy. The miracle of the market turns
ashes to gold. According to totalitarian theory, "it was only to be
expected that a total system should collapse totally, and hence leave
behind a total problem ... to climb out from under this universal `rubble,'
to use Solzhenitsyn's metaphor, everything would have to be done at
once, thus creating an impossible situation where everything, logically,
had to be done first" (Malia, p.506). Neoliberals take over the baton of
history: "Both economic logic and political situation argue for a rapid
and comprehensive process of transition. History in Eastern Europe
has taught the profound shortcomings of a piecemeal approach, and
economic logic suggests the feasibility of a rapid transition." (Lipton
and Sachs, 1990: 99. Emphasis added.)
What is this compelling economic logic? Lipton and Sachs
itemize the Stalinist legacies which have to be superceded — state
ownership of economic enterprises; state regulation of prices, taxes,
investment, and interest rates; restricted private sector; distorted prices;
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over-investment in heavy industry, absence of small to medium sized
firms; central regulation of entry and exit of enterprises; excess demand
which creates barriers to private enterprise and leads to backward
integration into supply. These defects are the product of the shortage
economy whose source is soft budget constraints and whose remedy
lies in deregulating prices, tightening credit and monetary supply,
introducing bankruptcy laws, privatizing state enterprises and
liberalizing trade. It must all happen at once, "the transition process is
a seamless web"(99).
If economic logic calls for comprehensive and radical change,
why does the political situation require it? Here Lipton and Sachs
identify two barriers to the transition: populist upheaval against
inevitable economic deterioration of standards of living and bureaucratic
inertia from officials who were accustomed to running the old command
economy. So new governments should cash in on their legitimacy by
undertaking as much as possible as quickly as possible. In this way
political dissent, whether from bureaucrats or populists, will mount
their challenge only when it is too late.
According to Lipton and Sach's analysis of 1992, the prospects
for the Russian reforms depends on the balance between on the one
side ex-communists and the industrial lobby (as organized political
forces) and on the other side the government's will and capacity to
introduce reforms despite resistance. Anders Aslund extends this
manichean view of the political world by scripting all actors as carriers
either of good or of evil, favoring or obstructing progress. The forces
of light are "..the bright young Russian economists who have assumed
major government responsibilities and Western economists anxious to
support the development of democracy, market economy and private
ownership in Russia, that will eventually lead to the kind of social and
economic welfare that we are used to in the West" (Aslund and Layard,
1993: xiii). Arrayed against them are the forces of darkness: "...the
Russian state directors seem to have all the characteristics that we would
like to avoid: they have little knowledge of economics; they are firmly
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molded by the old Soviet command economy; they know nothing of
the outside world; their purpose for coming to power is to gain wealth
for themselves and their narrow constituency. It is difficult to imagine
any grouping that would be less suitable for governing a country in
transition, and it is strange that these obvious arguments have not won
the Russian debate" (Aslund, 1993:33)."
This Moscow-centric caricature of the field of political forces
reflects the moment of extrication from the past, the struggle between
defenders of the old order and protagonists of the new. It does not tap
the complex set of interests that emerge once opposition to the old
order no longer binds actors together. Adam Przeworski (1991: chapter
4) offers a more nuanced analysis of the political dynamics of the
transition. He defends shock therapy on the grounds that it will advance
further than gradual strategies, given the opposition that mounts with
the reforms' negative effects. Tracing the trajectory of popular opinion
as the reforms in Poland unfolded, Przeworski (1993: chapter 3)
concludes that the transition to a market economy will be a protracted
process, easily threatened by fears of unemployment, particularly when
social services are crumbling. Support for the reforms was eroded not
only by the social dislocation they create but also by the aggressive,
anti-democratic manner in which they were pushed through parliament.
The reforms were designed with insufficient attention to political
factors. "Economic blueprints that treat politics as nothing but an
extraneous nuisance are just bad economics" (p.134).
For all his interest in political dynamics his is still a limited
purview, confined to the strategic interplay of technocrats, politicians
in power and the population. He ignores the formation of actors and
interests within the economy itself — the fluctuating and intricate
constellation of forces among conglomerates, enterprises, trade unions,
and local government as well as their relation to the central state. Not
only does he view politics as external to economics, he also has an
abstract notion of the economy. In both respects he is like the neo-
liberals he criticizes (Przeworski, 1992). If he is more modest than
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neo-liberals when it comes to predicting economic recovery, this only
underlines his failure to study the real effects of markets rather than
than their refracted effects in public opinion. We need an analysis of
the political constitution of markets and the conditions under which
they promote growth. We need to go beyond neo-liberal economics.
3. Evolutionary Theory
Neoliberal calls for radical and incisive surgery conjure up the
communist blue-prints for change, its attempt to fashion society anew
and from above. They conceive of the transition as a sequence of
programmatic stages and ignore the real consequences of one stage for
the realization of the next. Theorists of shock therapy stand accused of
a utopianism that pays too little attention to real political forces. Their
practitioners end up forcing reforms through the Congress of Deputies
or the State Duma, or circumventing the democratic process altogether.
They come up against a contradiction. As they celebrate the eclipse of
the communist order and the disintegration of the party state, they are
also losing the administrative levers necessary to impose their will on
a recalcitrant society. As their policies shipwreck on the sands of a
weak state, they give ammunition to those who propose a more piece-
meal approach to reform which would forge compromises with society
and the economy. Evolutionary theory paints shock therapists in the
same colors as the Bolsheviks. They stand guilty of trying to do the
impossible — redesigning society from above. While evolutionary
theory is as committed to capitalism as the neoliberals, it pursues the
same end by different and more gentle means.
Such strategic and philosophical divergences between
evolutionists and neoliberals are based in profound theoretical
differences. Evolutionists join the mounting chorus of criticism of
neoclassical economics (the theoretical foundation of shock therapy)
for its assumptions of complete information, frictionless transactions,
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equilibria. Real markets don't guarantee static or allocational efficiency,
let alone promote dynamic or adaptive efficiency. If neoclassical
assumptions are not operative under normal conditions of capitalism,
they are all the more irrelevant in transitional economies. According
to Douglass North (1990) improving economic performance depends
on learning and accumulating knowledge over time and on the growth
of institutions that structure incentives. Indeed, in his Nobel Laureate
lecture North (1994) concludes that Russia's economic growth depends
more on building appropriate political institutions than on privatization.
In a similar vein, Nelson and Winter (1982) replace static neoclassical
economics with evolutionary economics based on firms that follow
"routines," while "searching" for new strategies in a "selective
environment."
Neo-classical equilibrium theory cannot see economies as
evolving dynamically. It rests on diminishing returns to scale whereas
recent theories of path dependency (Arthur, 1990, Arthur et al., 1987)
and endogenous growth (Romer, 1986, 1994) demonstrate the
importance of positive feedback and increasing returns to knowledge.
In this view there is no guarantee that the particular economic outcome
will be the "best." Once an economy is locked into a particular trajectory
there may be no way of escaping regardless of the benefits of
alternatives. Path dependency opens up the possibility of involution as
opposed to evolution.
These debates are not merely academic. They are struggles
over the source of capitalism's "success" with very different
implications for countries seeking to emulate that success. How
economists understand the dynamism of capitalism has implications
for how they understand the failure of state socialism. Lipton and Sachs
focus on the distributional irrationalities of the shortage economy that
would be repaired by market forces. But Peter Murrell (1991) argues
from empirical data that state socialism was no less efficient in
allocating resources than capitalist societies. Where it lagged was not
in allocational efficiency but in dynamic efficiency, in its capacity to
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promote innovation and technical change. What becomes important,
therefore, is an institutional environment that encourages risk taking,
that guarantees contracts, that promotes stability and confidence in the
future. Murrell (1993) claims that the success of "shock therapy" in
Poland was due to reformers' willingness to forge compromises with
society. In this way they elicited the support of key actors, namely
Solidarity and the Church. In Russia, by contrast, the reformers
confronted society as their enemy and sought to wipe out Stalinist
legacies. There, they generated stern resistance to their surgery to the
point of being forced out of office.
Evolutionary theory, therefore, proposes to compromise with
the old while creating the new. This two track strategy, whose leading
advocates are Kornai (1990, 1992), Poznanski (1993) and Murrell
(1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), Goldman (1994) involves channelling
resources into an emergent private sector while trying to harden the
budget constraints of the state sector. It is better to promote independent
entrepreneurship than rapid privatization of the state sector. However,
the two are not so independent. On the one hand, the state sector shapes
and impedes the expansion of the private sector in the transitional
economy no less than under the shortage economy. On the other hand,
those private sectors that are expanding, namely commerce and finance,
sap industrial enterprises of resources, driving down the economy as a
whole. Instead of evolutionary theory we need involutionary theory.'
Advocates of evolutionary change often take China as their
exemplary success case where decollectivization led to a booming small
scale industry alongside the state sector (Murrell, 1992b; Mckinnon,
1994; Goldman, 1994). Sachs and Woo (1994) retort that such a strategy
can only work in an underdeveloped agrarian society that has still to
undergo industrialization. It could not work in an industrialized society
like Russia where restructuring sclerotic state enterprises requires much
tougher medicine. This may be true but shock therapy comes up against
it own limits when it destroys the very institutions that are necessary to
apply the medicine. Thus, Mckinnon (1992) shows how financial
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deregulation and decentralization disable the very central controls,
necessary for the transition to a market economy.
Given that in Hungary guarded reforms has led to poor
performance, China's lesson is not so much one of gradualism but of
the necessity of the party state to engineer the socialist transition to a
market economy (Shirk, 1993). As studies of the development of
capitalism within socialist Hungary (Szelenyi, 1988; Lampland,
forthcoming) and Poland (Salameh, forthcoming; Nagengast, 1991;
Poznanski, 1993), the party state can decentralize property rights,
promote competition and create markets. in China the party state has
orchestrated "local corporatism" (Oi, 1994; Nee, 1992; Nee and Su,
1993) which advanced economic growth through "flexible budget
constraints" (Cui, 1994a, 1994b; Walder, 1994a, 1994b) or what Evans
(1995) has called "embedded autonomy." The local state is a residual
claimant and has an incentive to maximize local economic growth rather
than bargain with the center for more resources (Nolan and Xiaofeng,
1992; Walder, 1994b). All of which suggests that evolutionary theory
should pay more attention to the political organization of the local
economy and its relation to the center (Bates, 1989). By invoking
institutions, evolutionary theory moves toward an analysis of the actual
processes of transition, but in dwelling on the form of those processes,
namely their gradualism, it directs attention away from their political
and economic content.
4. Society Centered Models
Neoclassical economics deals in the currency of equilibria. it
therefore thinks of the transition in terms of a leap from an old
equilibrium to a new one. When the experiments don't work, they
invoke an arbitrary list of obstructions — from Stalinist legacies to the
IMF. History is an afterthought, conjured up to explain failure. By
contrast evolutionary theory builds history directly into its models of http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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path dependency. Even if there is no space for theorizing economic
transitions as a sui generis process, they do at least recognize the lasting
impact of origins. In this respect they are similar to the theories of
social legacies which emerge from the critique of totalitarian theory.
The reigning totalitarian modes of Soviet history have long
been challenged by social historians who insisted on the limits of the
party state. influenced by the political struggles of the 1920s, both
Stephen Cohen (1985) and Moshe Lewin (1985, 1991, 1994) drew
broader conclusions that the Soviet order not only created a realm of
spontaneous social organization but required such society for its
effective functioning. The illegal, second economy, informal bartering,
self-organization on the shop floor and the like were simultaneously
modes of resistance and incorporation into party rule. When the Soviet
state collapsed these social legacies would lend historical continuity to
a process which totalitarian theory saw only as collapse and vacuum.
These legacies of the old order come in different stripes. As in
the case of failed modernization projects in the Third World, there is a
strong temptation to invoke cultural legacies to explain continuing
backwardness. It is in this vein that Marshal Goldman concludes his
study of failed economic reforms: "Centuries of czarism and seventy
years of communism have created a combination of obstacles that makes
Russia a special case and its reform effort unusually difficult. They
have also created a citizenry conditioned to wait for action initiated at
the center, not at the periphery by individuals" (1994: 256). Cultural
stereotypes, such as Homo Sovieticus who is bereft of initiative,
dependent on the state, resents inequality, and is hostile to private
property and private enterprise are regularly and arbitrarily deployed
to explain deformations of the market economy.
More serious are the attempts to establish the continuity of
attitudes based on opinion poll research. Thus, for example, James
Millar (1994) compares the results of emigre and more recent surveys
to conclude that among the legacies of communism are belief that the
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government is responsible for assuring prosperity, employment and
welfare, that public institutions are officials are not to be trusted, that
crime is part of daily life. Even if we accept the dubious practice of
comparing results from very different survey contexts, it is not clear
that continuity is a legacy rather than rational evaluation of an
unchanging situation. Would US citizens respond any differently? To
take a case in point, in their 1990 survey of attitudes toward markets
among New Yorkers and Muscovites, Shíller, Boycko and Korobov
(1991) did find Russians to be somewhat more hostile to private business
and monetization of relations but they were no more concerned than
Americans with fairness of prices, or with income inequality and they
showed an even stronger support for economic incentives. Although
surveys of attitudes are notoriously difficult to interpret, this study shows
how easily we stereotype others on the basis of false presumptions
about ourselves. It warns against identifying attitudes with cultural
legacies, when they can be readily explained as rational responses to
situational constraints.
A second legacy is that of personnel. Much has been written
about the reproduction of elites through the transformation of political
into economic capital (Stark, 1990; Hankiss, 1990; Staniszkis, 1991)
— how party bosses reappear as economic managers, or how in the
Russian case the legislature is made up of "ex-communists." Szelenyí,
Szelenyí and Kovacs (1994) have examined these claims empirically
for Hungary and conclude that whereas political elites have changed,
economic and cultural elites have remained the same. Interestingly,
their results are at odds with Szelenyí's (1988) thesis that socialism
was an interlude of interrupted embourgeoisement. His prediction of
the re-emergence of the pre-socialist bourgeoisie in the post-socialist
phase is belied by the continuity of economic elites. These studies of
the circulation or reproduction of elites often miss the economic and
political processes that give rise to the outcomes.
A third legacy is institutional. If under the umbrella of the
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complexes, then once the party state disintegrates their divergent paths
should become transparent. This is the argument behind David Stark's
(1992) attribution of different privatization strategies (how assets are
valuated, which actors are targeted to acquire assets, what resources
are used to acquire assets) to their different paths of extrication in Poland
(compromise), Czechoslovakia (capitulation), Hungary (electoral
competition) and Germany (unification). Stark claims to formulate the
emergence of outcomes as a process, contingent on its origins.
Unfortunately, he proı»ises more than he delivers. He fails to delineate
the processes that connect the patterns of extrication backwards to their
antecedent "social structure and political organization" or forwards to
privatization strategies. His rejection of "transition" as a teleological
construct in favor of the "transformation" turns out to be an arbitrary
reduıction of outcomes to origins. Such a descriptive account of
"transformation" is not a substitute for an analysis of the process of
transition. That would require going beyond formulating the
transformation in more than negative terms — it is not collapse, it is
not designer capitalism — and building a positive theory of combined
and uneven change. it would, for example, involve delving beneath
formal privatization programs to the concrete struggles over ownership,
or discovering the new forms of market embeddedness.
Not surprisingly, when it comes to such analyses of micro
processes anthropologists are leading the way. Caroline Humphrey
(1991) describes the maize of new relations around local suzerainties,
barter and mafia that engulfed Russia even before the formal collapse
of the Soviet Union. Developing these ideas and applying them to
Romania, Katherine Verdery (1992) analogizes the transition from state
socialism as a transition to "feudalism," understood as the parcellization
of sovereignty. As she says this is only a metaphor designed to
emphasize the inadequacy of such concepts as "democracy" and
"capitalism" to capture the unique processes of decomposition and
reconstitution of politics and economics in the post-socialist order. More
recently, in her analysis of the rise and fall of the Romanian pyramid
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scheme, Caritas, Verdery (1994) shows how political interests
masquerade behind the expanding money economy, drawing a desperate
population into a vortex of speculation.
Just as evolutionary economics is a powerful antidote to
neoliberal theory, so refocusing on society provides a corrective to
totalitarian models. These challenging perspectives, particularly those
informed by ethnographic accounts, lay the basis for theories of
transition, understood as a delimited, sui generis, politically constituted
process. What they still fail to do, however, is to turn their insights into
a theory of economic trajectories, and how markets do or do not promote
economic growth.
II: Combined and Uneven Involution
The transformation of the state socialist economy is
conventionally understood as a transition from plan to market. The
conventional view, therefore, leaves out any explicit consideration of
"production" and focuses on "exchange." Indeed, economists assume
that once market institutions are in place, together with private property,
then the transformation of production will follow automatically. The
debate between neoliberals and evolutionists is about the speed and
manner of establishing market institutions. It is not a dispute about the
effects of markets.
The thesis of"industrial involution," on the other hand, claims
that market exchange does not necessarily promote the expansion or
transformation of production. To put it crudely, history suggests two
alternatives.
First, and this is a unique feature of modern capitalism, markets
promote production. Through competition they stimulate the pursuit
of profit by transforming work, incorporating technical progress.
Markets and production are locked in a virtuous cycle.
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Second, and more usually, markets leave production
structurally unchanged. Profit is pursued through the expansion of trade,
through selling dear and buying cheap. When market institutions are
growing they deflect resources from production but even when they
are stable they do not impart any dynamism to production. Production
and exchange partake in vicious rather than a virtuous cycle. This is
merchant capital.
I have already tried to demonstrate the weakness of the theories
that depend on the first alternative and my intent now is to defend the
second alternative and specifically the theory of combined and uneven
involution. i will pursue three theses.
1. State socialism is the incubator of capitalism of a more or
less primitive character depending on the length of incubation. In the
Soviet Union markets were slow to develop but nevertheless the
disintegration of the party state released tendencies toward merchant
capital (section 1 below).
II. The particular form'  of capitalism that is liberated by the
disintegration of the party state, shapes its subsequent trajectory.
Industrial involution results from the combination of market forces
with existing institutions. Each phase of the transition sets limits on
the next phase and in this sense development is path dependent (sections
2,3,4,5).
Iii. This combined involution entails uneven involution as
specific economic and political attributes of different sectors combine
with market forces to produce divergent outcomes (section 6).
1. Administered Economy
State socialism is based on the central appropriation and
redistribution of surplus (Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979). The party state
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which runs the central planning apparatus seeks to maximize what it
appropriates from and minimize what it redistributes to economic units.
Enterprises have the opposite set of interests, maximizing what is
redistributed to them and minimizing what they give up. The relations
of appropriation and redistribution work through a system of bargaining
— more or less coercive —conducted in the idiom of planning. Three
features of this administered economy are important for our discussion.
In order for planning to work at all, centrally devised goals
become specified through a system of delegation to ministries, then to
conglomerates and finally to enterprises. This gives the economy a
monopolistic character since production of the same goods and services
by many different enterprises is more difficult to coordinate. Duplication
is viewed as wasteful. Monopolies are further consolidated by the
emergent system of hierarchical bargaining over targets, success
indicators, and resources. Enterprises seek to increase their power with
the center through expansion and the monopoly of the production of
scarce goods and services.6
In the absence of hard budget constraints defining economic
failure, the compulsion to expand leads to an insatiable appetite for
resources and thus a shortage economy. Each enterprise faces constraints
from the side of supply rather than, as is usually the case with a capitalist
enterprise, from the side of demand. Enterprises, therefore, seek to
incorporate the production of inputs into their structure and circumvent
the command economy by entering into informal relations with their
suppliers. This semi-legal system of lateral barter relations is organized
by party and tolkachi.
Within the framework of an administered economy workers
exercise considerable control over the shop floor for two reasons. On
the one hand, under a regime of shortage effective work organization
requires flexible adaptation to uncertainty of inputs, of machinery and
of raw materials. On the other hand, together with policies of full
employment, shortages of labor give workers the power to resist
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managerial encroachments on their autonomy. The result is a
compromise in which workers try to realize the plan so long as managers
provide the conditions for its fulfillment and a minimal standard of
living. The enterprise presents a united front in bargaining for the loosest
plan.
2. Phase I: Unfettering Merchant Capital
What happens to an administered economy when the party
disintegrates and the center no longer commands? Far from collapsing,
preexisting monopolies are strengthened. No longer subject to control
either from the party or ministries, their monopolistic tendencies are
unfettered. Based on interviews with managers in 1990 and 1991,
Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll (1991) note that many enterprises
responded to being cut off from ıinistries by creating "new vertical
organizations [of their own] from below,"-and by consolidating or even
extending their monopolistic positions. Local conglomerates which
protect the interests of enterprises in a given industry act like huge
trading companies with a monopoly over specific resources and
products.
At the same time the break-down of the command economy
led to an increase in lateral exchanges which previously had been strictly
controlled by ministry and party. in a shortage economy where money
is of limited value trade between enterprises increasingly took the form
of barter. A given enterprise was, therefore, the stronger the more
universally desired and therefore the more barterable were its products
(Burawoy and Krotov, 1992). Johnson and Kroll also observed
backward integration into the production of supplies — the extension
of an old strategy that dealt with shortages created by the command
economy.
The third dimension of our model of state socialism concerns
the political regime of the firm. The decomposition of central planning
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00461236_v1 
Contributeur : Eliane Daphy34	 Michael Burawoy 
gives enterprises considerable autonoıııy to deal with an increasingly
uncertain environment. The common interest which bound together
different groups within the enterprise against the central planning
apparatus evaporates and in its stead different fractions of management
enter into battles over economic strategies. in this process workers
continue to be without effective representation, but each managerial
group presents its strategy in terms of the interests of all employees
(Burawoy and Hendley, 1992). Seeking the support of workers is more
than a tactic in a political struggle, it is a particularly pressing need
since workers assume even greater control of the shop floor. Under the
Soviet order workers already possessed considerable control over the
production process due to social guarantees which gave them power,
due to the autonomous work organization necessary for adapting to
shortages, and due to management's interest in plan bargaining and
obtaining supplies rather than regulating work. With the collapse of
the party, supervision at the workplace became even weaker and
managers even more attentive to problems of supply and barter. The
result was the expansion of worker control over production.
On the one hand, these three sets of changes can be seen as
deepening distinctive features of the old order. On the other hand, they
can be seen as the rise of merchant capital, since the driving force
behind the strategies of enterprises and conglomerates is the
maximization of profit through trade, by selling dear and buying cheap.
Merchant capital does not have its own distinctive system of production
but grafts itself onto preexisting systems without altering them. Work
is "put out" to the shop floor where reward is based on meeting monthly
and annual planning targets. Directors use their inherited ties to
governmental organs to protect their subsidies, credits, export licenses
and at the same time stifle independent capital accumulation.
In this first phase of the transition managers are challenged
neither from below by workers nor from the competition of other modes
of production. However, what happens to monopoly, barter and worker
control when the government introduces its economi ċ reforms? This is
the question of the next section.
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00461236_v1 
Contributeur : Eliane DaphyThe Russian Road to Capitalism	 35
3. Phase II.• іYfoпetіzatіoп'
In January 1992 the Russian government launched its shock
therapy with price liberalization. After the initial sharp increase in prices,
inflation levelled off at between 20% and 30% a month. According to
the reform program stabilization would follow hardening budget
constraints and forcing enterprises to compete or dissolve. But the
political instruments for such regulation simply did not exist: the state
had disintegrated at the same time that the economy assumed greater
autonomy. The only way the state could maintain any directive
economic role was to extend credits — effectively under ınining the
program of shock therapy. The state's fiscal levers were being used to
uphold political control and thereby reproduced soft budget constraints.
Nevertheless, important changes were afoot and none more
important than the monetization of the economy. Although high
inflation retarded the move away from barter, still enterprises
increasingly paid their bills in rubles, beginning in the second half of
1992. This gave a new role to financial intermediaries, particularly the
banking industry which took off with extraordinary vigor. Following
the reforms of 1988, the old mono-banking system was divided into
five specialist banks and then as part of Russia's political strategy to
break away from the Soviet union, it decreed the independence of all
banks in 1991 (Hellman, 1993, chs.3-5). Banks had either to dissolve
or reconstitute themselves as private entities. Most pursued the latter
alternative in the only way feasible, that is by transforming a bank's
major clients into its shareholders. At the same time conglomerates
and enterprise alliances spun off new "pocket" banks. Resources —
personnel, material as well as financial — poured into the banking
sector. Rather than sink funds into their declining enterprises, directors
channelled surplus into banks where returns were quicker and often
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As industrial enterprises reproduced themselves at a lower
scale, the banks transformed their operation. Under the Soviet regime
banks had been passive registers of material transactions. When an
enterprise needed resources of whatever kind it did not consult its bank
account but bargained with its conglomerate or if it was particularly
large it might appeal directly to the ministry. It might use party
connections to strike a barter deal with a supplying enterprise. As the
economy became monetized so banks exercised much greater control
over enterprises by limiting the withdrawal of cash and monitoring
non-cash transactions.9 Where before party, conglomerates and
ministries regulated inter-enterprise transactions, now this function was
increasingly assumed by banks.
Of course, banks were not independent actors. They were
owned by their clients who were often desperate for short term loans to
cover working capital, and in particular wages. Struggles ensued
between the interests of the owners as agents of their failing enterprises
and their interest in the success of the bank based on profitable
investment. The resolution ofthis dilemma depended upon the alliances
among the owners, and between the owners and the bank managers.
Often, but by no means always, owners of the bank would get
preferential treatment, whether in the form of cheap credits or aid in
bargaining for credits from the Central Bank. For that reason enterprises
tried to become a major shareholder in a number of banks.
Insofar as banks were able to pursue independent strategies,
they were cautious in extending credits to their industrial owners. When
inflation is running at 20% a month and interest rates are very high but
nevertheless still negative, then banks lend money for only short periods
(maximum of three months). They can only issue credits to enterprises
with rapid turnover, namely those operating in the sphere of trade —
an interesting case of adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The
ascendancy of banks, therefore, once more fuelled the expansion of
merchant capital again at the expense of industrial capital.
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In these circumstances how do industrial enterprises survive?
First, and most obviously, enterprises simply don't pay their bills and
chalk up enormous inter-enterprise arrears. In their superb study, Ickes
and Ryterman (1992 and 1993) estimate that by the summer of 1992
inter-enterprise debt amounted to between 25% and 40% of GDP. They
were reduced to a seventh by the mutual cancellation of debts in the
summer of 1992 and have grown back to previous proportions since
then. In this way enterprises obtain (almost) interest free loans; they
avoid the control of the banks which becomes particularly severe under
insolvency; they mystify their actual financial state which can be
important when it comes to privatization or government attempts at
hardening budget constraints. In this way enterprises reproduce one
another's soft budget constraints and make it next to impossible for the
state to force closure through bankruptcy.
However, inter-enterprise debt does not solve the critical
problem of wages or even problems posed by suppliers who refuse to
accept credit and instead insist on prepayment. So a second strategy is
to seek loans from government or the Central Bank. However, all such
central credit has to be channelled through the recipient's bank which
has to guarantee the credit. When enterprises default on their loan it is
the bank that assumes the repayment obligation. In return for this service
it receives a meager rate of return ("spread") of 3%. Not surprisingly,
banks are often less than enthusiastic to accept even low interest
preferential loans on behalf of a client, even if the client is also an
owner. Still, there are always banks, themselves desperately short of
resources, that will accept such loans on behalf of clients. Other banks
risk sanctions from the Central Bank by reissuing targeted central credits
at much higher interest rates.10
Banks are placed under contradictory pressures by the Central
Bank. On the one hand, they are expected to guarantee state credits to
insolvent enterprises. On the other hand they are held to hard budget
constraints by the intensive supervision from the Central Bank. First,
each bank has to be registered with and receive a license from the
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Central Bank. Second, there are static measures of a bank's activities
based on prudential norms. But third, there is also the more important
dynamic control of a bank's liquidity. Each bank has to hold a
correspondent account, carefully monitored by the Central Bank  for
suspicious activity and to assure overall solvency. Violation of
acceptable practices can incur fines, or increases in the reserve ratio
above 20% (the proportion of its deposits each bank has to hold in the
Central Bank) or, in some cases, the Central Bank can close down a
bank.
In short, during 1993, the Central Bank strove to impose hard
budget constraints on commercial banks which in turn tried to transfer
those constraints to their clients. But the impact was a drop in the ocean,
given the escalating inter-enterprise debt and the credits issued by the
Central Bank itself. Instead of party, conglomerate and ministry
involved in a complex exchange of material goods and services, now
the government and the Central Bank handed out financial credits to
those with the political influence to obtain them. Paradoxically,
monetization of the economy simply rationalized the system of soft
budget constraints.
4. Phase II: Privatization
Economic reforms introduced a money economy, promoted
the expansion of banking which drew off resources from industry but
without subjecting enterprises to hard budget constraints. While
monetization and banking were accelerating industrial involution, how
was privatization affecting the internal organization of enterprises? As
Kabalina et al. (1994) and Poznanski (1993: 417) argue, privatization
has conventionally followed restructuring while in Russia the order is
reversed. According to neoliberal theory privatization was expected to
turn loss making enterprises into profitable ones." What have been the
actual effects of privatization?
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Learning from Eastern Europe, reformers quickly realized that
finding outside buyers for Soviet enterprises would be impossible. If
privatization was to occur, enterprises would have to be given away.
But to whom? Beginning in August 1992, all citizens of Russia were
given privatization vouchers worth 10,000 rubles. These were to be
used to purchase shares of companies directly or invested in some
mutual investment fund. Enterprises had to draw up privatization plans
based on one of three variants. By far the most popular was the second
variant in which employees purchased 51% of their enterprise, with
the remainder reverting to the state and to be auctioned off at a later
date. There was no realistic way of evaluating enterprises. They were
often given a price that the employees together could afford if each
used four vouchers. Employees assumed 51% ownership at little cost
to themselves. Shares were distributed in a relatively egalitarian manner,
usually in relation to seniority and income. However, top managers
often secured a disproportionate number of shares.
The effect of this voucher privatization was to give juridical
status to a process of prior decentralization. We noted earlier that the
disintegration of the party state had already given enterprises the
autonomy to pursue their own strategies in an increasingly uncertain
political and economic environment. As the economic recession
deepened, as working capital became unobtainable except by going
even further into debt, managers' time horizons became even shorter
and they began stripping their enterprises of assets, often for personal
gain. This occurred irrespective of whether the enterprise was "efficient"
or "inefficient," potentially "profitable" or not. Privatization accelerated
an indiscriminate industrial involution.
If public bodies do not have the capacity or the interest to halt
the destruction of the economy, the labor collective can still restrain
cannibalization when it comes out of workers' pockets. If privatization
gives managers the opportunity to channel investment into commercial
and speculative ventures, at the same time they become increasingly
beholden to their employees. First, as they become embroiled in the
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search for materials and credits, managers become increasingly
dependent on workers who control the shop floor. Given the
idiosyncratic character of socialist production workers monopolize
enterprise specific skills and knowledge and they are not easily replaced.
Second, directors know that so long as they don't have a
controlling package of shares, employees can always remove them.
When the furniture factory, where I worked in 1991, was privatized
(end of 1992) the labor collective ejected the incumbent managerial
team. It had been one of the highest paying factories in Syktyvkar but
at the time of privatization wages were already slipping behind other
enterprises. Employees used the occasion of privatization to elect a
new director. Conscious of his precarious position the new director did
everything he could to appease the labor collective but in the process
drove the enterprise further into debt, so much so that it became
effectively bankrupt. So he too was ejected at a shareholders' meeting
a year and half into his tenure when the factory was virtually at a
standstill. Privatization was the lightening rod for struggles in other
enterprises, including the largest and richest mine in Vorkuta. Workers
may be able to limit managerial pillaging, but they cannot compel
managers to adopt longer time horizons, particularly as the very
existence of enterprises is hanging by a thin thread.
Managers seek the support of their labor collective for a third
reason. When it comes to extracting government credits, wielding the
labor collective as a threat can still be a powerful bargaining chip. In
the coal industry, for example, management frequently used, and
therefore encouraged, strikes to wring material concessions from
government. The director of the Russian Central Bank in Komi is
inundated with telegrams, phone calls, delegations from enterprise
directors appealing for funds that would save an entire community from
destitution.
We see, therefore, that privatization along with market forces,
far from transforming enterprises, have been an effective vehicle for
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their conservation, for cementing the old alliance between managers
and workers. On occasion workers can act as a restraint on managerial
pillaging because they have interests in the survival of the enterprise
and because they have the capacity to enforce their will. More usually,
workers rapidly become disillusioned with their bosses and turn to their
own form of pillage, stealing raw materials, finished products, and
tools from "their" factory. Each side becomes trapped in a downward
spiral of ever shorter time horozions. Privatization has proven to be
the very opposite of an elixir — indeed has spread the malignancy of
industrial involution.
5. Phase III: Mafia and the Restoration of ß&irier
The second phase of monetization and privatization can be
regarded as period of easy credits that are dispensed on the basis of
political influence to now independent enterprises. in the third phase,
which begins in 1994 inflation falls, interest rates become positive and
central credits are increasingly scarce. In other words budget constraints
become harder but rather than leading to capital accumulation and
investment, rather than promoting efficiency and productivity, the
economy is driven backwards to barter and forwards into the claws of
the mafia.
Enterprises continue to chalk up increasing debts with each
other. Since most monetary transactions between enterprises are
conducted in the non-cash form (beznalichny) which is not convertible
into cash (nalichny), since any non-cash transaction has to pass through
banks, and since banks are effectively monitored and forced to operate
under hard budget constraints, the result is that bank accounts are frozen
or impounded. Enterprises have no interest in monetary transactions
since any money entering their accounts is immediately siphoned off
to the state in taxes or utility bills. Increasingly, enterprises operate
outside the banking circuit through barter or, if they are lucky, through
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direct cash transactions. An increasing proportion of the economy
moves into the shadows.
The restoration of barter and of the second economy more
generally is not a legacy of the past but created anew by centralized
attempts to impose hard budget constraints. This also has the
consequence of increasing the operations of the mafia. When the state
is neither able to enforce contracts nor able to compensate non-
compliance with credits, creditors seek other extra-legal means of
appropriating what is their's. When the political weakness of the state
is compounded by fiscal restraint, then enterprises increasingly enlist
criminal gangs to enforce contracts. This tendency is reinforcing since
refusal to fulfil obligations can also be sustained by access to extra-
legal force. The survival of any enterprise depends upon engaging an
effective security service which further eats away at productive
investment. Protection rackets spread uncontrollably to form the basis
of a shadow, privatized state which employs soldiers, police, secret
police, security police from the official state but now in second higher
paying jobs. Again the greatest profits are to be found in the sphere of
circulation and come at the expense of production.
How is the timber industry affected by this third phase? Since
wood has multiple purposes and is always in wide demand, the
disintegration of industry has spurred the increase of barter. But now it
is the barter of bankruptcy rather than the barter of success. In 1991,
the furniture factory we studied was bartering its wall units for all sorts
of scarce goods, from sugar to places in children's summer camp, from
mirrors to textile paper. Today it is bankrupt, indebted to the tune of a
million dollars, bereft of working capital, and unable to sell its products.
The only way it can maintain any production at all is to barter its wall
units for raw materials, pay the few employees that still work at low
wages, on an irregular basis and often in kind. Its second new director
is hoping to find some foreign investor or somehow obtain a credit
from a bank or government. Both strategies are long shots.
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The coal industry has not experienced such a precipitous
decline. In 1992 foreign barter was at its height and Western consumer
goods flooded into the make-shift kiosks that lined the streets. Since
then export of coal has fallen from over 17% to 10% of output.
increasing costs, particularly freight charges but also the chain of pay-
offs to trading enterprises have cut profit margins so that export is
barely worthwhile. Although the mines are heavily in debt, still there
is more room for manoeuvre because the conglomerate jointly controls
their accounts. The conglomerate acts on behalf of all the mines to
extract payments from the steel industry. Still, the mining industry is
only too aware of the rapid fall in its bargaining power with the Russian
government. it is, therefore, beginning to turn to the regional Komi
government which can more effectively use its regional monopoly over
scarce resources to blackmail the center.
David Woodruff (1994) has studied analogous moves around
electric power companies in three very different regions —
Krasnoyarsk, Vladivostok and Samara. In each region barter has been
restored as a mode of exchange as enterprises are forced to operate
outside the monetary sphere controlled by banks. Even more interesting,
however, is the way inter-enterprise arrears have migrated to the
electricity generating companies because they have the greatest
influence and leverage with Moscow. Tightening credit supplies is
consolidating bargaining with the center.
The resurrection of barter and the escalation of freight charges
threatens to balkanize Russia into more cohesive regional units. Trade
relations intensify wiıthin regions and diminish between regions. What
holds Russia together is no longer any political force or relations in
economic interdependence but the fraying thread of financial
transactions between center and region. As the cheap central credits of
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6. Uneven Involution: Timber versus Coal
So far I have argued that the three phases — disintegration,
monetization and privatization and regression — have combined to
accelerate economic involution. Rather than the absence of market
forces it is their presence which has propelled Russia into an economic
quagmire. One might expect, therefore, that involution is less or more
rapid depending on the capacity of economic sector or region to resist
market forces. This is born out in the comparison of timber and coal
industries within Komi. While both industries have declined, the
collapse has been much more rapid in timber than in coal. Thus coal
output has fallen by only 25% between 1990 and 1994 whereas the
production of raw timber fell by 44% between 1990 and 1993 and a
further 42% in the first six months of 1994. Why? The answer is tied
to the survival of the conglomerate: in the timber industry it has
disintegrated while in the coal industry it continues to be effective.
The timber industry lost the coordinating center which
controlled the commodity chain linking lumber camps to the timber
farms and from their to the processing plants, furniture factories and
paper mill. The conglomerate organized the distribution of timber; it
provided transportation, professional and technical services; it was
responsible for allocating supplies — from machinery to food. It
disintegrated because lumber camps and timber enterprises resented
the directing arm of the conglomerate which unilaterally dictated the
terms of exchange between their timber on the side and supplies, wages,
machinery etc. on the other side. The lumber camps saw themselves as
subsidizing the factories further up-stream — the processing plants,
the furniture factories, the paper mill. While they were immersed in a
shortage economy it appeared that the demand for timber was
inexhaustible. Only the iron grip of the conglomerate lay between them
and riches. Therefore, with the price liberalization and privatization,
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Freed from the monopsony of the conglomerate they assumed
they could sell their wood for higher prices. However, they quickly
discovered first, that they were not the only ones to increase prices.
Their own suppliers were doing the same. Second, their customers, the
processing plants, further up the timber chain could not pay their bills,
not least because they no longer received their customary subsidies
from the conglomerate. They turned to other buyers outside the territory
but the risińg cost of freight made their timber prohibitively expensive.
As a result the timber industry took a nose dive.
The situation in the coal industry was very different. The mines
were not links in an interdependent chain. The conglomerate was not
involved in organizing relations of economic dependence among the
mines. It was a center for dispensing services, defıning prices, and
most important for distributing quotas for exports and subsidies from
the state. By contrast the timber conglomerate had no monopoly over
export quotas nor did it have access to subsidies whether from republican
or federal governments. It had to rely on internal redistribution — taking
from the lumber camps and giving to the processing and manufacturing
plants. The centrifugal forces were much greater in timber than in coal.
So long as the coal conglomerate had monopoly access to
enormous resources from the state, mines had every interest in belonging
to the conglomerate. However, even here the richesť mine defected at
the end of 1991 to avoid subsidizing the poorer mines. It struck up its
own relation to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. Its defection
encouraged other mines to plan their own break away and form a
conglomerate of their own — one that would not be weighed down by
costs of running the social sphere. Defection rumors were at their height
in 1992 but by 1994 all the mines had regrouped behind the
conglomerate as their only hope for survival. In the face of falling
subsidies, escalating freight charges and impending closures the mines
had lost any illusions that life would be better outside the conglomerate.
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In other words, the hierarchical chain of the timber industry
fostered fantasies of independence. Each calculated the benefits of
defection without taking into account the effects of other defections.''-
Universal defection led to the conglomerate's disintegration precisely
in an industry where such a coordinating center was essential. Where
the timber conglomerate was necessary for economic integration, the
coal conglomerate was necessary for political unity in bargaining for
concessions from the federal government. To this end it was able to
take advantage of the concentration of the coal industry in two
neighboring cities, particularly the city of Vorkuta, as well as of the
political influence of miners. In 1989 and again in 1991 the miners of
Vorkuta had been the most militant and radical in demanding the
transformation of the old order. On their shoulders and those of the
miners of the Kuzbass and Donbass, Yeltsin had come to power in
1991 in what was then the Russian Republic of the Soviet Union. At
least in 1992 and 1993 this legacy and the threat of further disruption
gave the conglomerate greater bargaining power with Moscow. By 1994
the political power of thė miners had waned as the government began
to ignore striking miners. Increasingly defenseless against government
plans for drastic cuts in coal production, they could only benefit from
rallying behind the conglomerate (Burawoy and Krotov, 1993, 1995).
This comparison shows how the politics of a given industry,
shaped by ownership relations on the one side and economic structure
on the other, determine its fate. It also suggests that hanging on to
institutions from the past may be the most rational strategy for survival
during the transition to a market economy. In the above portrait the
timber industry suffered from its short sighted embrace of individualistic
strategies while the resuscitated coal conglomerate attempts to cut losses
by a rational coordination of the industry in face of market challenges.
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III: Overdeveloped Markets and Underdeveloped Economy
Contrast the analysis above with Aslund's:
The Russia emerging today is very different from what
pessimists have prophesied. It is not falling apart but coming
together. The new political institutions function. Strikes are
rare, and no serious social unrest is on the horizon. Incredibly,
most of the Russian economy, measured by either employment
or output, has been privatized in just two years. Russia has
already become a market economy, but one in the midst of a
long-overdue and massive restructuring. in short, Russia has
undergone fundamental changes and appears to be on the right
track. (Aslund, 1994:58).
One does not have to disagree with the facts in order to come
to very different conclusions. Russia may not be falling apart as the
pessimists prophesied but it is held together by an ever more slender
thread. The new political institutions do function but they are impotent
and largely irrelevant. There may be no serious unrest but individual
survival strategies are making it more difficult for the majority to survive
— now and in the future. Most of Russian industry is indeed privatized
but that has only accelerated industrial decline. Finally, Russia has
become a market economy but one that devours its material base as it
expands. According to Aslund the quicker production falls the sooner
it will "bottom out" and therefore, the closer the arrival of the radiant
future. Neoliberals are giving new meaning to an old socialist slogan:
"the worse the better."
Aslund is optimistic because the Russian government has
followed his advice. The elements of shock therapy are all in place:
price liberalization and privatization followed by stabilization. By
definition this must spell success just as the propagandists of state
ownership claimed that planning ipso facto would spell the success of
socialism. Aslund is living in a never never world. Capitalism was not
allowed to incubate within the socialist economy, and a series of path
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dependent paradoxes emerged. In phase i, disintegration of the party
state led to the strengthening of features of the old Soviet order —
monopolies, barter and worker control. A market appeared but one in
which enterprises sought profits from trade. In phase II price
liberalization and privatization led to the monetization of the economy.
Resources were channelled from industry into banking where returns
were greater and more rapid. With ever shorter time horizons bank
credits fuelled the expansion of trade at the expense of industry. On
the other hand, in order to maintain national political integrity, state
loans were distributed on the basis of need and influence. Economic
reform rationalized soft budget constraints rather than abolishing them.
Phase III saw the hardening of budget constraints but instead of
promoting economic growth it now led to regression. Transactions
moved back from the monetary sphere to barter while the mafia took
over regulation from the state. Exchange continued to sap production
of what little energy it retained. Those industries which successfully
clung to old relations were able to limit involution.
It is a premise of the neo-classical faith that markets lead to
economic development. When they don't it is because the markets are
"abnormal." In this case the downward economic spiral is a function
of a "transformational recession" — a problem of transition that will
give way to economic expansion once markets have settled own.
Alternatively, the markets themselves are deformed, "backward" or
"primitive," and so they have pathological consequences. I have tried
to show that it is not the abnormal features of the market but their true
essence that generates involution. Rather than the underdevelopment
of markets it is their overdevelopment that has bled the productive
economy of resources, capital, investment. There is no market road to
a modern market economy.
This is an old story. Studying the transition to modern
capitalism Marx and Weber agree on one point, that the real revolution
comes not with the rise of markets but with what Weber calls "the
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modern capitalism from the capitalism of promoters, speculators,
adventurers, concession hunters, in short, merchant capitalism. There
is nothing automatic or necessary about the transition from this merchant
capital to what Weber calls modern, Western, rational bourgeois
capitalism. Just as in Europe merchant capital most usually reinforced
pre-capitalist production, so in Russia the expansion of trade and
commerce has conserved rather than transformed the Soviet enterprise
(Clarke et al., 1993). The only difference is that the world context has
changed. Whereas merchant capital was once the leading edge of
economic development now it is associated with underdevelopment
(Kay, 1975). Reproduction without technical progress is much more
costly in a world dominated by advanced capitalism than in a world
dominated by trading companies.
The administered economy had its defects but to reduce the
failure of reform to the "legacies" of communism is to assume that
once the past is cleared away Russia will return to "normality" and its
economy expand. This ignores the dynamics of the transition itself as
well as the international context of advanced capitalism. Once these
factors are taken into account, involution rather than revolution or
evolution is Russia's destiny for the forseeable future. Social scientists
have demonstrated many negative features about communism, but they
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Notes
'1 take the idea of involution from Clifford Geertz, Agrarian Involution. There
is involution when "the economy functions much less effectively but (or more
exactly, because) it is the same economy" (Geertz, 1963: 125).
2Pipes (1994: 49) does acknowledge that Russia continues to suffer from the
absence of public spirit and from weakness of patriotic sentiments—cultural-
psychological problems lodged in the nation's collective memory.
'Bunce (1993) denies the relevance to post-Soviet states of the literature on
the transition from bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America and Southern
Europe. She writes that O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) framework is future
oriented and belittles the importance of the socialist past. Still Bunce and
Csanadi follow O'Donnell and Schmitter in two important respects: first, they
take the standpoint of elites and second, they focus on the uncertainty of the
transition to democracy. If they do differ from O'Donnell and Schmitter it is
in regarding elite actors as hapless victims of liminality rather than strategic
players in a "multi-layered chess game." Recent writings by Schmitter (1994)
and O'Donnell (1993) go beyond their early interest in transition to the study
of the consolidation and institutionalization of democracy. Here they explicitly
seek to incorporate the experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union and meet some of Bunce's criticisms. From a focus on strategic elites,
acting without reference to the previous order, they emphasize social legacies
inherited from earlier regimes and in this way give credence to the Soviet
past.
'In a curious about turn Aslund (1994) embraces the replacement of "bright
young economists"(Gaidar and Fyodorov) by gray apparatchiks
(Chernomyrdin) in 1994 as a sign of the success of the reforms. Russia has
entered "the stage of ordinary politics, when interests are more important than
ideas" (1994: 70). Visionaries have fulfilled their mission and they must hand
over power to pragmatic, consensus building politicians. All this is supposed
to have happened within a year.
'Reflecting on Hungary's poor economic performance, including falling
productivity, declining output and rates of investment, Kornai (1994) begins
to question whether spontaneous market forces will lead to economic growth.
Departing from his life-long opposition to state involvement in the economy,
he now makes a half U-turn advocating state led investment. To be sure the
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"transformational recession" is an artifact of the uncertainty and fluidity in
which market institutions have not developed. There is no suggestion of any
permanent industrial involution. It is ironic that while Hungary's Minister of
Finance in the new socialist government is a devotee ofneo-liberalism, Kornai,
Hungary's leading neoliberal economist, should be turning back to the state.
'In a fascinating comparative study of industrial concentration, Brown, Ickes,
and Ryterman (1993), conclude that the Soviet economy possessed neither
the very small but also neither the very large enterprises found in the US.
Monopoly emerged from segmented and regionally defined markets.
'This section is based on research into banking in Komi from January to July,
1993.
"Hellman (1993) presents the best analysis of the evolution of tl ıe commercial
banks in Russia, showing how pocket banks grow out of their pockets to
challenge their owners.
"One of the legacies of Soviet banking is the non convertability between cash
(nalichny) and non-cash (beznalich ııy) money.
ı"Тhere are also banks that are essentially pocket banks of thė regional
governments which are forced to assume bad loans.
"Cuí (1994a) has argued that neoclassical economics is an ecoııoınícs of barter
and, ironically enough, underestimates the significance of money. Including
money as a factor in its own right, he shows how privatization in the conditions
of economic recession in postsocialism cannot have the intended consequences
of hardening budget constraints. His theoretical analysis dovetails well with
my empirical observations.
12Тhis is an example of what Elster calls the fallacy of composition in which:
"..economic agents tend to generalize locally valid views into invalid global
statements, because of a failure to perceive that causal relations that obtain
ceteris paribus may not hold unrestrictedly" (1985:19; 487-490). Or more
succinctly: "the belief that causal mechanism valid for any particular member
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L'Espace de l'économie privée: la structure et les oppositions.1
Bien que l'espace de l'économie non étatique ait commencé à se
constituer depuis huit ans déjà, il est très difficile de dégager sa structure
d'une façon claire, à l'exception de la classification ordinaire utilisée
par la statistique. Cet espace est toujours en train de se transformer;
comme le montre l'évolution du secteur de propriété collective/
coopérative, qui, très petit à ses début, s'agrandit chaque jour grâce,
notamment, à la privatisation, mais aussi grâce à la croyance, de plus
en plus forte avec le temps, dans l'irréversibilité de ces transformations.
La division classique de l'espace économique entre industrie, commerce,
communication, finances, services, etc. reste valable seulement dans
le cadre d'une analyse synchronique, mais l'approche diachronique
dévoile des rapports complexes entre ces grands secteurs et leur relatif
déséquilibre interne. C'est pourquoi dans notre recherche nous avons
tâché de recourir à ces deux démarches: diachronique, pour obse rver
la genèse de la propriété privée et du patronat en Russie, et synchronique,
pour analyser les positions des patrons dans l'espace de l'économie
privée.
L'espace de l'économie privée s'est constitué progressivement
de telle façon qu'on peut faire ressortir plusieurs étapes dans son histoire:
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celle des coopératives, celle des petites entreprises (semí-étatiques);
celle des bourses; celle des banques et des sociétés d'investissement,
celle des grandes entreprises industrielles privatisées. Chacune de ces
étapes a connu un énorme développement ("boom") sur un temps plus
ou moins court et a été suivie de faillites en nombre relativement
important. il est difficile de citer des chiffres exacts, car les statistiques
à ce propos sont très fragmentaires ; cependant on peut trouver dans la
presse des publications sur les échecs les plus scandaleux (par exemple,
la fameuse société d'investissement "MMM"). Ainsi, en 1994, environ
40 banques ont été fermées après avoir connu une faillite épouvantable
qui a également frappé leur clientèle. Actuellement, après "adoption
d'une loi sur les faillites, on s'attend à de nombreuses faillites des
entreprises industrielles qui souffrent beaucoup de la crise économique
avec une chute de leur production qui peut atteindre 25 à 60% durant
Ies deux dernières années, soit en moyenne environ 50% par rapport à
1989. Selon les données de Goscomstat la productivité dans les
entreprises privatisées a également subi une forte baisse, quoique un
peu moins que dans les entreprises étatiques (d'environ 40%).
Les mouvements qui s'observent dans ia structure de l'économie
privée consistent parfois dans l'abandon assez fréquent d'une production
pour une autre, mais aussi dans le changement de statut juridique pour
les entreprises déjà situées dans ce secteur. On voit, par exemple, qu' à
Moscou le nombre d'entreprises en location a fortement diminué l'année
dernière: de 11585 en 1991, puis 6671 en 1992, í1 est passé à 1246 en
1993. Par contre le nombre de sociétés et de compagnonneries par
actions, ainsi que de sociétés mixtes, s'est beaucoup développé. On
peut supposer, à partir des données du Comité de statistique de Moscou,
que ces entreprises en location, soit ont changé de statut juridique, soit
ont été fermées.
L'analyse rétrospective de la constitution de l'espace économique
privé et, notamment, des mécanismes d'organisation des entreprises
privées fait apparaître une dimension fondamentale qui structure cet
espace: la proximité des entreprises privées par rapport à I'Etat. Ainsi,
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le premier pôle est constitué par les organismes privés qui sont proches
de l'Etat, notamment ceux qui sont historiquement créés auprès des
entreprises étatiques ou sur leur base (entreprises-satellites, banques,
associations, fondation, entreprises privatisées), mais aussi ceux qui
ont été créés par d'anciens fonctionnaires d'Etat (différentes sociétés
privées). L'autre pôle s'organise autour des entreprises situées loin de
l'Etat et regroupe principalement des petites entreprises créées par des
entrepreneurs "nouveaux venus" ou par les "gens des affaires"
(économie de l'ombre). La classification selon ce principe renvoie
également à différentes stratégies de développement de l'entreprise (que
nous observerons plus en détail ultérieurement), à savoir une politique
de réinvestissement des plus-values, une orientation vers l'économie
extérieure ou nationale, une politique fiscale, une sélection des cadres
d'entreprise, et ainsi de suite.
L'espace des entreprises privées
A partir des informations recueillies grâce aux interviews
approfondies de patrons et grâce au dépouillement de documents publiés
(revues, journaux), on a essayé de construire de façon provisoire et
méthodique cet espace des entrepreneurs privés. Les entretiens avec
des patrons d'entreprises et des présidents d'associations ont porté sur
leurs trajectoires sociales et professionnelles ainsi que sur les formes
de capitaux, culturel, social, économique, dont les patrons sont dotés,
avant et après leur accès à l'activité d'entrepreneur. L'examen des
positions hiérarchiques (dominants/dominés) qu'occupent dans l'espace
de l'économie non étatique les patrons interrogés confirme l'influence
primordiale du capital bureaucratique, c'est-à-dire d'une espèce
spécifique de capital lié à l'expérience qu'un patron a accumulée durant
son temps d'exercice à un poste auprès du pouvoir étatique et aussi le
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L'espace des entreprises non étatiques, qui s'organise selon un
axe public/privé, révèle deux stratégies différentes de la part des
entreprises situées à des pôles opposés. Ainsi, au pôle public se trouvent
premièrement les entreprises privatisées dont la direction reste d'abord
entre Ies mains des anciens directeurs (c'est-à-dire ce pôle se définit
selon le facteur de l'appartenance du patron au corps social ) et
deuxièmement les entreprises dont le statut juridique de société par
actions est associé à la proximité par rapport au pôle public. On y trouve
aussi des banques (surtout les anciennės banques "de branche"), dont
l'existence et la prospérité dépendent directement des crédits accordés
par I'Etat à leurs entreprises clientes.
Les stratégies de développement des entreprises situées près du
pôle public résident souvent dans des actions de pression systématiques
auprès des organismes gouvernementaux ("lobbysme") pour obtenir
des crédits d'Etat ou des facillités. Dans ce cas les directeurs ou les
banquiers, en tant que corps sociaux déjà constitués, jouent sur leurs
relations personnelles avec les autorités de différents niveaux.
L'autre groupe principal d'entreprises proches du pôle public se
compose de petites entrėprises privées créées principalement par des
gens qui exercaient auparavant une activité intellectuelle: chercheurs,
professeurs, journalistes, juristes. Ce sont les gens qui se sont lancés
dans la création d'une entreprise personnelle dans un but d' "auto-
réalisation", c'est-à-dire avec l'intention de renouveler leur activité
professionnelle. C'est le cas, par exemple, des maisons d'édition, des
créations de journaux ou de show-business, dont les patrons tiennent à
cumuler le capital spécifique de reconnaissance du public et du milieu
professionnel. La politique de recrutement des cadres pour ces
entreprises est marquée par une sélection de spécialistes ayant une
expérience dans un domaine donné et par la création d'équipes, politique
qu'on définit parfois comme "rationnelle" ou "occidentale".
D'une manière générale, les entreprises situées vers le pôle public
manifestent une attitude d'ouverture. Ils acceptent Ies entretiens avec
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des sociologues et des journalistes, la publication des interviews dans
la presse (qui ont souvent pour eux une fonction publicitaire indirecte).
Le pôle privé regroupe des entreprises bien différentes: d'un côté,
des petites entreprises dont les patrons n'ont pas de relations avec les
structures étatiques, qui sous-traitent souvent, mais dont l'activité est
légale; de l'autre, des entreprises dont le fonctionnement est lié à des
affaires en marge de la loi, c'est-à-dire, on peut trouver ici des entreprises
qui ne sont pas enregistrées juridiquement, soit parce que leurs activités
ne sont pas autorisées (par exemple, absence de licence), soit parce
que leurs affaires elles-mêmes sont délictueuses. Le capital économique
de ces entreprises est très inégal, mais elles ont toutes en commun
d'être passées dans un secteur complètement privé et d'avoir abandonné
le public. L'abandon du secteur public se manifeste, par exemple, dans
le fait que leurs emprunts ne reposent presque jamais sur les crédits
bancaires, mais sur les réseaux d'amitié ou de solidarité. Les patrons
de ces entreprises préfèrent aussi n'adhérer à aucune association ou
aucun parti politique régroupant des entrepreneurs. De même leur
politique d'embauche privilégie le recrutement souvent sans contrat
précis de gens qu'ils connaissent bien et avec qui ils entretiennent des
relations informelles, de confiance2, ce qui, dans un grand nombre de
cas, entraîne malentendus et ruptures des relations amicales aussi bien
que d'affaires.
Autre différence importante entre les patrons d'entreprises: leur
emploi du temps. Si les patrons des entreprises proches du pôle public
consacrent une grande partie de leur temps de travail et en déhors du
travail à des rencontres, réunions, séminaires, soirées et réceptions plus
ou moins officielles, où ils accroissent ou consolident le cercle de leurs
relations utiles, les patrons des entreprise proches du pôle privé
consacrent une part essentielle de leur temps à des rencontres privées
avec leurs partenaires et passent leur temps libre en restant dans une
sphère exclusivement privée, en famille ou en compagnie de leurs amis
ou encore dans l'anonymat des casinos et des bars.
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La deuxième opposition observable dans l'espace de l'économie
privée, l'opposition "intérieur /extérieur", divise les entreprises selon
leur orientation générale sur le marché national ou sur le marché
international. Cette opposition se manifeste immédiatement à travers
l'opposition entre production des biens et distribution des marchandises,
c'est-à-dire dans le sens économique traditionnel de l'opposition "expo rt
- import" ; mais cette opposition n'est pas purement économique; elle
se révèle aussi dans les rapports sociaux. Ainsi, l'analyse des entretiens
de patrons montre qu'ils ont des. stratégies opposées par rappo rt au
placement des bénéfices: les patrons dotés d'un important capital
économique et relativement pauvres en capital culturel donnent la
priorité au placement de leurs bénéfices hors du pays (dépôt de leur
argent dans les banques étrangères; achat d'immeubles à l'étranger,
investissement dans des entreprises étrangères ou création de petites
entreprises à l'étranger), tandis que les patrons des entreprises dotés de
plus de capital culturel qu'économique s'orientent, pour la majorité des
cas, vers le marché intérieur (réinvestissement des bénéfices dans leur
entreprise ou participation à des entreprises nationales, efforts, pour
attirer les investissements étrangers dans les entreprises nationalles,
recherche d'une position stable et de la reconnaissance à l'intérieur du
pays). Ce facteur marque aussi une opposition entre le capital industriel
ou financier (et, du même coup, les patrons des entreprises industrielles
ou des banquiers) et le capital de marchandises (les commerçants).
Ces stratégies d'investissement renvoient à des prises de position
différentes par rapport à l'avenir du pays et à son développement, mais
aussi par rapport à sa propre position dans la société et, en fin de compte,
par rapport à une émigration possible: partir ou rester. Elles sont aussi
des prises de position politique puisqu'elles mettent en jeu la confiance
des nouveaux entrepreneurs dans le régime actuel.
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Les ressources au fondement de la construction
des entreprises privées
L'analyse des entretiens recueillis lors de cette recherche3 nous
montre que l'importance relative des différentes espèces de ressources
qui peuvent être investies dans une entreprise privée n'est pas identique
aux différentes phases de la constitution du secteur économique. Le
capital économique qui doit être, semble-t-il, fondamental dans la
constitution d'une entreprise ou d'une société joue en fait un rôle de
second plan dans nombre de cas. Ce fait paradoxal s'est manifesté
d'abord dans la période de création des petites entreprises de type NTTM
(1986-1990), mais í1 s'est produit aussi dans la période de privatisation
et d'actionnarisation des entreprises étatiques avec le mécanisme de
privatisation par vouchers (1992-1993). Ainsi, dans le cas des NTTM,
on a remarqué que la base matérielle (machines, location, etc.) de ces
petites entreprises leur a été cédée au début par des comités de
Komsomol et du P.C. C'est aussi le cas des petites entreprises-satellites
créées auprès des grandes entreprises qui ont obtenu de leur entreprise-
mère une grande partie de leur base matérielle; cela est vrai dans le cas
de la privatisation des entreprises étatiques (y compris des grandes)
fondées sur les chèques de privatisation, surtout quand la part de
propriété cédée en échange des vouchers est assez importante (de 15 à
50%); et cela est également vrai pour nombre de banques qui ont été
"rebaptisées" après la réforme du système bancaire en 1990/91 et sont
devenues des sociétés par actions. Dans tous ces cas, les nouveaux
propriétaires n'ont pas eu (ou presque) à investir de capital économique
dans la création de leur entreprise et ce sont d'autres espèces de
ressources qui ont joué le rôle primordial dans ce processus. Cela dit,
on peut découvrir que l'importance et le volume du capital économique
investi sont différents dans le cas de dirigeants d'organismes étatiques
reconvertis en patrons privés et dans le cas d'entrepreneurs venus dans
le secteur de l'économie privée à partir de positions dominées.
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D'une façon générale i1 faut remarquer que toutes les études sur
les entrepreneurs et les élites économiques en Russie rencontrent
d'énormes difficultés dans la collecte de données sur le volume du
capital économique d'un patron quel qu'il soit ou même d'une entreprise.
il est pratiquement impossible de connaître le volume général des
ressources financières (en argent) dont dispose un patron, ou son revenu
annuel ou la valeur exacte de ses propriétés; on ne peut donc se servir
que d'indices indirects pour classer les patrons selon leur volume de
capital économique. Ensuite, il est presque impossible de comparer les
entreprises entre elles, qu'il s'agisse de leur capital initial ou de leur
chiffre d'affaires annuel en raison de l'inflation qui rend difficile la
comparaison d'entreprises fondées en différentes années. L'absence de
données exactes nous oblige à considérer tous les classements des
businessmen les plus importants de Russie qui sont parfois publiés
dans la presse comme autant de photographies du champ économique.
Généralement ces classements se basent sur les résultats des enquêtes
menées auprès des observateurs économiques des mass media, des
économistes-analystes de différents centres d'études sur le maŕché et
des associations commerciales, qui classent les hommes d'affaires
d'après leurs propres représentations et impressions. Ces classements
contribuent ainsi d'une certaine façon à la construction d'une ima ge
légitime de l'élite économique actuelle.
N'ayant pas la possibilité de disposer de données statistiques
exactes sur les revenus et les chiffres annuels des entreprises du secteur
privé, nous avons tout de même tâché pendant les entretiens de recueillir
des indices sur le capital économique de chaque patron interrogé. C'est
ainsi que nous avons fait porter nos questions à la fois sur le nombre
d'entreprises en sa possession, sur le capital initial de l'entreprise, le
revenu par unité de temps (an/mois), les effectifs de l'entreprise (à temps
plein, à mi-temps), la participation à d'autres entreprises (actions, taux
d'intérêt, etc.), les revenus personnels et l'appréciation de ses propres
revenus, la propriété privée (personnelle, familiale) du patron
(appartement, maison, résidence secondaire, etc.). En outre, pour mieux
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situer un patron et son entreprise dans le champ de l'économie privée,
nous avons pris en compte le statut juridique de la propriété de (des)
l'entreprise(s): privée, collective (coopérative, société à responsabilité
limitée, société anonyme, société par action), mixte, la spécialisation
de l'entreprise (domaine de production, de se rvice, etc.), la date de
création de l'entreprise.
L'analyse des entretiens montre que le capital économique
personnel du patron est important pour l'organisation des sociétés
privées (sous forme de S.A.R.L., S.A., en nom propre) en particulier
lorsque le patron est en situation de "nouveau venu" (ou encore de
"parvenu") dans le champ économique: lorsqu' un nouvel agent veut
intervenir dans le champ économique ou sur un secteur du marché déjà
plus ou moins structuré et entrer ainsi en concurrence avec d'autres
agents, í1 doit posséder un "titre d'entrée", c'est-à-dire du capital qu'il
puisse investir dans le jeu économique. (*Voir Tableau n° 1 sur les
anciens postes des patrons). Quand il s'agit des anciens agents comme
les directeurs des entreprises étatiques, les fonctionnaires du Parti et
du Komsomol, etc., qui ont déjà eu d'une façon directe ou indirecte
une entreprise en leur possession ou/et contrôle, c'est le capital social
et le capital bureaucratique (les relations, les positions et les expériences
institutionnelles) qui servent de "titre d'entrée", mais lorsqu'il s'agit de
nouveaux venus, c'est plutôt le capital économique lui-même (argent)
qui commence à jouer. On peut alors dégager deux types de patrons
russes: ceux qui sont proches de l'Etat (anciens dirigeants et hauts
fonctionnaires) et ceux qui se situent dans le secteur privé (surtout les
"nouveaux venus")4. Et cette distinction se manifeste non seulement
par rapport au capital économique et à son rôle dans la création de
l'entreprise personnelle mais aussi par rapport aux autres facteurs de
constitution du patronat russe, à savoir les stratégies de développement
de l'entreprise, les investissements, les styles de vie, les stratégies
éducatives des enfants, etc.
Dans notre enquête qui inclut 12 patrons de grandes entreprises,
6 sont des anciens directeurs d'usines et de fabriques privatisées qui
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gardent toujours leur poste de directeur, mais qui entretemps (après
reconversion de leurs entreprises en sociétés par actions) sont devenus
propriétaires ; 3 sont d'anciens dirigeants de banques étatiques
transformées en sociétés par actions; 3 sont reconvertis de l'ancienne
nomenklatura et sont maintenant des présidents d'associations
d'entrepreneurs. Ainsi, tous ont occupé des positions dominantes bien
avant la constitution du secteur privé.
L'économie russe a été et reste encore très monopolisée, on assiste
également à une domination de l'industrie lourde et de l'industrie de
transformation. Les positions-clés dans l'industrie sont occupées par
les dirigeants des entreprises dans le domaine de l'extraction du pétrole,
du gaz et d'autres matières primaires, ainsi que dans la construction
automobile et quelques autres entreprises monopolistes de construction
industrielle et de traitement chimique. Le supergéant "GAZPROM",
protégé par Victor Tchernomyrdin, son ancien dirigeant, aujourd'hui
premier ministre, a pu bénéficier de tous les profits de cette position
ministérielle: privatisation des entreprises les plus rentables, crédits
long terme à des conditions avantageuses, autorisations de vendre sa
production (pétrole, gaz) à des prix libres et sur le marché libre. Cela
dit, les nouveaux patrons des entreprises de "GAZPROM" (qui sont en
même temps ses anciens directeurs) ont occupé quasi automatiquement
les positions dominantes dans le champ de l'économie privée sans y
avoir investi leurs propres capitaux financiers. On peut citer des cas de
privatisation scandaleuse de géants de la construction automobile
comme "GAZ" (Niznyi Novgorod) et "ZIL" (Moscou), révélés par les
mass media qui ont découvert qu'un énorme "paquet" d'actions était
passé aux mains des directeurs de ces entreprises au lieu d'être cédé
aux collectifs de travailleurs.
A titre d'exemple de reconversion réussie d'un fonctionnaire
d'Etat en patron privé, mais restant très proche de l'Etat et des
organismes publics, on peut citer le cas d'un président de banque
commerciale (dont on ne peut pas donner le nom). En 1990 avant la
réforme des banques, le directeur d'un département d'une des grandes
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banques a été désigné comme expert, en même temps qu'un jeune
fonctionnaire du même département, dans une Commission de réforme
du système financier et bancaire du Soviet des députés de Moscou
(Mossoviet). C'est en travaillant dans cette Commission que ce
directeur, très connu dans les milieux financiers, a proposé un projet
de création d'une des premières banques commerciales (sous forme de
Société d'économie mixte) à partir de son département et la
réorganisation d'une autre banqiie régionale. Le projet a été accepté et
la nouvelle baııque, non seulenıent s'est vii prêter par le Mossoviet,
pour abriter son siège, un bâtiment en plein centre de Moscou doté de
tout l'équipement nécessaire, mais, fait plus important, elle a hérité des
anciens clients des banques réorganisées, de tous leurs avoirs, etc. L'ex-
directeur est devenu le Président de la banque et son adjoint a obtenu
le poste de vice-président malgré sa jeunesse (26 ans) et son relatif
manque d'expérience. Actuellement cette banque se situe parmi les 20
plus grandes de Russie et son président est sur la liste des 50
entrepreneurs russes les plus importants et les plus riches, í1 est
également membre de plusieurs commissions auprès du gouvernement
de Russie et de Moscou. Ce cas nous montre une fois de plus qu'en ce
qui concerne les gens qui occupent déjà des positions dominantes dans
le champ économique étatique, c'est le capital de nature non économique
(social, bureaucratique) qui sert de "titre d'entrée" dans le secteur de
l'économie privée.
Bien évidemment, pour les petits nouveaux entrepreneurs qui
partent de "zéro", l'importance du capital financier devient beaucoup
plus grande, car n'ayant pas d'autorité dans le milieu économique ni
relations personnelles, ils doivent pour s'y insérer y apporter de l'argent
servant à des fins multiples (frais d'installation, de fonctionnement,
loyer des bureaux, investissements dans la production ou l'organisation
des ventes, etc). Parmi les 40 petits et moyens entrepreneurs que nous
avons interviewés, 13 ont occupé des positions dominées avant de créer
une affaire à leur compte (ouvriers, employés de commerce, employés
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ont occupé une position dominée dans des univers plutôt sélectifs
(ingénieurs, chercheurs). Et si ces derniers disposent essentiellement
de ressources de nature sociale et culturelle comme les diplômes, les
patentes, mais aussi des projets plus ou moins élaborés, des
connaissances professionnelles plutôt élevées, etc., avec lesquelles ils
peuvent monnayer leur insertion dans le monde économique, les
premiers, qui sont démunis de ces ressources, ont besoin de ressources
matérielles et financières.
Pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à la création d'entreprise,
les personnes démunies de capitaux recourent souvent à l'aide de proches
et d'amis tout en essayant de ne pas se lier à des banques, car í1 est
assez compliqué de constituer un dossier, de fo ıırnir les
recommandations et les garanties d'usage et de payer des intérêts. Le
tout-petit commerce ("tchelnok") est souvent un moyen d'accumuler
le capital ínitial5. Ainsi, une jeune femme-commerçante, qui avait perdu
son poste de. directrice de cantine, nous a décrit ses débuts dans le
coııımerce. Son histoire comme celle d'un certain nombre de personnes
qui n'ont pu, comme elle, continuer à travailler dans le secteur étatique
pour des raisons diverses, dont I'insuffısance du salaire, montre que
leur passage dans le secteur privé est lié au petit commerce de
marchandises qu'ils ont fait venir des pays étrangers:
"...En 1990, je suis restée sans travail. A ce moment-là tout le
monde faisait "tchelnok". Moi aussi, j'ai décidé d'aller en Pologne
avec 200 dollars et j'ai fait mes premiers 600 dollars, puis encore
600 et encore 600 et puis 1200 dollars. C'est comme ça que tout
a commencé. Et puis en Chine, Turquie, Belgique. Nous avons
travaillé ensemble avec mon mari: lui ici et moi à l'étranger. En
1993 je suis allée en Allemagne et j'ai trouvé le partenaire avec
lequel j'ai fondé une société commerciale: achat-vente...".
(Femme-commerçante, 35 ans; non diplômée)
Quant aux ex-chercheurs, que nous avons interrogés sur l'histoire
de la création de leur entreprise et sur les moyens dont ils disposaient
alors, nous n'avons pas enregistré un seul cas d'accumulation de capital
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initial par ce moyen. C'est plutôt leurs relations qui leur ont permis
d'obtenir les emprunts nécessaires à la fondation de leur entreprise ou
encore le concours d'une organisation-cofondatrice (par exemple, pour
les sociétés à responsabilité limitée).
"Lorsque nous avons décidé de lancer notre petite société, nous
n'avons pas eu de capital initial. On était tous sans moyens et
d'ailleurs c'est pour ça qu'on a décidé d'entreprendre quelque
chose. Nous avons emprunté une somme assez importante en
échange de notre parole d'honneur et le petit pour cent d'intérêt
à nos amis qui ont déjà travaillé dans le business privé. Et aussi
notre directeur commercial a emprunté de l'argent à ses parents.
Nous avons racheté une société qui existait déjà et de cette façon
nous avons pris la succession."
(Commerçant, homme, 30 ans, ancien ingénieur-chercheur;
commerce de matériel informatique)
Tableau n° 1.
Les postes anciens des entrepreneurs de différents secteurs économiques
Secteur d'activité du patron
ancien poste du patron 6 production
industrie
commerce service Total7
sans emploi - 6 - 6
ouvrier - 2 - 2
employé dans le commerce - 1 - 1
employé, cadre moyen - 1 3 4
technicien - - - -
ingénieur 1 1 - 2
chercheur 4 4 2 10
dirigeant dans l'entreprise - 2 1 3
fonctionnaire du Komsomol 5 1 1 7
fonctionnaire du Parti 1 - - 1
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fonctionnaire du Ministère
ou de Commission d'Etat 1 1 1 3
profession libérale - - 1 1
Total 12 19 9 40
En examinant le cas du patron d'une société commerciale de
matériel informatique, fondée en 1991, -période où commençait à se
constituer le réseau commercial extérieur (avec des sociétés étrangères)
en Russie- par un ingénieur-chercheur "nouveau-venu" dans le monde
du commerce, on peut voir les difficultés qu'entraîne le manque de
capital financier, surtout dans la période de lancement de l'affaire:
recherche de partenariat, achat des premières machines, location de
bureau, publicité, etc. Faute d'emprunt important, l'affaire n'a pas pu
aboutir et pourtant les loyers n'étaient pas chers en cette période où le
marché des bâtiments commerciaux n'était pas encore saturé et où il
était, en outre, légalement possible (ce qui n'est plus le cas maintenant)
d'installer des bureaux dans les appartements réservés au logement et
bénéficiant de loyers extrêmement bas. Au fur et à mesure de la
constitution du marché immobilier, la très forte croissance des loyers
professionnels les a rendus prohibitifs pour nombre de petits patrons.
De même, avec le développement de la législation sur le commerce,
les dépenses de fonctionnement Iíées à l'achat de plusieurs autorisations,
licences, certificats, tarifs douaniers, etc., ont considérablement
augmenté. Les entreprises commerciales, qui sont orientées surtout
vers le marché extérieur, se sont trouvées dans une situation de
dépendance absolue à I'éġard des échanges monétaires et du cours
flottant du rouble.
La majorité des patrons étudiés possèdent plusieurs petites
entreprises qui ont une activité identique ou voisine. Dans nombre de
cas la possession de plusieurs entreprises est destinée à permettre aux
patrons de répartir entre elles Ies bénéfices et d'échapper au fisc, mais
parfois elle correspond à des stratégies d'agrandissement de l'affaire,
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visant à couvrir un plus grand secteur du marché afin de minimiser les
risques de faillite. La période initiale de constitution du secteur privé
(1989-1992) a connu un développement énorme des petites entreprises
accentué par un mouvement d'abandon du secteur étatique de la part
des agents qui quittaient des positions dominées, pour devenir dirigeants
et travailler à leur propre compte. Les petites entreprises ainsi créées
étaient le produit d'une association entre membres de la même famille
ou entre amis. Parfois il suffisait d'avoir un projet plus ou moins rentable
pour pouvoir profiter de la position assez solide de quelques amis dans
les affaires et créer sa propre entreprise en liaison avec la leur et avec
leur concours. On peut illustrer ce cas par un extrait d'entretien avec un
patron, copropriétaire d'environ 20 entreprises:
"...1l [une de mes connaissances] vient et me dit: j'ai un projet,
j'ai besoin d'argent. Je lui dis: O.K., pour ce que tu me demandes,
nous nous mettons d'accord sur le profit, sur la firme dans le
cadre de laquelle il va travailler, etc. Je ne m'inquiète plus de
rien. Il embauche lui-même les gens, í1 cherche lui-même les
locaux, il achète lui-même l'équipement et il répond de tout. Je
m'informe du résultat: 6 mois ont passé, tu as promis 50% de
profit, où est-il? - il me dit: ça n'a pas réussi. Je lui dis: comment
ça n'a pas réussi? Regardons le point n°2: si ça n'a pas réussi,
alors pour chaque mois de retard on doit payer tant pour-cent.
Quand ii vient, il demande: et quel sera mon poste? - Et lequel
veux-tu? - Je ne sais pas. - Je ne le sais pas non plus. De quoi
vas-tu t'occuper? - De la construction d'une usine de briques. -
Alors faisons de toi le directeur de la construction. Ce poste
t'arrange-t-il? - Cela m'arrange. Voilà tout. I1 reçoit le poste de
directeur. _Nais avant de lui donner de l'argent, je veux être
informé de tout. Il doit me prouver, pour que je le croie
entièrement, que tout est en règle: Sur simple parole je ne donne
pas d'argent. Enfin, je donne parfois, mais pas de telles sommes.
C'est-à-dire qu'à certaines personnes parfois je fais des cadeaux."
(Commerçant, homme, 30 ans, non diplômé).
La stratégie de multiplication des entreprises typique de la période
1990-1993 n'était évidemment pas liée au simple désir des gens de
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"faire des cadeaux" à leurs amis, mais elle était surtout un effet du
régime fiscal (les petites entreprises bénéficient d'avantages fiscaux
pendant leur première année d'activité). Actuellement on assiste
l'apparition d'une nouvelle tendance des petites sociétés à s'associer
pour former des compagnies et des unions, cette tendance, bien qu'on
n'ait pu encore observer tous ses effets, tend à produire, semble-t-il,
une répartition plus équilibrée du contrôle sur le marché. D'ailleurs í1
faut remarquer la généralisation de la tendance des petites et moyennes
entreprises à répartir leur activité entre production, commerce et
services, toutes ou presque toutes les petites entreprises industrielles/
productives faisant à l'heure actuelle du commerce ou proposant des
services. Par exemple, ceux qui travaillent dans l'électronique proposent
également le service d'entretien des micro-ordinateurs, ou vendent des
micro-ordinateurs ou du matériel bureautique ou électronique. Cette
situation a rendu caduque la distinction que nous avons introduite au
départ et qui faisait que, lors des entretiens, on demandait à chaque
entrepreneur de citer d'abord toutes les entreprises dont íi était
propriétaire ou copropriétaire pour définir ensuite son activité pri ńcipale
et parler avant tout de l'entreprise correspondant à cette activité. Dans
notre échantillon de 40 patrons (excluant les grandes entreprises et les
associations) le nombre d'entreprises possédées (ou contrôlées) varie
entre 1 (dix cas) et 20 (un cas).
L'importance du capital culturel
Les résultats des enquêtes menées sur les entrepreneurs en
Russie8 comme ceux de notre recherche montrent que la majorité des
patrons des entreprises non étatiques sont des gens diplômés. Cette
observation qui est particulièrement vraie pour les grandes entreprises
reste valable pour les entreprises petites et moyennes. Ainsi, l'enquête
réalisée en Bielorussie9 (307 entrepreneurs soit 10% des patrons des
entreprises privées de différents statuts juridiques et situées en
Bielorussíel montre que 70% des répondants ont un diplôme
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d'enseignement supérieur et 6% sont des docteurs en sciences. Dans
l'échantillon (constitué en dehors de toute représentativité) 27,7% des
répondants ont été des ingénieurs, 13% des dirigeants d'entreprises,
5,5% des chercheurs; 4,9% des professeurs ; 5,2% des économistes;
3,9% des cadres dirigeants moyens; 2,6% des membres des professions
libérales; 2,3% des informaticiens; 3,9% des étudiants; 5,2% des
ouvriers. Ce qui permet d'affirmer que les entrepreneurs, en Bielorussie
aussi bien qu'en Russie, se recrutent essentiellement parmi les gens
diplômés.
Afin de mesurer le volume du capital culturel des entrepreneurs,
nous avons pris pour critère de notre analyse non seulement le fait de
posséder un diplôme d'enseignement supérieur mais aussi d'autres
indicateurs comme la formation générale (scolarisation dans le cycle
secondaire général ou spécialisé; études universitaires dans une école
centrale prestigieuse ou péríphéríque, sans prestige; cours de langiıes
étrangères, etc.), la formation artistique (école de musique, de peinture
ou autre art), la formation sportive (activité sportive pendant la scolarité
et actuellement), la formation professionnelle (études post-
universitaires, cours professionnels ou de management, d'affaires, etc.),
la possession d'une bibliothèque (collection de livres) et d'objets d'art
au domicile privé (chez les parents et chez le patron lui-même),
d'antiquıítés, les pratiques culturelles pendant les années de formation
et actuellement.
L'analyse de ces variables présentée dans le tableau n°1 ("La
formation des patrons des entreprises de différents secteurs de
l'économie") montre premièrement que la part des patrons diplômés
est très élevée, et surtout que le taux de patrons passés par les différentes
formations est quasiment égal pour le secteur de la production, du
commerce (й l'exception des tout petits commerçants) et des services.
Nous n'avons pas trouvé, par exemple, de grande différence sous le
rapport des études dans des écoles secondaires spéciales de langues
étrangères ou de la formation artistique. II n'y a pas, semble-t-il, de
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patron dans le champ économique. Cependant, des différences
apparaissent si Ion compare les patrons sous le rapport de cette autre
composante du capital culturel que sont la formation et І'expérience
professionnelles.
Ainsi, parmi les 40 patrons de P.M.E. que nous avons interrogés,
33 ont des diplômes d'enseignement supérieur: universités, écoles
supérieures tėchniques ou de sciences de la nature. 11 faut remarquer
par ailleurs que tous les patrons du secteur de la production et de
l'industrie sont diplômés et quatre sur douze ont effectué des études
post-universitaires. Ils sont tous venus des entreprises étatiques au
secteur privé et ils ont une formation adaptée au travail dans le secteur
d'Etat. (cf. tableau n°3). Les patrons (petits et moyens) de ce secteur de
l'économie sont plus riches en capital professionnel que les patrons
des autres secteurs étudiés et, en particulier, les petits commerçants.
On peut notamment observer l'importance de la formation
professionnelle et de l'expérience acquise dans les institutions d'Etat
dans le cas des anciens chercheurs de différentes disciplines devenus
petits patrons par la création de leur propre entreprise dans la période
1990-1993. Notre échantillon en compte dix et quatre d'entre eux
dirigent actuellement des petites sociétés de production dans un domaine
haute technologie (optique à laser; électronique; production des corps
conducteurs lumineux; nouvelle technologie de production de
l'hydrogène). Quatre autres font du commerce dont trois ont commencé
par être chef d'entreprise industrielle, avant de pratiquer exclusivement
le commerce.
La différenciation des patrons sous le rapport de "importance
du capital culturel détenu commence à apparaître lorsqu'on entreprend
l'analyse détaillée des entretiens de patrons occupant différentes
positions dans le champ économique. C'est d'abord la manière de parler,
le vocabulaire, donc, la culture générale du patron et éventuellement le
type de famille dans laquelle il a été socialisé qui frappent le lecteur
ou, mieux, l'auditeur des entretiens enregistrés. La culture générale du
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patron qui se mesure aussi par des indices comme la lecture, l'amour
des livres, le type d'éducation reçue dans l'enfance, etc., n'est pas sans
influencer sa position économique, un patron restant d'autant plus fidèle
au domaine d'activité choisi au début de sa vie professionnelle et se
livrant d'autant plus rarement au commerce pur (à l'exception du
commerce du livre) qu'il a une grande culture.
Tableau N° 2.








Grandes Ecoles 2 7 4 13
Ecole supérieure technique,
sciences de Ia nature
(sauf Grandes Ecoles) 10 5 5 20
Etudes post-universitaires,
doctorales (y compris Acadé-
mie du Commerce Extérieur) 4(1) 5 (2) 1 10 (3)
Etudes commerciales,dans
le business (cours, stage) - 1 3 4
Ecole secondaire spéciale
(langue, science) 3 4 2 9
Etudes de musique et de
beaux arts (dans l'enfance) 4 6 1 11
Autres formations 2 3 2 7
Non diplômé 10 - 7 - 7
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Plusieurs patrons ont insisté, au cours de l'entretien, sur
l'importance des études et des principes moraux qui s'y acquièrent.
"Mon éducation et les principes que j'ai acquis durant mes études
me gênent dans certaines transactions faisant intervenir le risque
ou certains passe-droits. Je ne suis pas un entrepreneur. Je ne
sais pas qui je siıis. Mais être entrepreneur aujourd'hui cela veut
dire avoir le culot de ne pas connaître beaucoup de choses, cela
veut dire ne pas avoir de principes, cela veut dire savoir se ficher
des autres et même les écraser".
(Patron d'une société de construction et d'entretien de micro-
ordinateurs; hoıııme, 37 ans, diplômé de l'Académie du
Commerce Extérieur)
Le manque de culture générale s'observe dans le cas des
boutiquiers qui n'ont généralement pas de diplômes d'enseigneınent
supérieur (quelques-uns parmi eux se disent étudiants d'écoles
supérieures) et qui ont un rapport ambivalent à l'égard des gens
diplômés, ayant d'un côté beaucoup d'estime pour les diplômes
universitaires, mais se moquant d'un autre côté de ceux qui "perdent"
leur temps avec les livres et ne savent pas gagner de l'argent. La langue
de ces boutiquiers est émaillée de mots d'argot qui reviennent sans
cesse, leurs phrases sont courtes et inachevées, ils aiment truffer leurs
phrases de mots anglais (américains) pour "faire très moderne,
cosmopolite". Dans la majorité des cas ces boutiquiers ont connu des
difficultés pendant leurs études secondaires, comme l'avoue cet
interviewé qui est très représentatif des gens de sa catégorie:
" 
1.
..[A l'école] j'étudiais passablement. J'avais toujours "trois"
Je me souviens du profėsseur d'histoire.. il y avait
franchement beaucoup de mauvais professeurs. Le professeur
d'histoire était seul à se distinguer de manière positive. Et les
autres - une masse grise, rien d'extraordinaire. Non, ils n'avaient
pas d'antipathie pour moi, mais... D'abord [à l'école primaire] si
je n'avais pas tous les 5, c'étaient au moins tous les 4. Après la
troisième-quatríème 12: les amis, les bonnes bouffes, les filles...
C'est, bien sûr, une plaisanterie. On peut dire que le manque de
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contrôle de la part de mes parents a joué son rôle. Et sans y
prendre garde j'ai perdu pied".
(Boutiquier, petit commerce de produits
alimentaires et de tabac, 24 ans)
Il faut noter que l'importance du capital culturel autant que du
capital économique augmente au fur et à mesure de la constitution du
champ de l'économie privée. Aujourd'hui le capital culturel, en
particulier sous sa forme spécifique qu'est le capital professionnel
(formation spécialisée et le diplôme d'une école supérieure), devient
vraiment nécessaire dans le cas des entreprises mixtes (avec une
participation étrangère) et des sociétés à 100 % de capital étranger
situées en Russie, ainsi que dans le cas des banques. Si dans les
premières les compétences les plus demandées consistent en la
connaissance des langues étrangères à quoi s'ajoute l'expérience du
travail dans les nouvelles structures de l'économie "libre", les qualités
les plus indispensables pour obtenir les plus hauts postes dans les
banques commerciales (non étatiques) sont par contre l'expérience du
travail dans l'ancien système bancaire et le diplôme d'une école
supérieure reconnue dans ces milieux. Ces conditions ne sont pas en
contradiction avec nos observations précédentes, car elles concernent
l'embauche du personnel de ces entreprises et non celles de leurs patrons
qui ont accédé à leurs postes selon d'autres principes de sélection.
Le rôle de la famille dans la création
des entreprises personnelles
En examinant les principales caractérístíques des patrons
interrogés dans notre étude, on remarque une certaine dépėndance entre
la position des patrons et leur situation familiale. Si dans certains cas,
le poste anciennement occupé par le propriétaire lui-même a une
influence sur le poste actuel, le plus souvent intervient la position sociale
de la famille dans son ensemble : la position de chacun de ses membres,
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le capital de relations sociales accumulées, ce que l'on peut désigner
comme le capital social de la famille qui ne se réduit pas au simple jeu
des relations de piston, même si ce système est très développé. Ce peut
être parfois le nom de famille ou la mention de l'établissement où
travaille l'un des parents ou encore, mais plus rarement, la mention du
club ou de l'association d'appartenance qui joue un rôle important dans
les transactions économiques.
Afin de reconstituer le capital social des patrons nous les avons
interrogés sur leur famille (lieu où travaillaient leurs parents, leur
profession et formation) et sur leur propre trajectoire professionnelle
(ancien lieu où ils travaillaient et dernier poste occupé dans le secteur
d'Etat, adhésion à un parti politique et à une association d'entrepreneurs
ou professionnelle).
L'analyse de l'origine sociale des entrepreneurs et, en particulier,
des catégories socio-professionnelles de leurs pères nous permet de
tracer du point de vue de l'origine sociale une frontière entre les patrons
qui travaillent dans la production et ceux qui travaillent dans le
commerce et les services. Ainsi, nous pouvons voir que l'origine sociale
la plus modeste caractérise les commerçants et les patrons des
entreprises de services, les patrons des entreprises de production
comptant seulement deux fils d'ouvriers et un fils de technicien. Tandis
que six fils de cadres dirigeants d'entreprises (sur un total de 12) dirigent
eux-mêmes leurs entreprises de production, on ne trouve qu'un seul
fils de dirigeant faisant du commerce. On peut supposer une certaine
influence de la position du père sur le choix du secteur d'activité du
fils. Il ne s'agit pas de succession professionnelle à propement parler
(nous n'avons trouvé aucun lien direct entre profession du père et
profession du fils) mais plutôt de dispositions familiales par rapport au
travail.
Cette recherche faisait l'hypothèse que la création des petites
entreprises reposait essentiellement sur l'utilisation de la solidarité
familiale, l'ensemble des membres de la famille étant regroupés et
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mobilisés par l'un des leurs autour d'une affaire commune, c'est-à-dire
que la petite entreprise était en fait, dans certaine mesure, une entreprise
familiale. Cependant les entretiens avec les patrons ainsi qu'un certain
nombre de témoignages nous ont montré qu'en réalité les stratégies
des patrons sont construites selon d'autres principes.
Ainsi, on peut décrír deux stratégies principales:
1) l'entreprise est une affaire qui appartient à un seul membre de
la famille (dans la majorité des cas - le chef de famille) et les
autres membres ne s'en mêlent pas et sont même peu au courant
de son activité;
2) la création d'une entreprise par un membre de la famille incite
d'autres membres à en créer une à Iėur tour ou tout simplement
à quitter le secteur d'Etat pour travailler dans le secteur non
étatique.
Le deuxième cas est d'autant plus important qu'il correspond
assez souvent à des situations de corruption et de mafia. On peut
l'observer par exemple lorsque les anciens dirigeants de grandes
entreprises industrielles d'Etat tiennent à garder leur position de
monopole sur le marché libre. Ils développent alors la stratégie suivante:
le directeur d'une entreprise industrielle d'Etat (*témoignage d'un patron
de petite entreprise à Smolensk) transforme "son" entreprise en une
société fermée par actions 13 et í1 garde le contrôle des actions.
Parallèlement í1 entreprend de créer des entreprises-satellites dans le
même domaine à la tête desquelles il place des membres de sa famille
(frères, femme, enfants, etc.).
Dans d'autres cas on peut découvrir que les proches parents
travaillent dans diverses entreprises non étatiques des différentes
branches de l'économie sans qu'il existe de relations très étroites entre
eux. On peut citer l'interview d'un des patrons:
"L'entreprise de mon père fait pratiquement Ia même chose que
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l'industrie militaire. Cependant moi, je suis mieux informé sur
les affaires et j'ai plus d'expérience car j'ai lancé mon affaire un
an plus tôt que lui. II reste que nous ne discutons presque jamais
de nos affaires. Mes conseils ne sont pas nécessaires et bien au
contraire ils sont négligés... Nul n'est prophète en son pays...
Mais moi, je ne m'impose pas."
(Homme, 30 ans, patron d'entreprise de
production d'équipement à laser)
Pour le moment i1 est difficile de parler avec ce rtitude de la
participation des femmes aux entreprises de leurs maris, mais il apparaît
immédiatement que lorsque commence le commerce "sérieux" les
femmes ne sont plus là. Les hommes représentent la majorité écrasante
des patrons des petites et moyennes entreprises et 100% des patrons
des grandes entreprises (parmi les 52 entrepreneurs que nous avons
interrogés il y a 5 femmes, propriétaires de toutes petites entreprises).
D'une façon générale, les femmes-entrepreneurs occupent dans l'espace
de l'économie non étatique des positions dominées, notamment dans le
domaine des services médicaux, de la cosmétique, de la couture, du
show-business. Ajoutons que même dans ces domaines elles ne
constituent pas la majorité des patrons.
A l'appui de l'hypothèse relative à I' "effet d'épidémie familiale",
il faut noter que les femmes entreprennent généralement de créer leur
propre affaire sous l'influence de leur époux et postérieurement à eux.
"Lorsque mon mari a lancé son affaire en 1988, il s'est heurté
tout de suite au manque de secrétaire qualifiée. Ses difficultés
m'ont fait penser qu'il nous manquait à Moscou un système de
formation de cadres qualifiés pour ce travail dans les entreprises
non étatiques. En 1989 je me suis décidée à ouvrir une Ecole de
formation des secrétaires. Je recrute mes étudiantes parmi les
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L'espace des styles de vie
Les styles de vie des patrons sont très diversifiés et leurs
oppositions deviennent de plus en plus ınarquées, bien que le groupe
des patrons en soit encore à une étape de sa formation telle qu'il est
difficile de le considérer comme un groupe social au sens strict. Il faut
souligner que ce sont les nouveaux propriétaires qui cherchent à se
distinguer des autres catégories sociales, moins fortunées qu'eux, par
des signes visibles de l'extérieur et bien ciblés comme voiture, maison,
vêtement, etc. Cette recherche de la distinction est déjà assez poussée,
le goût du luxe étant peut-être la première nouveauté qui s'enracine
dans l'esprit des entrepreneurs russes. Compte tenu de la crise
économique et du désarroi qui sont présents en Russie aujourd'.hui,
l'ensemble des styles de vie adoptés par les nouveaux entrepreneurs
est digne d'être examiné même si nos données ne sont pas encore assez
systématiques.
Moscou aujourd'hui représente (bien évidemment après les
grandes capitales occidentales) un réservoir de produits de luxe où
s'approvisionnent les "nouveaux Russes". De nombreux grands
magasins comme le GUM, le CUM, le Passage, mais aussi de petits
magasins se sont transformés en galeries abritant des grandes marques
reconnues en Europe: telles Cartier, Christian Dior, Ester Lauder,
Lancôme, Yves Rochas, Valentino, Pierre Cardin, Galeries Lafayette.
Ces galeries sont situées dans une portion de la rue Tverskaya, au centre
de Moscou. Le commerce de luxe permet, dans la période actuelle (et
ce n'est pas uniquement le cas de la Russie, on l'a observé aussi dans
les pays occidentaux ruinés après la guerre), un très grand et très rapide
bénéfice 14.
II faut mentionner encore les nombreux salons de voitures aux
marques prestigieuses (BMW, Mercedes, Cadillac, Porsche, Lincoln
Continental, Rolls Royce, etc.), sans compter les marques japonaises
et françaises qui ont beaucoup moins de prestige. Sí, en 1990, la voiture
étrangère était une rareté à Moscou, déjà à la fin de 1992, 36 748 voitures http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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de marques étrangères ont été enregistrées (parmi lesquelles 45% sont
des voitures d'occasion). Le dernier modèle de BMW (BMW-600) a
commencé à se vendre en Russie, plus tôt qu'en Europe. Le représentant
de Rolls Royce a ouvert son salon à Moscou pour vendre des voitures
dont le prix variait entre 140 et 260 mille dollars après avoir découvert
qu'il s'était vendu à Moscou davantage de Mercedes-600 (dont le prix
est environ de 130 mille dollars) qu'à New York15. Ainsi, le premier
signe par lequel les entrepreneurs marquent leur différence et cherchent
se distinguer des autres en affichant leur prospérité est la voiture de
marque étrangère, surtout la "Mercedes" ou la "BMW" qu'ils achètent
d'abord à titre d'équipement d'entreprise, puis, comme deuxième,
troisième...voiture, pour leur propre compte.
Les loisirs des entrepreneurs sont organisés autour des voyages
et de la fréquentation des business-clubs et des clubs sportifs. Le système
de clubs d'entrepreneurs en Russie16 n'a pas encore véritablement pris
sa forme définitive et on peut actuellement compter à Moscou quelque
vingtaine de business-clubs qui possèdent leurs statuts, leurs
programmes, leurs membres, leur système de recrutement par
cooptation. Cependant, même sí ce système n'est pas encore constitué,
on peut dégager aujourd'hui, à partir de nos obse rvations, trois types
de clubs correspondant à trois types d'orientations de leurs activités.
Les premiers sont les clubs commerciaux, clubs plus ou moins
"anonymes" qui n'ont pas de public précis, mais correspondent plutôt
des lieux de rassemblement et de distraction pour les entrepreneurs:
restaurants, bars, casinos, nightclubs (comme, par exemple, "Club 2x2"
ou le club "Carte argentée"). Les entrepreneurs qui fréquentent ces
clubs ne sont définis par aucun principe de sélection, ils n'ont ni intérêts
communs ni positions politiques explicites. Il s'agit d'un public de
"nouveaux riches" qui n'ont aucun capital politique ni bureaucratique
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Les deuxièmes sont des clubs dont la fonction principale est
l'organisation de communications informelles entre les entrepreneurs
et des représentants du pouvoir étatique (hommes politiques, membres
du gouvernement) pour l'élaboration d'une stratégie commune, la
conciliation des intérêts et l'exercice de pressions sur le Parlement et
les instances gouvernementales. Ces clubs sont fermés, le nombre de
leurs membres (grands entrepreneurs et parfois hommes politiques et
journalistes des journaux influents) est limité et les relations entre leurs
membres sont plutôt personnalisées. Les clubs de ce type ont leurs
statuts et des règles de comportement pour leurs membres. Il est
intéressant de citer quelques-uns de ces clubs et surtout les noms de
leurs présidents: on retiendra le Club de commerce de Moscou: président
- Nicolai Rijkov (ex-premier ministre sous Gorbatchev); le Club des
directeurs: président - Abel Aganbegian (académicien, économiste; ex-
ministre du commerce extérieur sous Gorbatchev); le VIP-club:
président - Ivan Kivelidi ("Vnecheconomcooperatcia", Société
économique du commerce extérieur) le PROFI-club: président Victor
Macarov (patron d'une grande société de l'industrie chimique).
Le troisième type de clubs est constitué par les clubs qui ont été
créés sur la base des clubs politiques, mais qui ont évolué dans la
direction des business-clubs. Au début ces clubs rassemblaient des
hommes politiques et des militants, puis ils ont recruté de grands
entrepreneurs. Ces clubs ont pour objectif l'élaboration et la réalisation
de projets politiques dans la gestion macro-économique. La sélection
des entrepreneurs qui ont adhéré à ces clubs ne s'est pas faite selon des
principes précis, mais plutôt grâce au rôle de "porte-monnaie" qu'ils
jouent pour ces clubs en les dotant des subventions dont ils ont besoin.
Parmi cette catégorie de clubs, il faut mentionner d'abord le Club
"Realisty" ("Les réalistes") présidé par Youri Petrov, qui est également
le président de la Corporation d'investissement de l'Etat et ensuite le
Réforme-club "Vsaimodeistvie" ("interaction") dont le président est
Egor Gaïdar (ex- premier ministre sous Eltsin).
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Le public des deux derniers types de clubs, se compose de patrons
qui possèdent une certaine autorité dans le milieu des entreprises en
même temps que des relations avec les structures du pouvoir et qui
sont riches, aussi bien en capital économique qu'en capital politique
ou bureaucratique, qu'ils maintiennent et consolident grâce à leur
appartenance au club. Ces clubs forment des structures très proches de
l'Etat, qui peuvent même parfois faire partie de lui.
Nous ne disposons pas pour le moment des informations
suffisantes pour une analyse détaillée des business-clubs (bien que cette
analyse nous semble importante pour l'étude de la constitution du
patronat en Russie), mais í1 n'est pas sans intérêt de présenter les
premières observations que nous avons pu faire concernant leur
fonctionnement. On a pu observer ainsi que les entrepreneurs qui
fréquentent ces clubs doivent se conformer à certaines règles non écrites
de conduite comme, par exemple, le fait de porter des costumes signés
de grands couturiers européens ou de se présenter en compagnie d'une
femme (une maîtresse "officielle"). Quant aux clubs du premier type,
ils ont leur propre réseau de femmes qui travaillent pour ces clubs et
qui sont en général des prostituées. Dans leur ensemble, les grands
entrepreneurs russes portent des costumes et des cravates semblables
ceux que portent les hommes d'affaires européens qui leur servent de
modèles (avec évidemment quelques variantes spécifiques): la règle,
pour les hommes d'affaires russes, est de porter les articles les plus
coûteux, qu'il s'agisse des costumes, des chemises, des cravates, des
chaussures, etc., leur prix élevé étant, pour eux, un critère essentiel
d'appréciation. Mais í1 existe toutefois certains signes privilégiés de la
distinction, tels la cravate "Hermès" (marque peu répandue et la plus
chère) que se doivent de porter les grands financiers ou lės grands
banquiers tandis que les gros commerçants choisiront de porter plutôt
une cravate "Christian Dior" ou "Yves Saint Laurent". Si les nouveaux
entrepreneurs qui occupent des positions assez stables sur le marché
russe et qui ont des relations à l'étranger copient les modèles de leurs
partenaires occidentaux, íI existe pour les "nouveaux venus" tout un
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"système de formation du bon goût" qui s' est constitué à travers les
revues spécialisées pour businessmen: "Commerçant", "Domovoï",
"Delovie ludi", "Delovoi mír/Busíпess World", "Inostranelc", etc., qui
expliquent comment í1 faut s'habiller, comment il faut aménager son
intérieur, quelles sont les voitures les plus prestigieuses, comment on
doit se comporter à l'étranger, etc.
Pour ce qui est des membres de l'ancienne nomenklatura
reconvertie en businessmen, ils préfèrent conserver les règles de
comportement et un mode de vie "à l'ancienne" ; ils possèdent, en effet,
déjà leurs habitudes : leurs restaurants "fermés" à l'abri des regards
curieux, leurs tailleurs, leurs maisons de repos, etc. Cette façon
particulière de se conduire est bien connue de leurs partenaires
occidentaux17 qui sont sensibles à leur rigidité, à leur tendance à la
morosité et à la fierté  excessive qui caractérise ce type de "nouveaux"
patrons.
* * *
On a pu tirer de nos observations la conclusion que l'aptitude à
bien se présenter (bureau, personnel, tenue, etc.) correspond étroitement
à une expérience bureaucratique, mais elle est aussi un indice de la
stratégie économique du patron, orientée soit vers la recherche d'une
position dominante dans l'espace socio-économique, soit vers
l'accumulation personnelle de richesses liée le plus souvent à
l'occupation d'une position dominée. On peut ainsi constater qu'il existe
une certaine homologie entre les positions sociales autrefois occupées
dans le champ de l'économie étatique et les positions actuelles dans le
champ de l'économie privée : à une position dominante dans le passé
est associée la tendance à avoir une grande entreprise, à afficher
publiquement ses activités, à participer à des expositions, à faire de
larges publicités pour les produits; la majorité de ces patrons tendent à
insérer leur activité dans les structures officielles. A l'inverse, à la http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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position plutôt dominée dans le passé liée à l'absence de participation
aux structures économiques étatiques et au défaut d'expérience sont
associées une disposition à s'orienter vers de petites entreprises, une
faible présence ou un renoncement à la publicité; une moindre
participation aux associations, une politique de dissimulation, etc.
L' examen des positions dans le champ de l'économie non étatique
révèle que c'est seulement au niveau des positions dominantes que
s'observe un véritable processus de formation d'un corps d'entrepreneurs
- le patronat: seuls les patrons situés dans le quadrant I constituent un
groupe qu'on peut au vu de l'ensemble des caractéristiques
fondamentales de ses membres appeler un "corps". Ces patrons se sont
d'ailleurs organisés en clubs, associations, etc. grâce auxquels ils se
reconnaissent mutuellement, adoptent des stratégies communes, ont
des pratiques culturelles voisines ; échangent des informations utiles,
etc. (Tel est le cas de VIP - club des plus hautes personnalités du monde
des affaires, présidé par un grand entrepreneur, i.Kiwelidi. VIP tient
des réunions chaque mois où se discutent les problèmes urgents en
présence d'hommes politiques et de fonctionnaires d'Etat intéressés
qui y sont invités, une grande partie des négociations et des contrats
passe entre les membres du club se faisant au cours de ces réunions).
Les patrons occupant les positions dominantes associent
fréquemment l'activité d'entrepreneur privé à l'activité politique/
publique; en utilisant au profit de la première activité toutes les
possibilités que leur offre la seconde; ils occupent des postes dans les
deux secteurs de l'économie en tentant d'ajouter les profits de l'un à
ceux de l'autre. De cette façon, ils trouvent le moyen d'accroître encore
leurs avantages par la privatisation des biens qui sont la propriété de
l'Etat et surtout de la municipalité ou de la région. En outre, il faut
signaler que les patrons (comme K. Вorovoi) dont l'entreprise commence
à voir leurs bénéfices diminuer, peuvent se tourner inversement vers
l'activité politique ou publique. Les stratégies de ces patrons orientées
vers l'Etat sont redoublées par des stratégies de reproduction scolaire:
ils envoient souvent leurs enfants faire des études dans les écoles
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prestigieuses d'Etat ou, grâce à des programme d'échanges avec les
pays occidentaux, dans les écoles supérieures d'Europe ou des Etats
Unis.
La position dominée des petites et moyennes entreprises est
aggravée par l'absence de capital bureaucratique car, dans la majorité
des cas, leurs propriétaires sont isolés et ne se regroupent pas à des fins
d'échanges ou d'entraide. Ils n'ont pas les moyens d'obtenir les profits
et les franchises offerts par les différents programmes gouvernementaux
ou municipaux et n'ont même pas accès aux informations sur de telles
possibilités - par exemple, l'exemption d'impôt pour les entrepreneurs
produisant daııs le domaine des technologies nıédicales ou encore
l'attribution de crédits sans intérêt pour le développement des
exploitations agricoles fermières.
Les entrepreneurs russes ne constituent pas encore un groupe
social véritablement homogène, doté d'intérêts communs et de pratiques
similaires, ayant ses organismes représentatifs, ses programmes, ses
élus et ses porte-parole pouvant agir en son nom (comme, par exemple,
le Conseil national du patronat français); ils restent encore assez
dispersés, leur regroupement ne faisant que commencer. La constitution
des entrepreneurs en tant que corps social spécifique ne s'observe
actuellement qu'à l'état de tendances: à travers "existence de plusieurs
partis politiques d'entrepreneurs (qui sont encore très peu nombreux),
de clubs (qui réunissent un cercle très restreint de grands entrepreneurs,
quand il ne s'agit pas de nightclub), d' associations (dans les rares cas
où ces associations ne poursuivent pas uniquement des buts
commerciaux). Cependant, il faut souligner que toutes ces structures




Contributeur : Eliane DaphyEntrepreneur en Russie	 89
Notes
I Cette recherche a pour objet principal l'ensemble des entrepreneurs russes
qui sont propriétaires copropriétaires des entreprises constituant le secteur de
l'économie privée. Pour désigner ce groupe, nous préférons utiliser dans cette
recherche le terme d' "entrepreneurs" qui correspond mieux aux pratiques
économique et linguistique existant en Russie que le terme de patron et qui est
couramment employé. Le terme de "patron", bien qu'il soit parfois associé au
comportement économique typique des nouveaux propriétaires au sens
webericn, ıı'est pas répondu en Russie et se réfère plutot à la période d'avant la
révolution ou de la NEP (nouvelle politique économique). Le mot russe
"entrepreneur" signifie en Russie la "personne qui dirige une entreprise pour
son compte", définition équivalente à celle de "patron". Ayant adopté cette
dernière définition de l'entrepreneur, nous avons parfois utilisé dans notre
recherche les deux termes - entrepreneur et patron - comme des synonymes.
2 Cc sujet est développé dans un article des sociologues russes: Climova S.,
Dunaevsky L., Novie predpriıτѓnτatelí í starava cultura (Les nouveaux
entrepreneurs et l'ancienne culture) / Socѓo/oguitcheskie issledovaniva
(Recherches sociologiques), 1993, n°5, p.64-69. Les auteurs analysent la culture
de type patriarcal et la culture de type occidental dans les rapports des patrons
des entreprises privées avec leurs employés.
Etant donné les changements permanents du volume et des caractéristiques
de ce nouveau groupe, nous n'avons pas pu construire, pour cette recherche,
un échantillon représentatif des entrepreneurs, mais, tout en essayant de suivre
les différentes étapes de sa constitution, nous avons choisi d'etudier les cas
qui nous ont semblé les plus répresentatifs des différents types de nouveaux
agents économiques. La recherche a été réalisée principalement à partir de
l'étude des trajectoires sociales, recueillies par inte rviews approfondies. Un
total de 52 interviews ont été réalisées auprès de dirigeants d'entreprises privées
travaillant dans la production industrielle ou "intellectuelle", dans  le commerce
ou dans les services, occupant les positions les plus diverses dans le champ
économique: depuis des positions assez élevées (notamment des vice-présidents
de grandes banques et interviews et les articles publiés dans  la presse (45
interviews). Ces derniers étant réalisés par des journalistes et pour des raisons
très différentes des notres, ont un caractère souvent incomplet, si bien que
nous n'avons pu les retenir que pour des analyses complémentaires. Cet
échantillon ne couvre évidemment pas tous les secteurs de l'économie russe,
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mais il touche les secteurs qui se situent au centre des transformations et des
restructurations du système de rapports économiques postsoviétiques.
Les 52 entretiens sont répartis entre ces catégories de la façon suivante:
1. Associations d'entrepreneurs - 4
2. Banques commerciales (sous forme de S.A.) - 5
3. Directeurs d'entreprises privatisées (usines et fabriques):
- Industrie légère (textile, mercerie) - 4
- Technologie industrielle - 2
4. NTTM (entreprises fondées sur la base de centres de créations technique de
la jeunesse), petites entreprises dans le domaine de la haute technologie - 8
5. Petites entreprises (S.A.R.L., S.A., à titre personnel)
- Service et commerce - 16
- Haute technologie - 7
6. Boutiques (kiosques) - 6
4 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu et Monique de Saint Martin, Le Patronat / Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales. n°20/21, 1978, p.14.
5 "Tchelnok" (rus.) dans le sens littéral "navette" (fr.) - les gens qui voyagent
dans les pays étrangers uniquement dans le but d'acheter des marchandises
(en quantité très limitée et au prix le plus bas possible) pour les revendre après
dans leur pays (des "shop-tours"). C'est une activité individuelle qui n'est pas
enrégistrée et qui est difficile à controler.
6 Les catégories de paysans, médecin, techniciens et professeur de
l'enseignement secondaire n'existent pas dans notre échantillon.
7 A titre de comparaison on peut indiquer les chiffres concernant les 12 patrons
des grandes entreprises: 3 ont été des cadres diregeants dans des banques
d'Etat; 6 - anciens dirigeants d'entreprises; 1 - secrétaire du Comité central du
Komsomol; 2 - anciens cadres ministériels.
8 Cf. Nelson., Babaeva L., Babaev R. Perspektivi predprininiatel'stva v Rossii
(Les perspectives de l'activité d'entrepreneur en Russie) /  Sociologitcheskie
issledovania (Recherches sociologiques), 1993, n°1, ibid. Fetisov E., Yakovlev
1., 0 socialnich aspectach predprinimatel'stva (Sur les aspects sociaux d'activité
d'entrepreneurs); Crichtanovskaya 0., Enta rossiyskogo biznesa (L'élite du
monde des affaires russe) / Kouraпty, 12 mai 1994; Climova S., Dunaevsky
L., Novie predprinimateli i staraya cultura (Les nouveaux entrepreneurs et
l'ancienne culture) / Sociologitcheskie issledovania (Recherches
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9 Grichtcheпko J., Novikova L., Lapcha L, Socŕalпŕy portret predprŕпŕmatela:
Minsk, vesna 1992 (Le portrait sociologique d'un entrepreneur: Minsk,
printemps 1992) / Sociologitcheskie issledovania (Recherches sociologiques),
1992, n°9, pp.53-61.
10 Trois boutiquiers sont actuellement étudiants dans des Ecoles supérieures.
11 Le système de notes à l'école primaire et secondaire est à cinq notes ("1" -
Ia plus basse et "5" - la plus haute).
12 L'équivalent du CM 1-CM2 dans le système français.
13 Une société fermée par actions est une entreprise dont le nombre
d'actionnaires est limité en permanence par l'indiction qui frappe les détenteur
d'action, de vendre ouvertement (par exemple à la bourse) leurs actions à des
personnes extérieures à la société. Ce qui permet de limiter le nombre
d'actionnaires.
14 Paradoxalement le meme phénomène s'observe aussi pour le marché du
livre où les livres les plus chers (surtout les beaux livres et les dictionnaires)
se vendent très vite ("comme des petits pains").
15 Коииrапty, n°159, 24 aout 1993.
16 Lepekhin V. Les principaux business-clubs de Russie, Vlast' ("Pouvoir"),
n°5, 1994.
17 Nous avons obtenu cette information par un entretien avec un repŕésentant
d'une grande banque occidentale dont la filiale est située à Moscou.
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Eastern Europe's Nouveaux Riches
Steven Sampson
"There are two kinds of people in our country: the ones
who drive Mercedes and the ones who sell bananas."
Albanian medical student, summer 1994.
What is privatization all about?
When "privatization" is discussed in terms of Eastern Europe,
the immediate connotation is that control over certain public or
anonymous goods devolves down into individual hands. Privatization
is considered a good thing. The World Bank, East European politicians,
and foreign consultants from the EU all advocate it. Privatization in
Eastern Europe is not simply a transition to a market economy. It is
also a transition to a consumer society. It is a society where
consumption, taste, and the culture of goods all require the construction
of new meanings, of new principles of organization. The consumer
society redefines "who 1 am" and "who I am not". Amidst all the talk
about Eastern Europe's ethnic  identity problems, we seem to forget
about all the other identities being forged. Talk about businessmen
versus mafiosi, about "talent" versus "connections", about being
"cultivated" versus the "vulgar" is talk about identity as well. http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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These nouveaux riches display their status in various public fora.
They are the topic of conversation among those who are jealous or
condescending. They are claimed to be both the coming driving force
of the new societies, and the parasitic group fostering inequality and
inhumane behavior. They are the upwardly mobile new middle class,
and they are the mafiıa.
They are rich, and they have bad taste. Derided as new rich
without refinement, unable to turn their money into culture, the
nouveaux riches are a kind of public topic to be consumed in the new
Eastern Europe. In this sense, the nouveaux riches in East may be
considered a kind of case of "Distinction Orientale" to use Bourdieu's
work. However, there is a problem for the East European nouveaux
riches: it is a problem of establishing models for consumptions. In a
society where some of those driving Mercedes themselves recently
sold bananas, who gives them cultural models?
It is this insecurity of cultural behavior, centered on an insecurity
in consumption, which will be the focus of this paper. How does this
class in formation resolve problems of insecurity? How do people turn
their money into culture? The data will derive principally from Romania,
with additional examples from Hungary. Subsequent studies are planned
in ex-DDR and Poland.
The problem of the nouveaux riches
The dilemma of nouveaux riches is hardly new. It is a
displacement between economic resources and social status. Here again,
it reflects an old problem that economic, social and cultural hegemony
ought to overlap. The problem is that it often does not: those with
culture or sacred knowledge may not be the materially wealthy; those
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Bourdieu has tried to resolve this problem by his detailed analysis
of the kinds of capital among French elites. It is not simply a case that
many people with high cultural refinement do not necessarily possess
the material resources, and vice versa. The problem is also one of
determining which groupe defines an elite. The power to make
distictions is the core of elite power, and this is inherently a function of
cultural capital rather than pure money capital.
The "transition" in Eastern Europe is a transition in the kinds of
capital which predominate, and in the way by which one kind of capital
is converted or not converted into another. The nouveaux riches are
both actors and victimes in this process of "capital conversion".
The problem for the nouveaux riches is to resolve the incongruity
between newly acquired material resources and lack of cultural
hegemony. The problem takes the form of the strategies pursued by
the nouveaux riches to displace existing ruling classes. Historically,
some of these class struggles have seen the old norms discarded and
replaced: the aristocracy is killed and their cultural forms stigmatized
or outlawed; this is certainly what happened in the USSR in 1917 and
in most of Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba after 1945 (1959).
However, other possibilities could arise, the new class might try
to appropriate the forms of the old elite. When such attempts at
redefining cultural canons of taste do not succeed, we get stories of
kitsch, vulgarity and bad taste. The annals of social scientists, stories
of the aristocracy and Old Rich, and a considerable body of American
novels, films and television are filled with tales of upwardly mobile
strivers who somehow do not know to achieve such refinement.
Acquiring cultural capital is often more difffıcult, and certainly more
time consuming, than acquiring money capital. it takes a cultural
investment, and one or more generations.
The trajectory from vulgar to refined may be predictable when
there is a cultured old rich to emulate, as is the case in Western Europe
or the United States. But what happens when this old rich is lacking or http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
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invisible, as was the case in Eastern Europe? Where does the new
wealthy, consumption class look out to find their models for cultural
behavior? How are material resources converted into cultural capital
(McCracken 1988, Douglas and Isherwood, 1978; Appadurai, 1986,
Miller 1987).
And more important, to be taken up later, why should this
happen? Why are the nouveaux riches not content to remain vulgar?
Why, as in Budapest, do the nouveaux riches spend all this time going
to the Opera? Why start up literary salons and invite poets to hold
court in your home? Why, as in Romania, establish clubs where poets
and actresses can come? What is this magic dust which people of culture
have and which those with new money want?
The problem for the nouveaux riches is resolving this
discontinuity between material, social, political and cultural status. The
dilemma is sought resolved not by dismissing or ignoring the cultural
dimensions, nor by any sort of cultural revolution, but in using all one's
material resources to acquire the cultural patterns of the class being
displaced. One hires tutors. One learns how to dress correctly. Clubs
are set up. Wives go to aerobics. Home decorators, dog breeding, and
trips to Asia become important. Private schools, private clubs, and
etiquette books. One buys art. The nouveaux riches, like all insecure
new classes, are culturally conservative.
Resolving this insecurity, turning money into culture, can only
be accomplished by a public demonstration of mastery over cultural
things and activities. Mastery here can be considered to comprise the
individual's ability to manipulate culturally valued symbols in the
culturally correct way. The opposite of mastery here is vulgarity. The
vulgar rich may possess something or act out an activity, but manipulate
it imperfectly, thus revealing their lack of cultural competence.
The proper consumption of things and their public demonstration,
creating a lifestyle, thus becomes the key to any  nouveaux riches cultural
campaign. Following McCracken, this can be accomplished by catching
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hold of culturally constituted meanings as imparted by those with
cultural capital, and demonstrating mastery over them. The hunt for
things with meaning takes place in the social world of the nouveaux
riches, in their interaction with the culturally sophisticated, in their
imparting of value to specific material goods. At the individual level
this search for meaning is reflected in individual consumer behavior.
So far I have discribed a general problem for the nouveaux riches.
It is a problem of appropriating and manipulating those goods and
activities associated with taste. This pulls the nouveaux riches up. To
pull them over the top would entail a situation where the nouveaux
riches themselves determine these judgements. As yet this has not yet
happened.
Bourdieu takes the problem of the "judgement of taste" as
unproblematic. But it is here, in the field of judgement, that Eastern
Europe seems to differ. In a society where conspicuous consumption
was suspect and old cultured aristocracy invisible, if not liquidated,
who determines judgement. How do we judge taste when there is no
authority of judgement?
We might see the real class struggle in Eastern Europe not as
one between groups fighting over hegemony, but as a struggle to obtain
the position of defining taste. At the moment, judging from the foreign
etiquette books and cult of foreign TV, the arbiters of taste come from
outside, from the West. And here is the stuff of globalization and
distorted meaning transfer. When meanings and cultural phenomena
cross borders they get distorted. Here appear some of the differences
between Eastern Europeans and the nouveaux riches experiences
generally. Let me try to summarize them.
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Eastern Europe and the transition to consumerism
The transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe is not synonymous
with the emergence of an elite out of a faceless mass. There was an
elite, and it was called, appropriately "them". "They" were the
nomenclature, those who held power, influence and could pass it on to
their childen by virtue of their position in the state and party apparatus.
The transition to privatization has not eleminated the "us"/"them"
distinction. Rather it reformulates the principles behind these categories.
"They" have now become those with money and privilege who flout it
openly. The use of the term "mafia" to denote virtually any network of
which one is not a member has been extended to cover this "them".
The state functionaries who were once a privileged caste have now
acquired an "us" feeling as they see their salaries drop and their chances
to draw on informal resources disappear: the market takes the place of
bureaucratic corruption.
"Them" are endowed with several traits. Generally their succes
is seen as being due to hidden advantages, connections, corruption,
ruthlessness, anything but talent.
Cultural capital in Eastern Europe
• While some of the early socialist leaders were urban intellectuals
(culture with or without money), the bureaucratic ruling class was often
recruited from peasants and workers lacking both culture and money.
It was a case of political capital replacing those with money or cultural
capital. This new elite came to power in an Eastern Europe which was
bereft of cultural models. "They wore shirts with open collars", as
Konrad and Szelenyi wrote in 1974.
Communist elites could convert material resources into cultural
capital: they could pay for private tutoring from the old elite, invite
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prominent cultural personalities in their circles, get their children into
good schools or travel abroad. Unlike money capital, cultural capital
could be retained by their childen after their parents lost positions in
the apparatus.
In pre-1989 Eastern Europe, there was certainly an obsession
with obtaining and consuming scarce resources. But these were not
consumer societies as one might think. A truly consumer society has
to involve open display and demonstration of taste. A mass consumer
society involves diffusion of information about standards of taste, about
changes in these standards, about who judges what as "in"or  "out".
One needs arbiters of good taste and centers of consumer choice.
The state controlled economies discouraged and prevented this
kind of consumerism. Consumption had low priority and was considered
ideologically dangerous. The consumption patterns of the upper classes
were well hidden from the rest of society. Consumption differences
were also limited in a society where everyone had the same car, where
the number of restaurants was few and roughly the same fare, where
the official style was conservative and where too much individuality
was not politically correct or prudent from a career point of view. It
was no accident that state functionaries, the faceless apparatchiks, even
looked the same right down to their being clean shaven, same hair
style, and dark suits. Without trend setters there could be no trends,
and without trends, no markers of style; there was neither good taste
nor vulgarity, but simply mediocrity.
The elites lived well of course, certainly better than the general
population. But their tastes were rather mediocre or kitsch. A visit to
Honeckers or Ceausescu's villas after the revolutions show not
extravagance as much as a kind of dull kitsch style.
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Tke 1989 revolutions
The principle effect of the 1989 revolutions was to allow Western
cultural goods to enter these societies virtually unhindered, and to allow
East Europeans to acquire these goods in the West via travel. The real
revolution, as so many East Europeans discovered, was a revolution in
consumerism. Even East Germans, who each night had watched West
German TV, remained dumbfounded as they prowled Berlin looking
at the consumer society in person (Bornemann 1990).
The political opening of Eastern Europe affected people's
economic and personal horizons. Scarcities of staples diappeared and
were replaced by high prices. There arose the problem of consumer
choice: to buy the locally produced TV or the Sony. A new "them"
arose, the "them" who had acquired money. Envy of those with money
was nearly universal. After all, some people don't want power, but
everyone wants money. That those with money could now display their
wealth made the situation that much sharper. Displays of wealth tied
up with ethnic differences were especially provocative, as shown by
the derision and attacks on Gypsies and Hungarians in Romania,
Georgians in Russia and Wessies in Eastern Germany.
A new cult of entrepreneurship arose. Entrepreneurial intentions
were viewed as positive by only 25% of thr Hungarian population in
1988, and today by almost half. (Lengyel and Toth, 1993, Lengyel,
Offe and Tholen, 1992). Words like spekulant and biznitza  are now
replaced by the more positively connotated businessman or the negative
mafiosi.
The importance of the 1989 revolutions is they laid the
groundwork for consumerism as a means of expressing class affiliation
and identity. The 1989 revolutions are the first to bring with them
consumerism and lifestyle. The results have been immediate and
massive, much more massive than the large scale institutional problems
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of democracy and privatization. Consumerism takes place not at a
structural level but an individual level.
Who are `nouveaux riches'?
Used here, several types of nouveaux riches have arisen in Eastern
Europe according to their social "roots". Such a categorization is
deceptive, however, because it implies that the individuals enter only
one category and remain there. In real life, we can find the same
individuals moving in and out of these categories in the course of a
day, week or month. They can be both legal and illegal speculator,
struggling shopkeeper or well off businessmen. For analytical purposes,
however, we can distinguish the following:
1. Former party and state officials who use social relations to
establish themselves as private businessmen or managers of newly
privatized state firms. Such individuals are called "parachutists" by
Stark (1990) because they jump from the political to the economic
sphere. The folklore regarding nouveaux riches is that all the old elite
have become rich businessmen. Like all stereotypes, the parachutists
metaphor contains an element of truth: conversion of political position
into money has certainly taken place at different rates in Eastern Europe.
2. Former players in the second economy whose activities (legal,
semiillegal, illegal) are now permitted or at least tolerated (Sampson
1987,1988). Those who changed money on the black market of did
some petty smuggling are now bankers and importer-exporters. Like
so-much second economy activities, and in an atmosphere of lacking
law enforcement legal regulations, much private business operates in a
grey zone of legality. In other words, some of the nouveaux riches
from this category are criminals.
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3. Former state employees, many with higher technical or
professional training and "culture", who leave state employment to
start their own small firms. These may be free lance architects, computer
consultants, or opening small restaurants or antique shops in the home
of their parents. These classic entrepreneurs may parlay their social
networks or cultural capital into a business venture. And they can
become rich.
4. Former wage workers who lose their jobs and are forced to
open small shops, kiosks, video rentals or food shops in order to survive.
Here we may speak not so much of entrepreneurship as much as
desperation. The situations resembles that of "ethnic business" in
Western Europe (Sampson 1990) in which small household service
shops compete with each other in a cutthroat, labor intensive market.
The "kiosk culture" of any major East European city is typical of this
situation for former wage earners whose enterprises have closed. Some
of these individuals who start shops or sell their services as mechanics,
or cafe owners, etc. may earn a lot of money at the upswing of such a
conjuncture. However, recent observations suggest that in a later phase
many will fail due to a saturation on the market and failure to keep
apace with changing tastes.
5. "Traditional" liberal professionals or craftsmen who in various
East European countries (ex-DDR, Poland, Hungary) were allowed to
practice their trades. Privatization, and the ability to offer more services
to nouveaux riches, has made these individuals especially successful.
The five categories above have little in common as to cultural
backround or political position. What joins them is that they are now
able and willing to demonstrate good taste, but that is for some groups
the canons of taste are lacking. Good taste must be recognized. It
demands authorities and it requires confirmation. Taste is not an
individual property but a social one. Good taste is the power to
manipulate key culture principles authoritatively. And to be imitated.
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Moreover, it is clear that some members of the above categories
are better able to demonstrate good taste than others. Those with political
capital from the old regime may have been able to acquire some cultural
capital and in this sense feel a sense of identity with those in group 3.
Those in group 3, however, may feel hostile toward the newcomers,
deriding them for their lack of talent. Mistake ś in utilizing cultural
symbols may be more common for groups 1, 2 and 4 than others.
Finally, the fluid situation in Eastern Europe often forces these
categories together in an unholy alliance. Uncertain legal regulations
or unenforceable laws forces different categories to mix, or compels a
member of one group to take the characteristics ofanother group. Highly
educated specialists with old cultural capital suddenly have to do
business with local mafiosi who have cornered the real estate market
or who can provide a way through the customs bureaucracy. Those
with culture are forced to cooperate with those who have money.
In sum, the transition in Eastern Europe is about "capitalism"
and about the emergence of new classes. The former nomenclature are
tenaciously trying to hold onto their privileges in the state or to privatize
state property via subterfuge. The new poor are certainly jealous of the
new rich.
But this class struggle is not the only kind of struggle going on.
There is a struggle between groups to convert their capital into
something else: parachutists are trying to convert political into money
capital; aspiring nouveaux riches are trying to convert (or augment)
their money into cultural capital; the professional free-lance
entrepreneurs are trying to convert their cultural capital into money
capital, and so on. Missing in this circle of capital conversions is the
conversion of money capital into political capital. As yet, the particular
conversion has not taken place, except in the sphere of illegal economic
ativity: the mafiosi, who have made money and try to politically
dominate the illegal market are an example of the conversion of money
into political domination via violence.
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00461236_v1 
Contributeur : Eliane DaphyEastern Europe's Nouveaux Riches 103
The nouveaux riches' aversion to politics may be understood
simply in terms of trade off between political and economic spheres.
Parachutists are in effect abandoning a sinking ship. One newly wealthy
construction boss in Albania, who also has to make money by exploiting
the embargo against ex-Yugoslavia, expressed it more succinctly when
I asked him about politics. He waved a wad of 100 dollar bills in my
face and said, "This is my party. The money party.".
The struggle between different forms of capital and the efforts
to convert one form into another, or augment the capital one has certainly
varies from one country to another. The different communist regimes
also influenced the speed and the character of the transition and the
kinds of nouveaux riches groups which have emerged. It is instructive
here to compare Hungary and Romania. Hungary is the home of refined
central European taste and vulgar exhibitionism. Romania is a more
frontier society in which the nouveaux riches find it harder to locate
alternative cultural models and more difficult to replicate them.
Romania is the home of vulgar kitsch. It is a place where men can walk
around thinking they are J.R. and women may have their only model
of refinement from Sue Ellen. There are reasons why.
Romania versus Hungary
Romania under Ceausescu was one of the most economically
and politically rigid of the Est European states. Its private sector was
the smallest in Eastern Europe and its living standards so low that even
the most privileged functionaries lived modestly by Western standards.
Excepting.the Ceausescu family, wealthy Romani as were hidden from
public view, their wealth consisting of not having to be forced to stand
in line for food. Romania, to 1989 was a nasty place for just about
everybody, which can explain why Ceausescu was killed by people in
his very own apparatus.
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Hungary, in contrast, had begun to evolve a private sector in the
early 1970's, a sector which was legal, semi-legal and illegal (second
economy research was itself a largely Hungarian enterprise conducted
at Karl Marx university, which, like similar institutions in Eastern
Europe, has had little trouble retooling its staff to teach business and
management). Privatization in Hungary had begun in 1968, whereas in
Romania it first began in 1991. Hungary's domestic political regime,
led by the slogan " He who is not against us is with us" encouraged the
channeling of any political discontent into privatized intellectual activity
or private economic activity. Hungary was the country of salons, cafes,
small entrepreneurs and private restaurants. If someone couldn't get
rich, it was thought, it was largely their own fault for not exploiting
networks (Kenedi 1982). Hungary thus saw the emergence of a limited
nouveaux riches class early on, largely from traditional liberal
professionals and craftsmen, whereas Romania did not.
The two countries also contrasted in the presence of culturally
refined models to be followed. Hungary had never totally eliminated
its old rich or cultured aristocracy. Models of refined behavior,-
Hungarian, Central European, bourgeois, cosmopolitan, urbane-
continued in the socialist period and were revived through the 1970's
and 1980's as a form of resistance to the proletarian cultural chauvinism
of the Kadar regime. Being cultured in Hungary was to be intellectual,
to travel (they had the chance), to appreciate high and avant garde
culture, to learn English, to invest in the cultural refinement of one's
children via private tutoring, getting the right friends, and even in the
right kind of young people's salon. This overshadowed the fact that
the political elite had its own restricted neighborhood in the hills of
Buda.
Romania had also had a small cultured aristocracy before the
socialist period. After 1945 the cultured Jewish and German elites left
the country, while the indigenous francophone Romanian elite barely
survived, and struggled to pass on what cultural capital they had to
their children. Widows of impoverished aristocrats would hold private
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language classes in their homes. The salon of Madam 0. would bring
together children to learn French, but also fostered like minded views
of the world in a private, elite setting (in what must be a typical sign of
Transition envy, a study of the these elite children from the 50's is
being carried out by the Museum of the Romanian Peasant.)
The Hungarian aristocracy, old bourgeoisie and urban Jewish
elites survived the socialist period in much better shape. They were
able to protect, and project their cultural models easier and remained
more visible than their Romanian counterparts. The small, powerless
Romanian cultured elite, suffering a Mao-like assault from the
Ceausescu regime from the early 1970's was largely immobilized  and
invisible in the dark night which was Romania in the 1980's. The social
gap between the Romanian iioiiveaux riches and the old rich was much
larger. The desperation of the old rich or culturally refined can now be
observed in the many antique shops in Bucharest, in which the material
culture oftlıe old elite is now being auctioned off to the highest bidder,
inevitably the nouvear'x riches.
Hungary, then, had a more gradual entry into the world of
consumerism, whereas Roniania in 1990 suffered a shock. Hungary's
indigenous cultural elite and more urbanized society was able to publicly
effect the values and culturally refined behavior of the  nouveaux riches
to a much greater extent than Romania. Hungarian noiiveaiix riches
were able to become cultured. In Romania it seemed that there were
those with money and no culture, and those with culture and no money.
Finally, Hungary had prolonged and widespread access to alternative
cultural models from the West; these were neither rejected outright in
the socialist period, nor grabbed up whoesale in the frantic post-1989
euphoria as occurred in Roniania. It is possible that Hungary in the
1970's was as vulgar as Romania in the 1990s and in this sense the
Hungarian pattern may be reappearing in Romania today.
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Romania's new rich
Romania's economy and society was dominated by brutal
repression and ecomomic and social homogenization. A small cultural
elite dwelled in Bucharest and in the older cultural capitals of
Transylvania-Cluj and Timisoara. The country was poor, repressed and
isolated. Privatization was lacking and private display not only
impossible, but in the atmosphere of the Ceausescu regime, virtually
illegal. Low standards of living and the spartan attitude of the Ceausescu
family kept Romania at a consumer standstill. Being rich in Romnia
meant not having to stand in line for meat, sugar and coffee.
The december 1989 revolution brought an upsurge of small-scale
economic activity. Small time wheeling and dealing abounded as
Romanians who had operated in the black and grey markets now
traveled across the border to buy blue jeans or electronic goods, selling
their merchandise in flea markets or street corners. In a legal vacuum
many small private enterprises were created, and those who got in on
the ground floor got rich. Or at least this is how most Romanians
remember it. Businessmen were still considered criminal, speculators,
and subsequently, mafiosi. This Stalinist thinking was combined with
resurgent ethnic tensions, as so many street traders were Gypsies.
While some nouveaux riches were emerging from among the
ranks of street traders, some members of the former secret police
apparatus (the securitate) were parlaying their foreign currency holdings
and foreign contacts into more discrete import-export companies. For
most Romanians, the image of the nouveuax riches was that any private
entrepreneur who was not a Gypsy smuggler or criminal was simply
assumed to be a former securitate  . Since holding foreign currency had
been a criminal offense, who else could have had such start up capital
during the Ceausescu regime. In this sense there began the notion that
"all the securitate became rich", and that they all became "mafiotz".
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Privatization went slowly in Romania, so that the parachutist
ex-secret police firms also evolved slowly. By late 1990, however,
there existed plenty of public fora and opportunities for new riches to
display their wealth without fear of arrest or prosecution. Romania,
Europe's poorest country, became filled with Mercedes and expensive
restaurants. (The Mercedes cult has some interesting details. First, it
has penetrated every East European country, lately Albania where it is
called "Benz". Second, the lack of yearly style changes means that
there is very little outward difference between an older cheaper model
and the newer luxury one. "He worked three month and brought back a
Mercedes" became a staple conversation in Romania, and now Albania.
The year or model of the car is unimportant. Romanians in fact brought
back so many ancient cars from autoyards of Western Europe that there
is now a law preventing the import of cars over 8 years old).
In the fora of privatization, the emergence of many categories
of nouveaux riches did not so much generate economic competition as
it did cultural envy. After all, Gypsy traders, former secret police import-
export firms, private computer consultants or kiosk owners don't really
compete. They do need each other's services, however, and in this
sense create contact. Educated, free-lance entrepreneurs, for example,
found it hard to establish small enterprises. They lacked start-up capital,
did not have the right connections in the bureaucacy or did not know
how to skirt around regulations. Many complained that they simply
lacked the necessary ruthlessness. Local kiosk or fast food owners
needed help in obtaining supplies. Explaining their problems took on
the character of attributing unfair cultural characteristics to their
opponents. The new entrepreneurs possessing education complained
that they had "qualification" while the others were "criminals" or lacked
talent. "If I had their connections I would be rich too", was the refrain.
For their part, the former nomenclaturists never spoke of their
social networks, but rather, of their "vision", "desire", "discipline" and
"hard work". Former party bosses, communist party officials, secret
police officers who were staunch defenders of socialism now mouthed
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the Protestant Ethic. They insisted that those who protest "just don't
understand how to work hard."
In contrast to the free lancers who complained of lazy, untrained
employees and parasitic officials, the parachutists talked of being able
to "understand" their employees so as to ease the transition. In their
offices there was a much more patron-like atmosphere, where the
employees were loyal to their boss. In fact such understanding was a
big problem for the free lancers as well: an architect starting her own
firm took with her some of her colleagues from the state planning office
where they worked; they had all been friends. She quickly found herself
in conflict with them, unable to maintain cordial relations and to
simultaneously pressure them for more performance.
The parachutists did not just invoke a Protestant Ethic in terms
of their work. They saw their work as a kind of calling, as a patriotic
duty to elevate Romania back up and "show the West what we could
do". This was a continuity with their patriotism during the Ceausescu
regime, in which a major businessmen could assert, "I worked for the
secret police and I'm not embarrassed about what I did".
The academically trained consultants and freelancers saw
themselves not as patriots but as independent entrepreneurs using their
natural talents to realize something. Trying to convert their cultural
capital into economic capital and political independence, they criticized
everyone for their lack of work ethic, fear or narrowmindedness and
"lack of culture." One might also note a political struggle between the
two groups: the academic freelancrs were often anglophone and worked
for Western companies or aid foundations. The parachutists often did
more commercial work with many Arab or Turkish firms. Inasmuch as
the parachutists were often cut off from Western contacts they were
also xenophobic.
The struggle for hegemony between these two groups of
nouveaux riches thus revolved around two kinds of discourses: one
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or lack of culture. The academic free lancers condemned the parachutist,
ex-black marketers and speculators for illegitimately obtained wealth:
"they" were preventing "us" from earning a rightful share of the money
which accrues to "our" level of talent or training. Listening to these
laments, it was as if cultural refinement as such ought to be rewarded
with economic resources.
Yet both the culturally refined academics, who criticize others
for their ill-gotten wealth, vulgarity and bad taste, operate on an identical
premise as their opponents: namely, that economic status and cultural
refinement ought to overlap. The value is not only the means to achieve
it.
The parachutists, too, were never content with simple _money
succes. Asked what they would like to do with their money, they talked
about converting their money into culture: they wanted to establish a
"foundation", to start an association to restore old buildings, to build a
museum or a monument to Romania heros. Several of them are linked
to the bustling private universities which now awarded Ph.D. degrees
to former officials of the old regime. The Ph.D. is still the sign of
cultural capital in Romania. Mrs. Ceausescu, with a fourth grade
education coveted her Ph.D. in chemistry, and all three of their children
had them as well.
Marking status
How do Romanian nouveaux riches attempt to consolidate their
status? How do they convert money into culture? One way is to find
the proper forums where they can both demonstrate and refine their
cultural mastery. One is via private or semi-private restaurants. in
Bucharest, Ceausescu's own grand compound, found on Boulevard
Kalinin, is now Club 11íe Nastase, the street renamed Boulevard Mircea
Eliade. The club has a pool and social facilities and members of the
ruling political party hold meetings there. The club has a restaurant
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which prides itself on not serving Romanian food. The restaurant is
located near the homes of the old nomenclatura, and these dwellinga
are now being bought and refurbished by parachutist nouveaux riches.
Other restaurants, such as "Select" or "Velvet" speak for
themselves as locations where parachutists can meet. The "Vienna"
makes a point that its floor show does NOT include nudity, making it
exceptional in the Bucharest night scene where nude dancing is not
only performed, but where the dancers' relations with clients have now
reached the so-called "contact" stage. Other public forums include
concerts and the yearly Crystal Ball, with an entry fee equal to bout a
month's salary for a minister.
In the absence of being born cultured, nouveaux riches require
cultural pedagogues. All the eastern countries have acquired best selling
etiquette books, instructing people how to treat foreigners at dinner,
how to serve caviar, how to have a cocktail party, and other phenomena
heretofore foreign to Romanian life. One of these is simply an eight-
page-brochure available at the Bucharest train station which begins,
"The transition to a market economy requires new forms of social
behavior...." Some of these books and columns are writtten by returned
exiles. In both Hungary and Romania there are celebrity exiles who
decide on good taste. Other etiquette books are simply translated from
American books.
A problem with restaurants is that anyone, rich Gypsy traders,
for example, can enter. Hence, there has been a move to establish private
clubs in which the clientele can be more selective: no Gypsies, no petty
Turkish or Arab traders. One club was open not only to business people
but also to poets, actors, and Western businessmen and diplomats. A
club of this sort would seem incongruous in the West. In Romania,
however, it represents a forum for both money and cultural capital. We
can see artistes and Western diplomats as possessing a kind of magic
dust. It is magic because it comes from beyond and in unlimited
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quantities. And it is dust because it can settle anywhere. In such a club,
cultural capital can rub off.
The magic of Westerners is not just mystical of course. Western
foreigners, and things western, have a mystique about them in Eastern
Europe. Access to western popular and material culture was so long
forbidden. Today it is a common beliefthat it is only foreign connections
which enables anyone to take money. The cult of the foreigner pervades
East-West rhetoric at several levels. it occurs in European Community
development programs where the West makes demands on the East. It
occurs in debates about whether Romania is bowing down to foreigners,
selling out to foreigners, "entering Europe", and in the critique of
Western treatment of Romania with phrases like " we are not Burundi"
etc. Little wonder, then, that Western foreigners obtain magical status
in these clubs. They come from a world which is transmitted to the
Romanians via media-Dallas, etc.- but it is a world which they do not
know first hand. It is a magic world, and Westerners, along with artistes,
have magic dust.
There may come a time when businessmen's clubs may decide
that actors, poets and Western diplomats are unnecessary. Businessmen
may decide to convert their economic capital into political capital
instead of searching after culture. We may also find the nouveaux riches
becoming more discrete. Already some of Bucharest's richest people
drive their Romanians cars in Bucharest and take out their Mercedes
only when they leave town. If discretion is the sign of cultivated wealth,
then some Romanian wealthy should be getting cultivated. As of now,
however, it has not occurred.
The future: a Hungarian scenario
What is the future for a Romanian nouveau riche? Here Hungary
is an instructive example. Hungary's nouveaux riches are now rapidly
becoming cultivated. Cіltural pedagogical materials are more available
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in sophisticated magazines like "Private Profit", "Elite" and
"Beautiful Home", not to mention the all-important Hungarian
"Playboy" a favorite of intellectuals with its guide to good food,
drink and social mores. More Westerners visit Hungary and provide
models of behavior, although many of these people, befitting those
doing business in the Wild East, would number among the vulgar
rich in the West. The literary salon, an informal gathering of
intellectuals built around a reading followed by drinking, has emerged
as one forum where Hungarian nouveaux riches attempt to recruit
cultural pedagogues, in what appears as a form of bribery. Hungarian
intellectuals tell stories of nouveaux riches who wanted to attend or
sponsor established salons but being unable to. The Hungarian media
seems more attuned to trends among the nouveaux riches group:
when they move into new neighborhoods, when they replace the
Mercedes with the BMW or Volvo, when they acquire an interest in
new hobbies such as dog breeding, and when they enter they buy art
or suddenly decide that artificial flowers are in.
Some conclusion: converting capital
The world of transitional Eastern Europe is indeed a "world
of goods" (Douglas and Isherwood 1978). Insofar as "goods help
substantiate the order of culture" (McCracken 1988:75) the strugggle
to use goods appropriately helps form and consolidate the many
types of nouveaux riches in Eastern Europe.
Ironically, we hear about 1989 as the year of revolution and
the period afterwards as "transition". In fact, it is only now that the
real revolutions are taking place. They are revolutions in cultural
attitudes and behavior which are as profound as anything experienced
in 1917 or 1989.
Finally, the study of nouveaux riches necessitates a rethinking
about two aspects: the assumption of overlap between the different
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forms of dominance - economic, political, social, cultural - and the
process whereby one form of capital is converted or transformed into
two individuals or groups may not necessarily mean that one person
only to be transferred or imparted. Hence, it may be possible to map
out a variety of capital transfer processes in which capital may be
converted, supplemented, augmented or duplicated. Contact between
two individuals or groups may not necessarily mean that one person
loses what the other acquires. Perhaps the whole concept of cultural
capital should be replaced by "magic dust".
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How have managers changed since the so-called `golden age'
of career stability of the mid-century decades? In this paper I look
back at the 1960s, drawing mainly on Managers and their Wives,
published in 1971. 1 I then turn to studies documenting the situation in
the late 1980s and my own extended interviews with more senior
managers in 1990.2
One change, which seems to be generally accepted, is that
managers have a succession of jobs rather than the `career' which may
have existed in some previous golden age - for a few years perhaps in
the 1950s. Some may claim that at that time managers `could be
reasonably optimistic about their career prospects' 3 but it is generally
the case that those who argue thus base their position more on American
material than on British. W.H. Whyte's book on The Organization Man
was first published in Britain in 1957 and later by Penguin Books in
1965 and it soon became a benchmark from which commentators felt
change could be measured. Goldner's article on `Demotion in Industrial
Management' was published in America in the same year but despite
its seemingly greater relevance to the British situation than Whyte's
book, it has largely been ignored.4 The assumption that American
cultural traits of mid-twentieth-century applied equally significantly
to European countries is highly questionable. The interchangeability
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of ethnography of that period between America and Britain was a
product of the intellectual convergence which came with the fashionable
notion of convergence of industrial societies.5 British sociology in the
mid-1960s was at a pretty modest level of development and there was
a tendency to follow American lines of thought more uncritically,
perhaps, than would be acceptable thirty years later. We now have our
own stars to give us light.
Clearly, we must be careful not to create a myth of relatively
privileged managers enjoying what Scase and Goffee call their
`customary benefits' in the 1960s, to serve as a contrast to what became
the insecure, `Reluctant Managers' of the late 1980s. Nevertheless,
there have been changes - not least in the introduction of new technology
and in corporate restructuring - but there are also many more managers
proportionately and absolutely now than there were in the 1960s and
an increasing, although still small, proportion of these are women.
The changes for the British managers in the second half of the
twentieth-century in Britain have, indeed, been substantial. There were
some hints in the 1960s of what was to come. The British Institute of
Management published a Report in 1969 entitled The Experienced 
Manager as part of a programme designed to explore the training and
development needs of older managers. Reflecting the thinking of that
period, the author described the `career progress of the average
manager'. `On entering the company, especially if he (sic) joins as a
trainee, he will normally be put through a form of processing. in addition
to indoctrination in the ways of the company he will be encouraged to
see his career as one of uninterrupted and loyal advancement.'6 If one
substituted the phrase `communist party' for `company' in that quotation
most people reading it in the 1990s might well consider that it made
better sense. Certainly it illustrates how little the so-called liberating
1960s affected management thinking. But there were worrying clouds
on the horizon. The author of the Report goes on to note `The time may
well come when that in which the experienced manager is an expert is
of diminishing value to the company. The cycle of usefulness of
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expertise is shortening as the technological and economic operations
of the companies become more complex.'
Twenty four years later `the cult of insecurity' could be
discussed as part of the conventional wisdom of the middle class. As
one commentator observed:
A new branch of management theory says that the
`casualization' of the middle classes is not just the result of
cost-cutting in a recession but an efficient and rational response
to the modern world. In a language that sounds like a second
cousin to English, they justify the sacking of middle managers
with talk of `down-sizing' and `right-sizing' of 'delayering'
and `flattening' of `shedding' and `process engineering'.7
The same account, written in 1993, claimed that 8 per cent of
Civil Service jobs - 44,250 people - have had the management of their
jobs put out to tender. This process of `market testing', whereby officials
compete against private companies bidding to manage their work, is
planned to continue `until all 555,000 civil servants have been
confronted by the market'. British Telecom reduced its managers and
staff by 80,000 from 1989 to 1993. The feature was headed `Nobody is
Safe'.
This shift from `uninterrupted and loyal advancement' to a
situation where `nobody is safe' is one of the greatest changes of the
last quarter of the twentieth-century. It will do much to modify our
views of success in the next century.
Over the past thirty years, I have had the opportunity to discuss
managers' ideas about success, since my own research interest in the
topic spans that period.8 I can reflect now on the material reported in
Managers and their Wives - published in 1971 -and compare it with
interviews I have carried out over the last five years in preparation for
After Success. The study by Scase and Goffee provides an additional
valuable source, since it is based on a larger sample than I was able to
gather, drawn from six large organisations. The oldest manager in my
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sample, interviewed in the 1960s, was born in 1921; Scase and Goffee's
managers were mostly born after the second world war.
In the 1960s I was puzzled why managers in industry worked
so hard; I questioned in an ironical way whether they were `willing
slaves to the system': they appeared to have internalized an ideology
of self-coercion and were suffering the full force of the competitive
society. Commenting at the time on the men I first interviewed in 1965
and 19661 suggested that, `they must work hard to produce more, for
if they did not, somebody else would; markets would decline and even
managers can become redundant. They have no security'(sic). Their
only reassurance seemed to come from moving forward and upward
through a succession of jobs. `For them life is a hierarchy and success
means moving up in it ... very often it is the fear of failing rather than
positive aspiration to climb which pushes these men on. Those who
had an experience of downward social mobility in their family history
were among the most determined to have a successful career. They
work, then, because they are trapped in a competitive society: above
all they do not want to fall. The men were not, however, usually prepared
to admit that they were driven on for selfish, materialist reasons. They
would talk of "challenge" and "responsibility" as well as family
commitments.'9
Yet, paradoxically, a firm commitment to achieve `success'
was not, in general, typical of the managers of the 1960s. Few men
were advancing along a clear and structured career line. I got a sense,
when reading through the list of all the jobs they had done, of them
being pulled up the management hierarchy by luck or by having a patron
- or mentor as they are now called - who knew their name and suggested
it at a critical time.
Mr Ash, one of the managers in the 1960s sample, knew the
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i never set target dates ... partially because I am basically
superstitious ... i am certainly or probably going to be
disappointed if I plan too much ahead. As far as getting ahead
in the world is concerned, to me it means nothing specific. In
fact it is slightly distasteful and smacks of people with ruthless
ambition. I have never taken business seriously. Others rate
business success worth while for its own sake. 1 don't. Success
means no more to me than my personal job satisfaction and
more money. I don't admire successful businessmen .... I plan
things mentally but don't like to recognize that I am planning
it ... 1 thinkcabout it a lot but won't talk about it. This is probably
because i am superstitious as I said before ... I don't have much
choice - in fact i choose not to have much choice.
(Distribution Manager aged forty seven in 1968)
Mr Bridge was a head of department in 1968 and he revealed a
nervous insecurity. `Taking a job like this is often a way to fall flat on
your face. There's a danger at my age of not reaching a plateau but of
reaching a peak and then going down on the other side. This is a definite
danger. I've now got to engage in rat-race politics. I apply for promotion
thinking only of my masters - there is a need to be seen to be ambitious.'
(Department Head aged forty seven in 1968). A younger man, Mr
Petham, born in 1928, was a Sales Manager in 1968 but hoped
eventually to get on the main board of his company. `I always have
doubts íf I can do a job and I often wonder if the benefits are worth it in
terms of the quality of life that i have to lead as a result of the job. The
fınancial position that we are in does not improve generally because of
the increased expenses of a bigger house ... 1 don't think I've made any
conscious choice about my career other than taking promotion when it
was offered ... i don't see my career as a logical process apart from
staying in the technical sales side. it's more a series of sharp jumps. I
think I've come a very long way.' 10
The false image of the golden age of managerial careers seems
to be based on the notion that all managers were working for companies
like Unilever or BP. The reality was different. Most men moving
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experienced their working lives as going through a collection of jobs
which they retrospectively termed a career. As various surveys of the
1950s demonstrated, many managers had worked their way up, having
left school at fourteen but gaining skills and experience during the
war. Many had studied in the evening for professional qualifications,
had come a long way and were suspicious of `success'.1 1 Only 38 per
cent of my 1960s sample were graduates, the rest had risen on the
escalator of the post-war recovery from the 1950s. When I first took
part as a tutor on a course for managers in the early 1960s many of
them - maybe up to a half or more -were production engineers of one
sort or another, happy amid the oily, noisy machinery of the plant and
sceptical of the smooth-talking people on the sales side or those in the
unreal world of personnel. Accountants were particularly despised as
people `who did not know what industry was all about'. Mr ickham
who, as a thirty one year old management consultant in 1968, was a
high-flier was still absolutely sure that he did not want a son of his to
be an accountant. I remember in 1961 or 1962 having a debate with
managers on an AEi staff course on whether the goal of the company
should be to sell what it could make or make what it could sell. The
engineers, used to producing colossal turbo-generators for India or
wherever could not conceive of an alternative of selling what you could
make. Arnold Weinstock and his consumer durable revolution was yet
to come.12
I feel that looking back on my main 1960s study I was fortunate
in being able to catch glimpses of the stability and security of mid-
twentieth-century Britain.
The middle class managers of the 1960s emphasised the
importance of a `rounded personality', a `full person' and whilst they
always said they didn't mind what their sons did, the assumption they
made, either explicitly or implicitly, was that `a lawyer would be nice'
or a similar professional position. I didn't think to ask `And how would
you feel if your son dropped out and became a New Age Traveller?'
but i am pretty sure of the answer I would get. I suspect that when the
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age cohort of the established middle class is quite small it could afford
to be quite relaxed about being ambitious. A stress on stability, style
and `gentlemanly' values was possible because it was not necessary to
be otherwise.
Raynor has described success as `an almost compulsive drive'
for the middle-middle class 13 yet it was hard to find much of that
amongst the Madingley Managers of the 1960s. But the forces of change
were waiting in the wings. The estate agents, accountants and city traders
who would make greed acceptable in the 1980s had already left primary
school by 1968. Furthermore, the first major post-war attack on British
industry was just about to begin. The age of mergers, take-overs and
asset stripping was short-lived but very dramatic. Post-war parvenus
were not socialized by the public schools. Beneficiaries of the 1944
Butler Education Act were not socialized into submission in the way
that Richard Hoggart described in his autobiography, 14 internalizing
what Parkin called the subordinate value system. 15 They were angry
young men eager to upset the establishment, whose `gentlemanly
values' were perceived as hypocrisy. Clever sons and daughters from
the skilled working class and lower middle class went to university for
the first time in the history of their families and became social workers,
housing managers and academics. Sociology grew dramatically and
its acolytes spent much time investigating class and the social mobility
through which so many of them had benefitted. Indeed, social mobility
became something of an obsession for some sociologists, despite the
fact that the results did so little to explain the cultural changes that
were having such important social consequences.
I was particularly fortunate in that I was a participant observer
in this crucial period of transition in British industry between 1969 and
1973. Together with Jack Winkler, we had received a three year grant
to look at what directors in British industry actually did, perhaps as a
way of reducing their perceived stress and anxieties. 16 Many of the
most senior and powerful men in British industry were extraordinarily
generous in allowing us to observe Board level politics at first hand by
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shadowing them unobtrusively or by sitting quietly in their offices.
This was the period of what at the time Prime Minister Heath called
`the unacceptable face of capitalism'. Small businesses were bought
solely for the site value of their offices or plant; family firms were
taken over and family directors bought out or given sinecures; large
firms were re-structured, divisionalized and re-grouped; a new breed
of over-smart-suited young men with MBAs appeared one week as
`consultants' and a few weeks later mysteriously became finance
directors on the Board. Fortunes were lost and fortunes were made.17
I sat in the offices of a long-since bankrupt property development
conıpany and watched a portfolio of offices and shops in south east
England being re-valued over a sandwiclı lunch. I can't remember now
whether it was £50 million or £80 million that was added to the
company's assets through this `working lunch'.18
At the beginning of the 1970s we made some tentative
predictions in Managers and Their Wives about the changes that might
follow. We noted that the wives of our managers were much more
reflective than their husbands and had more doubts about the necessity
for `management thinking' being entitled to impose itself on home and
family life. They wondered whether all the long hours oftheir husbands'
effort were worth it. Furthermore, we suggested that `So long as wives
accept a passive role or a supportive, work oriented one, all may be
well. But the spread of the ideal of a close, companionate type of
marriage, coupled with the rising level of education of womėn, may
mean that the sacrifices will become increasingly unacceptable ... We
found little evidence among the women in our sample of dislike of the
nuclear family, resentment against the marriage tie, or very great
frustration in their chief roles of wife, mother and housewife. But we
did find a sense of uncertainty about identity among the women'
(emphasis added now). 19 We went on to conclude that the main force
for change would not be the managers but their wives. We noted the
changing conceptions about the position of women in the British society
of 1970 and the emergence of different expectations about the nature
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of marriage and family life. We suggested that the next generation of
middle managers would be unlikely to be willing slaves to the system.
'We would expect the tension to become greater as the drive for greater
efficiency in British industry meets increased concern about the quality
of personal relationships, and of marriage in paпicular.'2°
My experience of the early years of the University of Kent led
me to add, rather quaintly I now think: `The "feminization" of young
men, which has been one of the unintended consequences of the
expansion of co-educational higher education, may have helped to make
many more young men sensitive to the feelings of the young women
they know or live with. Marriage is probably entered into far more
seriously and on a basis of greater equality than it has been at any time
in the past. It seems less likely that young men who have been to
university since the mid-1960s will ever imagine that they are marrying
a docile housewife.'21 However, we also considered the possibility
that a strong streak of materialism could remain, which certainly
appeared in the 1980s. `It is possible that this category of people in our
society will become more materialistic. Most of our couples have
achieved only a modest degree of affluence: the incentives of a larger
house, a second car, more lavish and longer holidays may keep middle
managers in Britain hard at the grind until the end of the century.'22
The oil crisis of 1973 ended the post-war boom. Inflation in
the mid 1970s became almost uncontrollable. Public expenditure had
to be contained. Britain was humiliated by tough demands from the
International Monetary Fund in 1976. As industrial strife increased in
the late 1970s the `incompetence' of management and the `greed' of
the workers led to the final collapse of a kind of corporatist consensus.
On Christmas Day 1976 The Economist published a special survey on
`The Coming Entrepreneurial Revolution'. Norman Macrae, the deputy-
editor of The Economist was remarkedly prescient when he began by
stating, `The world is probably drawing to the end of the era of big
business corporations. These institutions were virtually created during
1875-1910. During 1975-2010 they may virtually disappear in their
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present form ... . Many services now provided by government will
need to be "recompetitioned" and "reprivatized".' The end of
organization man was at hand.23
Scase and Goffee began their work on Reluctant Managers in
the mid-1980s in order to explore the changing experiences and attitudes
of middle-managers and, perhaps to their surprise, they rediscovered
the ambiguities and uncertainties about success that had been described
in Managers and Their Wives a generation earlier. However, what is
of particular interest is that the reasons for the Scase and Goffee
managers being reluctant about committing themselves to employment
seemed to be substantially different from those we put forward. Perhaps
it is worth emphasizing that another study, also referring to middle-
managers in the 1960s, also documented a degree of distancing from
complete work involvement: 47 per cent of Sofer's example expressed
significant reservations about the work they were doing and were
resistant to total commitment. As one said: `1 don't live to work. I
work to live'.24 The authors of Reluctant Managers make it clear that
compared with how they imagined the 1960s managers to be, the mid-
1980s managers are not prepared to put employment first. `Managers
of all ages, then, seem concerned to improve the quality of their personal
life styles outside rather than within work ... they have consciously
reduced their psychological dependence upon employment.' 25 Scase
and Goffee discovered growing feelings of cynicism amongst junior
managers; middle managers also became affected by the apathy that
surrounded them and ended up adopting a similar stance. They quote a
male manager in Accounting and Finance in his late forties in the mid
1980s. `Staff are expected to work much harder than before ... . But
when they see their hard efforts being lost by the stroke of a pen, it's
rather frustrating and people are beginning to wonder whether it's
worthwhile slogging their guts out.'26
Managers appear to be showing signs of fatalism, alienation
and anomie which Marx and Durkheim foresaw as part of the cost of a
capitalist market economy. Like instrumentally oriented manual-
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workers they may view their work as something they do for the money
but their true identity develops outside employment.27 Many managers
now may seem to be little more than highly qualified technicians.
Increasingly, senior managers now monitor very precisely the ranks of
middle and junior managers, creating considerable pressure for them
to reach specific targets. Individual respondents in the Scase and Goffee
study objected to the short-term nature of the targets. Any success is
short-lived: if a target is reached or bettered the target is then raised.
This approach engenders fear. Working relationships become more
aggressive: people are increasingly watching their backs and struggling
for personal survival. All this destroys organizational commitment.
In answer to the question put by Scase and Goffee `What do
you think should be the major inputs in management training?', 69 per
cent of the men and 82 per cent of the women mentioned personal and
interpersonal skills such as assertiveness, team-building or leadership.
The more technical aspects of the job were mentioned by very much
smaller proportions of the sample. Since most managers have been
promoted into their present positions because they have demonstrated
various forms of technical, functional and specialist knowledge, their
perceived lack of interpersonal managerial abilities may generate
insecurity and anxiety. Furthermore, since the appropriate interpersonal
skills differ between companies with different organizational styles
and since men and women are likely to move between these different
contexts in the course of their working life, the scope for confusion
and increased anxiety is great.
Whether or not the golden age of orderly careers ever existed,
the experience of most managers in the 1990s is of considerable
insecurity and uncertainty about their future prospects. I suspect that
in the past a disproportionate amount of social science research was
focused on large organizations such as Unilever or the oil companies.
Thus, whilst Scasė and Goffee acknowledge that Sofer's study was
based on a few large-scale organizations, they make the unwarranted
assumption that his conclusions would apply to all managers. The
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Madingley managers of the 1960s did not feel secure about the future
but nevertheless at that time one of the most unlikely options was
redundancy or dismissal. Thus, Scase and Goffee's assertion that few
managers are committed to career success may not be particularly novel.
However the idea that there is now an alternative idea of personal 
success is indeed new and non-work criteria play a large part in self-
assessed ideas of success. In particular, and crucially, Scase and Coffee
discuss the way that managers and their partners work out some joint
survival/development strategy for themselves and their dependents.
Men are becoming more like women in recognizing the futility of
working out detailed career plans. Rather, they take jobs that suit their
various circumstances or, indeed, make the best of a bad job. 47 per
cent of Scase and Goffee's male managers said they were sometimes
frustrated and a further 38 per cent said that they were sometimes or
always frustrated. The percentages were much the same for both men
and women.
Some people struggling with resentment and anxiety may show
symptoms of sub-clinical depression and succumb to various
dependencies. Relationships with partners may stretch or snap.28
Increases in divorce and suicide rates among this category may indicate
with differeńt degrees of tragedy the personal crises which the
contemporary way of organizing society seems to produce. Maybe the
thrusting and aggressively written management textbooks are partly to
blame, suggesting that career failure is due to some kind of personal
inadequacy: character or moral weakness produces failure, not the
system. This is a neat trick which Merton discussed so well in his classic
essay on Social Structure and Anomie. 29 Anxious managers appear to
bė an exceptionally gullible market for evangelical `consultants' or
gurus who prey on their fears and insecurities and peddle the latest
brand of psychobabble, which most people could get free from their
grandmothers if they simply inserted the jargon and put it on
transparencies for the overhead projector.
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In a witty and perceptive review of more than a dozen books
on management written in the mid 1980s, Patrick Wright pointed out
that their authors have a new-found confidence. No longer under any
obligation to consider management as a properly constituted `academic'
subject, borrowing from more established disciplines to justify its
recommendations and prescriptions, the new management thinkers do
not even attempt to bring the movement of enterprise under a rational
description which might identify professional management with stable
administrative functions of planning, resource allocation and control.
Far from trying to take the guesswork out of the corporate game, the
tendency now is to celebrate it. 30 The new magic words are 'excėllence'
and `change', often approached with a religious fervour. `The excellent
company knows that the pace of "change" - one of management
thinkings' catch all reifications - is escalating, and also that constant
innovation is the prerequisite of success.'3 1 The new gurus urge
companies to encourage those who under the old rational model would
be dangerous deviants or oddballs. Now they are to be feted,
encouraged to make mistakes in the search for innovation and to go
hard for the vision thing. The new entrepreneur is a survivalist
surrounded by "change" - an external force which comes at him with
the irresistible power of the Megatrend. ... where traditional
management thinking tries to help corporations get better productivity
out of the Organisation Man by "tacking on skills to the same old
person", the peak performer is interested in complete personal
transformation.' 32
If excellence is to be limited to a maverick minority then most
managers are likely to be nervous and insecure. How do they know
that they are capable of becoming excellent if this is all a matter of
intuition and personal idiosyncratic style, and being unafraid of risk
and uncertainty? At least with the old rational model hard work and
persistence might well lead eventually to success. In the study of
Reluctant Managers it is interesting that only 35 per cent of the sample
positively disagreed with the statement that the personal costs of career
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pursuit outweigh the benefits; what then did the other 65 per cent
consider to be most important as the basis for their non-work identities?
Whilst they might long for a magic balance and insist that the most
important thing in their lives are their family and personal relationships,
there is very little evidence to suggest that there has been any radical
shift in the domestic division of labour. Men may be disillusioned and
anxious in their jobs but they have no better alternative to turn to, apart
from taking early retirement. Two thirds of Scase and Goffee's
managers want to retire in their fifties. This appears to be a much more
seriously desired option at the end of the century than it was in the
middle.
All these problems affect women managers too but they have
the further problem of working in predominantly male environments
which can be a distinctive source of stress. They also have the additional
burden of being primarily responsible for the home. If men are yearning
for a better balance between home and work, they should pay more
attention to what their partners say before trying to delude themselves
and those who interview them. The distinctive problems faced by
women managers now receives much academic and journalistic
comment but are likely to be more acute at the junior and middle levels
of management discussed by Scase and Goffee. There are some
indications that as managing involves more interpersonal skills, women
may come to have the edge on men who are stereotypically less in
touch with their feelings and less able to cope with emotional problems.
If these are now some of the central problems of management then
much depends on whether the fashion lies more in the macho, assertive,
task-oriented approach'to management, which men may find more
congenial or the more people-centred style which women would find
more congenial. Scase and Goffee are ambivalent, if not confused,
about this point claiming, at different places in their book that each is
in the ascendent.33
Perhaps the nub of the argument being put forward by Scase
and Goffee was reflected by one of their respondents, a man in his late
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forties working in engineering and maintenance. `1 believe that if! go
any higher ... I will be working for the Company twenty four hours a
day. Then I should be married to the company. I don't want to marry
the Company. I want to stay married to my wife and family. That's it,
basically in a nutshell. Which is why I've got no ambition left.'34
Scase and Coffee conclude, `Very few couples are totally immersed in
their work and overwhelmingly preoccupied with career success ... .
Accordingly, conflicts between work and domestic life are
controlled.'35 `If, in the past, there was a pronounced work ethic which
fostered a desire for occupational achievement and nurtured work-based
values around which personal identities could be constructed, this has
now diminished.' 36 This conclusion applies primarily to middle-aged
middle-level male managers and not to male senior managers.
There are now signs, in the mid 1990s, that management faces
a new crisis that will not be easily resolved. A recent survey shows a
profound lack of confidence in management and a substantial
deprioritization of the significance of employment. Overall, some two
thirds of a national sample of over 2000 adults disagreed with the
statement that the people in charge know best or that business strikes a
fair balance between profits and the public interest. Over half the sample
claimed that if work interfered with their personal life they would put
work in second place.37 The retreat from commitment by middle
management could have far-reaching social and political consequences.
The case for comparative ethnography in other European contexts is
strong: are British managers unique in their disillusion?
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Polish and American Managers
Krystyna Joanna Zaleska
Introduction
This research was undertaken with the aim of improving the
effectiveness of any organization that has Americans and Poles working
together by trying to understand the patterns of cross-cultural interaction
between them. Cross-cultural interaction is studied on two different
levels. The first is the context of cultural meanings, and the second the
level of management practices to which these meanings refer.
The data was collected between the 21st of July and the 6th of
August 1992. It was collected among managers of the subsidiary of a
large US based multinational corporation in Warsaw. It contains 24
unstructured interviews collected from seven Polish and seven
American managers.
The choice of a subsidiary of an American multinational
corporation in Poland has many consequences for the findings and the
representativeness of the sample. This MNC has a strong corporate
culture rooted in the traditions of the American business. The foreign
organization attracts certain type of manager during the recruitment
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and selection process. This selection process favours employment of
those who have managerial attitudes more in tune with those of Western
managers. On the other hand, the Polish business environment and the
system of values inherited from the previous communist period still
have a strong influence despite the fast cultural change. The mental
product of that environment, Homo Sovieticus, is deeply rooted in the
minds of those who are the products of the educational, political and
economical systems of the past.
This case analysis is designed to answer the managerial question:
How should we manage cross-cultural interactions within the
organization? From the researcher's point of view the case addresses
the question: What laws govern the interactions between culturally
different people? The paper is organized around two major sections.
I..National Management Style - In this section the Polish response
towards a participative management style is analyzed. The perspective
of American managers working in the Polish cultural context and that
of Polish managers working in the MNC is investigated.
2. "From Homo Sovieticus to Corporate Man" - in this section
the corporate culture is divided into different categories involving the
central values and beliefs of the MNC. The difference in attitudes
towards them help to define what is new in the Polish business
environment.
The problems in the analysis are defined in terms of the cultural
traits, habits and norms of the researcher's home society (Polish), and
then redefined in terms of American cultural traits. The differences in
what the researcher interpreted and what the respondents attempted to
communicate are likely due to the researcher's unavoidable cultural
bias as well as her own value judgments. The letter "P" after citations
from the interviews indicates a Polish manager, while the letter "A"
indicates an American manager.
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National Management Style
Participative versus Autocratic Management Style
"Poles like to be told what to do. Very often they look at me and
say, `you are the boss, you decide, you tell us'."A
"1 can't stand when people say: You are the boss. There is a
problem and you need to make the decisions'. Maybe I do need
to make decisions, but they should be based on information given
to me."A
"A manager should know things. It is not good to go too often to
subordinates and ask them. it is in contradiction with the role of
a manager. Why are you the manager after all."P
American managers introduce a participative management style
in the company and advocate that Polish subordinates participate in
managerial decisions. They delegate decision making. They develop
the competence of their subordinates by assigning tasks to them and
by fostering successful task completion. They determine when to
involve subordinates in making decisions. These attempts meet
resistance. The old system of reliance on the director and centralized
decision making by fiat seems to be still an obstacle to increasing
participation and collegiality. Having a powerful superior whom Poles
can both praise and blame is still a way of satisfying a strong need for
avoiding uncertainty (Hofstede,1980).2 An American manager who
asks his subordinates many questions and thus demonstrates the
importance of his staff in problem solving, and one who at the same
time is able to admit his mistakes in front of the staff, is displaying
new features of management unusual for Polish managers.
The Polish manager of a warehouse for instance was surprised
when the American manager told him to go to the employees, explain
the options to them, and give them the choice as to when to open the
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warehouse. The Pole was shocked about the possibility of the employees
suggesting him when to open the warehouse.
Openness and Closedness
"Communication with Polish employees is difficult, especially
when an employee has a problem. There is a general
unwillingness to talk directly about oneself and one's problems.
Poles will gladly talk about somebody else. They will not talk
about their own needs. They don't like direct questions about
things which are important to them. Perhaps it is considered
impolite, too bold or inappropriate for them."A
"As an American I am very used to the style of being up front
with people and their problems. If you have a problem you come
out and talk about it with others and your boss."A
"in the beginning people didn't like this directness. Poles don't
like to be told directly what they are doing wrong. Now they are
accustomed to it. Some were shocked in the beginning, however,
by our very direct style."A
The American culture, which values direct and often blunt
speaking, clashes with the Polish way of communicating. For the
American, saying exactly what you mean is considered a virtue. There
is a low tolerance level for ambiguity. That is why managers want to
interpret and be interpreted pretty much at face value. Poles have a
more closed and indirect style of communicating, especially in relations
with subordinates and superiors. Poles often describe Americans as
very open, direct, spontaneous and natural. They thus distinguish
themselves as a group from them.
American managers do not receive the feedback they expect.
They tend to receive only positive feedback, which is sometimes
misleading. They must actively seek out and get the sometimes negative
but more honest feedback from subordinates. Poles have an informal
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network of communication. They discuss problems among each other,
with the second person feeling responsible for going to tell the manager
about the problems of the colleague. Americans find it a little bit unusual
when a subordinate communicates with a manager by going through
these informal channels, and sends a message through another person.
After business meetings the Poles may burst into a deep emotional
discussion in Polish. They would not, however, do this in English in
front of Americans.
The problems of giving honest feedback can be explained as
being typical when two different cultural groups try to communicate.
Poles feel both the cultural and language barriers, which is further
exacerbated by the power barrier between the American boss and the
Polish subordinate. The reason why Poles are reluctant to talk directly
about certain problems can also be traced to the communist past. As a
rule the subordinates' right to communicate with a superior was
restricted. Subordinates could not offer alternative interpretations of
data or make proposals that would modify the superior's decision. It
was rarely possible to relax or express one's feelings in a natural and
spontaneous manner. On the other hand, the new values (influenced by
the American "John Wayne" syndrome), which the organization is
trying to build, influences the Poles' behaviour. They try to do their
best at emulating this macho attitude by not showing their weakness in
front of Americans.
"The Polish manager is often talking to me about how others are
doing a great job, and he even asks me to go tell them this since
he is unable to do this himself."A
"If you are good, Americans can send you a congratulatory letter.
If it were the boss I could think this was motivation. But it was
an American colleague of mine and he had no particular interest
in it. I would never think of doing so. it was so spontaneous."P
There is a significant difference between two groups of managers
in giving this type of feedback. Positive feedback is not popular among
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Poles who tend to be critical. Negative feedback is easier for them to
give both to subordinates and to peers on the same level.
"Americans don't give me any strict explanations of what I should
do. it seems that it is a conscious policy of the firm's and it
makes sense."P
"Americans have certain assumptions about us and they don't
communicate them. When they think that something is obvious,
they don't say it."P
"Poles more easily criticize things among themselves, but it is
difficult for them to criticize things in the presence of Americans.
It is as if they don't believe in their strengths, and are afraid that
their opinions are either untrue or irrational. They afraid of being
funny."P
"Poles don't disagree with me as I would like. They are less
likely to question decisions or directions, which is what i am
used to in the US. It is because there is a difference in the respect
given to, and recognized regarding average authority figure. It
is my perception that the average Polish citizen will not on a
daily basis question authority. Americans do this very readily."A
Americans value active participation in any discussion. Poles,
with a tendency towards a more autocratic management style, do not
like to argue with managers. This is because criticism of management
is viewed as criticizing the manager's right to delegate, as well as his
or her social status of being a manager. Americans attempt to create a
sense of obligation in subordinates and for this reason keep job
specifications loose. The subordinates in turn need to create their role
implicitly from careful observations of their superior's needs. However,
a majority of Polish managers mentioned the need for formal rules and
guidelines, with each specific task spelled out for each job function.
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Attitudes toward Subordinates
"Secretaries are treated poorly here. I don't need a waitress. I
don't want a secretary who makes me coffee. Secretaries who
work for us have a huge job responsibility, they don't just make
notes, they have to make analysis on their own."A
"In general Polish managers seem to have a little less respect for
their staffs than in America. They can reprimand the secretary
in front of the group, and give her a complicated task to do with
little instruction and a short time to do it in."A
"It is unacceptable in our company that someone from a higher
level treats those at a lower level differently. That is classism.
Some Poles do this. Poles place less value on the individual
worker."A
"These are some things that are easy to get used to. In America
I would never ask the secretary to bring me coffee. You can
onlyuse them for business purposes. It is so easy to start it here."A
Poles are not used to working with secretaries in the same way
that Americans require. Secretaries are accustomed to being treated as
"waitresses" by Polish managers. On the opposite end, expatriate
managers expect secretaries to take on more responsibilities, and show
independence and initiative in decision making. Some Americans
pointed to the bad influence the Polish environment has on Americans
as a sign of demoralization under the Polish working conditions. The
American attitude towards secretaries in the perception of one Pole is,
however, the following:
"I am very pushy and demanding on secretaries. I do the same
thing as Americans. I think that if secretaries have a hard time
now with me as a Pole, they will work much better in the future.
In order to work here efficiently you have to prepare people
because only then they will be able to adjust to the attacks of
Americans, which are very aggressive."P
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Formality versus Informality
"I respect the history. I respect the cultural aspect. Every time
they call me `Mister Director' I remind them to call me by my
first name. I am constantly telling them that I have a culture too.
This company has a culture, one that I want to build here. I don't
like the environment that fosters formality and the environment
that it creates. It is a barrier for effective communication. You
almost have too much respect and then you stop talking to me,
soon you stop coming and saying `I have a problem'."A
"I noticed that a couple of people who use titles, locals on the
same level as I am, they get more respect from their employees.
I see a different level of respect due to formality. Maybe Poles
like that. Poles like to know their place."A
"There are some people in the firm with whom I will never be
on a first name basis. I am on a first name basis with some people
and on a Ms.\Mr. basis with others. I don't know why but I will
not change that."P
Poland has a culture where management relations are generally
formal and now locals have to adapt to a less formal American mode.
Those Poles who resist informality appear to be cold and distrusting in
the perception of foreigners. The majority of Poles learned to adjust to
the norm very quickly, but this does not mean that they wish to continue
to be on a first name basis when speaking among Poles, especially
with subordinates. In the eyes of Americans, some locals use this
distance to help them manage personnel, especially those at the lower
levels.
It is too superficial to interpret Polish formality only as a way of
managing and directing personnel. It is derived from both tradition
and the educational system. Using first names for older people and for
superiors is not a Polish norm. For Americans, it seems silly to address
them as director and they think that it builds barriers. They are judging
this by their own standards. In fact, this is an old Polish tradition,
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although ceremonies in centrally-planned companies also reinforced
formality in management relations. The major mistake is when Poles
or Americans think that terms of address are equivalent in these two
cultures. Being on a first name basis for Americans is not equal to
being on a first name basis in Poland. They literally do not translate
into the same meaning. In Poland if the boss calls the receptionist by
their first name, the subordinate-superior relation is changed. In America
it does not mean anything; the line is still maintained. Some Poles can
be confused by a too rapid introduction of informality because they are
not aware of this fact. Indeed, some Poles are afraid that they can lose
the ability to lead by moving to a first name basis. They feel that it may
have bad consequences concerning the behaviour of Polish managers
towards their staff and vice versa.
"Poles like Titles"
"In America you generally accept what the boss tells. You don't
have so much courage to go to the boss and say: "1 want a career
I want to be a manager. That is important for me. When can I be
that". The better way is when the boss sets the expectations with
you and when you achieve those expectations you will be
promoted."A
"Poles are passionate about getting ahead in status. People are
looking for examples of badges to wear for the rest of the
populace to know that you have made it."A
"My boss must be in a big car. `What car are you going to drive'
- I was asked by a Pole in the first meeting in Poland."A
American managers noticed in Poland the importance of things
which communicate the power and status of management. A car or
having a title is used symbolically to exert control over subordinates
and impress visitors. In Poland the superior is expected to demonstrate
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his or her authority in relation to subordinates. "This is not a job for the
boss", said Polish sales person to the American boss when he was
cleaning the shelves in the shop.
A lot of new Polish interviewees want to be managers without
having any basic business experience. This is a magic word for them
which associates a higher status. On the other hand, American managers
try to show what little importance these formalities, titles, and other
signs of status denote. But what is trivial, meaningless, nonproductive,
and non business building in one culture has value in another. The
system of values associated with formality, titles, and signs of status
emphasize individual dignity and is deeply rooted in the social
consciousness and traditions of the Polish nobility.
From Homo Sovіetіcus to Corporate Man
"Things don't just happen, you have to make them happen"
"People are still afraid to make decisions, they want to be told
what to do, to be given job descriptions and be told exactly what
they should do."A
"You work in a field and make mistakes on your own, nobody is
over your shoulder. if you are not pushing yourself and if you
are not checking yourself, then you never improve yourself."A
"People are not aggressive about their career, there is a lack of
ownership to some extent. People don't believe that their career
is something which can be managed by themselves. They can
go as far as they can possibly dream of going based on their
open merits. In the US people are more aggressive and very sure
of themselves. Here the ambitious are just less vocal. I have
trouble getting Poles to seethat they are capable of doing that."A
"We are modest, we don't speak about our achievements, we
are not assertive enough, we don't praise ourselves."P
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"Poles don't struggle for themselves. Now you have to do it.
The new mentality of this company requires it. Nobody will take
care of you if you do not do this."P
"You have to be a fighter and want to change something and to
do extra things in this company."P
"Don't go to your boss with a problem; go with the solution to
the problem, give him options to the solutions. This is a principle
which is not taught in Poland."P
Effective performance that brings results and the ability to work
in teams by showing leadership skills - these are the new skills which
guarantee success in the company. Compliancy, maintaining the status
quo, and being someone who waits for things are all undesirable
characteristics. The reaction of the Polish manager in the store who
did not change the price of a product in order to be more competitive is
an another example of the old apprehensiveness to make decisions.
"Can I do that? Am I allowed to do that?" The idea of the manager
asking whether she is allowed to do something to the product shocked
the American manager.
This lack of assertiveness is very apparent during interviews.
Many Poles find it troublesome to answer the very straightforward
questions posed by Americans concerning personal achievements.
People are not accustomed to speaking so openly about their strengths.
Displaying a strong but relaxed sense of confidence is a new personality
feature that many Poles lack.
"We want to make Employee's Interests our own"
"Authority has never been something you trust here. They had
always other motives. They never wanted what was good for the
subordinates; that is why people did not trust authority. Maybe
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that is why people don't come to talk to us about their
problems."A
"Sometimes they don't understand that the company is trying to
do the right things for individuals. Sometimes there will be
questions which assume that the employer is going to take
advantage of that and is going to treat locals badly and because
of that assumption they behave in a certain way. It is not a good
assumption that the company and manager is not trying to help
them if they have a problem."A
The prevalent attitude towards authority is one of distrust, fear,
and disbelief. It is too much to believe that the boss also wants what is
good for the employee. The concept of managers being oriented towards
assisting other people, and being motivated to serve fellow human
beings is something new and incompatible with the old idea of a boss'
function. For some Polish respondents the authority figure is still
associated with individuals rather than with an organization. In the
American point of view, the boss is employed to serve the organization
rather than him or herself. The corporate culture meshes the need for
results with the concerns of the individual. This managing style focuses
on people and is appreciated by Poles. Employees then feel that they
are an important part of the firm and that it is a worthwhile endeavour
to be effective.
"Build the Business, build the People"
"I prefer to have an older boss because it would be very stupid if
I have a boss younger than me."P
"He has less life experience, a shorter marriage, he is younger,
he is not authority to me. I would prefer someone who has more
life experience. It is a very Polish thing that I find this to be a
problem. I realize that."P
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"The company gives a lot of authority to young people very
quickly. You never know, that guy who is looking younger than
you could be a vice president already."A
The basic new assumption of the American system is that the
individual is appointed and promoted on the basis of his knowledge
and professional expertise. The corporate culture rewards competence
and performance in key skills as evaluated against objective criteria,
tenure and loyalty. How much experience someone has and how
professional he or she conducts themselves is valued by the company
more highly than the person's age. The situation in which much younger
managers have older subordinates provides problems for some Polish
subordinates. Some Poles are convinced that it is not possible to have
both youth and knowledge. Instead, experience and competence must
go hand in hand.
There is a newly formed belief on the part of the Poles, that
work will bring success. Everyone feels secure that as long as they
produce results, they will not lose their job. There is a tacit new
assumption that talented people who are willing to work can advance
and succeed. The need for competence and the value placed on this
competence is growing. It was not so obvious in the past that good
performance also meant future promotions. It was quite possible to be
a very good employee and yet never be rewarded.
"Poles make mistakes when they say: `Americans don't share
salaries, in the Polish system we share salaries'. I would say it is
not straight forward at all. In the American system, in our
company's system, we don't share specifics on what any one
person makes, we try very hard to share the system, by which
you make more salary. We make it very clear that your salary is
based on your performance. If you perform well you will make
a lot of money."A
"You are not in a position to bargain about your salary. If you
tell Americans that you are not satisfied they will fire you. This
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"I like this system but I would like to know how I am in
comparison with the others. If I knew that the person who works
together with me had a higher salary than me, I would be very
unhappy."P
Problems in adjusting to a new salary system is another example
of the old way of thinking when competence and good performance
was not a basis for promotion and rewards. Placing more value upon
the individual's performance and effort, and rewarding that with
increased income, creates motivation to be responsible. People learn
to adapt to this new attitude to different degrees, but with many old
habits still remaining. Poles want to know how much other salaries are
because they are accustomed to it, whereas for Americans it is a
distraction within the organization. The difficulties in introducing new
customs are reinforced by the differences between the Polish and
American cultures in deciding what information is personal. Poles have
no problem with asking strangers about their salaries as a means of
establishing their status, whereas for Americans it is very personal thing.
Also the American attitude that salary increases should be initiated by
the employees' direct supervisor, does not match well with the ease
with which Poles ask for salary raises themselves.
"The Customer is always Right"
"That is really a holdover from the old system. Here they feel
they are in a position of authority. They seem to forget what the
relationship is between them and the customer. They always feel
they treated customers well but they hadn't. They already think
that they are different from the old mind set but it is still only
half way. They have got a long distance to cover,
unfortunately."A
"When you are doing business with somebody you don't do it in
a way which gives them an impression that you think you are
smarter than anyone else."A
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"People applying for positions in sales departments do not want
to do basic business first, to be a sales representative, they want
to be immediately managers. People that I interview want to be
only managers. How you can manage sales representatives if
you don't know what they do? They lack a concrete answer."A
In spite of intensive training on how to properly treat a customer,
Poles still tend to behave in the old manner. Americans are not satisfied
with the Poles' behaviour in front of the clients and view them as not
being very service oriented towards the buyer. Americans believe that
sales jobs are looked down upon in the Polish business culture, and
that it requires intensive training to change this notion.
"Our Problems are our Opportunities"
"In the old system people tended to look for problems, not for
solving the problems."A
"People who come from the old system they are usually
pessimists. You can see this in the interviews: "Do you really
believe that you as a person can make a difference. Somebody
associated with old thinking will say "No, anything that I do, it
does not matter, things are just what they are, just accept it."A
"The new project will never work", "My customer will never
buy this", "We can't do that", "It will not work in the Polish
environment", "It has been never done in that way."P
Negative thoughts are very prevalent among Poles. It is easier to
be critical and find why something will not work than to look at why
something may work. Such an attitude clashes with the company's
value that regards problems as potential opportunities. The Americans
explained the Polish negative attitude as an environmental thing. But it
can be also considered as a Polish national characteristic. Americans
as a nation are more future oriented than Poles, who, in comparison
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with them, tend to base decisions more on past experience. The
assumption that people can substantially influence the future underlines
much of the U.S. management philosophy and this now has to become
a basis for Polish management as well.
This positive versus negative thinking is believed by Poles to be
caused by the Americans' naivety and ignorance concerning the
business environment in Poland. Therefore, it is not only that the Poles
are negative, but also that they have a more intimate knowledge of the
local business situation and they therefore try to convince Americans
of the Polish reality.
"People are good"
"What was new for me was that Americans have the assumption
that you are acting for the good of the firm and that you are
honest. That people are good. if you go to a restaurant, nobody
will tell you that you are nasty and that you used the company
money and did it for a bad purpose."P
"A positive attitude towards people, trust in people - this is a
basis for everything. Americans don't wait to catch you in a
mistake. We are more suspicious of people, our assumption is
that a person wants to do something bad."P
"I have never met a group of people that was more sceptical of
the future and more distrusting. Everyone we do business with
is conviňced that we are dumping a less quality product on the
market. The Polish costumer is very sceptical, they don't believe
that they can get products as good as anybody else in the world."A
The conflict between the Americans' belief that one can rely on
the goodness of others versus the Poles' suspicion that somebody has
done wrong, occurs between many different levels of daily business in
the organization: between superiors and subordinates, and between co-
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workers. It also affects the way customers view the product, and the
way the employees view the product.
Polish managers describing the differences in interviewing styles
uncover other examples, showing that they do not share the same
optimistic and trusting view of human nature as do Americans.
"Americans want to hire the best, because the organization wí11
gain from them and you as a boss should be not afraid if you hire
a person who is more clever than you. You will benefit from it
because the company will benefit."P
"In state companies you had to protect yourself by not
cooperating, a new employee was your potential enemy."P
Thinking in broader terms of the company's gain rather than of
just one particular interest, is a new way of thinking, especially for
those with previous experience in state companies.
"I don't believe that colleagues are able to evaluate me properly,
that they will tell the truth."P
"i don't like it because I have little experience in assessing people
and you can make a lot of mistakes and hurt them. Only when
you know somebody well and only when you have worked with
somebody for a long time can you say something which is true."P
A suspicious attitude mixed with the Polish inclination towards
an autocratic management style raises problems with introducing a
Western evaluation system. Poles do not like it and have problems
adjusting to it. One Polish respondent said: "People can write subjective
opinions, but I believe in the objectivity of my boss." Whereas the
main reason for such an appraisal system given by the American
manager was: "In the old system you had a boss who evaluated
everything, like a God. Now peers have a right to evaluate you. A boss
is not objective, your peers can tell more about you."
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The main goal of this evaluation system is an attempt to provide
specific feedback of a very constructive nature from the team within
which the employee is working. This system derives from the
company's concern about the individuals' development. It looks at how
a manager is developing his or her employees and if the employees are
developing themselves himself over a certain period of time. The stress
on teamwork is strongly emphasized in this type of system.
During the first evaluation Poles were surprised at the number
of relevant examples included about their behaviour. Many of them
did not realize how much progress they had made during their time in
a company.
There are obvious reasons why Polish employees do not like
this system. It reminds them too much of the network of spies and
informers from the past. This negative association is reinforced by old
suspicions and biases. The Poles belief that the "Boss is always right"
causes the evaluation system to not work as productively as intended.
"Do what is Right"
"Poles want to succeed so quickly that many times they will
sacrifice organization to achieve the goal, to get five or six
objectives but they don't pick the newest. You have to take a
step back and look on your priorities, which project gives you
the most benefits. They need some work with planning."A
"When you ask somebody to do something for you, they will do
their best effort, but they will try one road and then not come
back with an answer. In the U.S. you work for different solutions,
when you find them you come back."A
"A good work ethic is not coming in 5 minutes after present
time. A good work ethic is coming 5 minutes before. If a project
is due tomorrow you have to do the job by tomorrow. It is not
the next day or the day after."A
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The Polish lack of discipline, the tendency to put things off until
the last moment, and a lack of planning skills were all noticed by
Americans. The American style places emphasis on precise, accurate
data, and places a high value on planning things in advance. But these
are skills that Poles did not have an opportunity to develop in the
previous system. Polish employees need to be told often what steps are
needed in a certain task. Their way of organizing their individual
schedules affects their promptness and attentiveness to scheduled
appointments, in a way that is different than that of foreigners. The
ability to work under pressure at the last minute is even regarded as a
virtue by some Poles, who think that Westerners are not able to work
as efficiently when a deadline is approaching.
Americans perceive the work ethic outside the organization to
be still bad but in the organization people work well. However,
foreigners' opinions are different and range from very positive to
negative.
"I tell them not to work so hard. I have many examples when I
said to people - `Don't work on this weekend'. I tell the secretary
to leave at night. I don't want her to work at night."A
"A typical American is complacent, with a good standard of
living relatively secure. A lot of people are interested in doing
better for themselves. Poles in comparison with them seem to
learn new ways of doing things. They want to see personal growth
and financial growth. They have a strong desire to improve. The
approach to longer hours is not a case in US. Poles keep longer
hours and they don't have any compensation, whereas in the
U.S. it will be very rare."A
"I am extremely surprised about the work ethic of Poles. In my
mind it was such a distinction that Poles have a poor work ethic.
But with the comparison to Americans, the desire to work hard
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"One of the questions I'm asked a lot by people who just started
to work here is `What are the working hours here?' In our
company you have to do your job, it does not matter how long,
effects are important. A lot of Poles are coming at 9 and leave at
5 and they don't care what else is going on."A
"We don't have strict working hours I am always here after 9, I
am famous for that. On the other hand I work until 7 and I work
10 hours a day. Nobody tells me that I work too little."P
"It means nothing that some Americans come earlier in the
morning than Poles, the quantity of hours is not important but
the quality of your work."P
Generally Poles prefer, unlike Americans, to come in a little bit
later and to stay a little bit later. A majority of the problems with
different work styles have to do with the transition from the chaotic
pace of a centrally planned economy to the programmed efficiency of
the MNC. This shift requires new skills in strategic planning and time
management, requiring the increased organization of the individual's
work. Adjusting to a new pace, and being able to work efficiently under
pressure due to increased competition demands a completely new work
style for some Poles. The personal adjustment of Polish managers
includes the transition from managing smaller business operations to
the larger more complex operations in a big corporation. This
adjustment also includes moving to an efficiency-oriented system
geared to profits.
"Americans look differently at the firm, they associate themselves
very closely with it. They are part of the firm. In the past i never
felt such a relationship with the firm."P
"This new way of thinking that you have to have a strong
psychological connection with the firm surprised me. You have
to show you are interested. In the past you escaped from your
job as quickly as possible."P
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"In a state company, if somebody has a problem, he or she solves
it with their own interests in mind. Here we are thinking in terms
of the benefit of the whole company."P
"I made a mistake and I regarded it as my mistake because I was
responsible for it, but the problem was judged as a problem and
loss for all of us. This is a different way of thinking and it is the
attitude of this company. Success belongs to everybody and so
does failure. This is better than making one person responsible
for it."P
Belonging to the firm, teamwork, and thinking of the company's
best interests rather that one's own, are all part of a new attitude which
needs to be further developed. The degree of personal involvement
and responsibility in the daily drama of company affairs is valued very
highly by Western companies. The stress is on teamwork; not on
destructive competition, which would be counterproductive for the
whole firm.
Notes
' Adler, N.(1982) "Understanding the ways of understanding: cross-cultural
methodology reviewed. In Comparative Management: Essays in Contemporary
Thought, R.N.Farmer (ed.) Greenwich, CT: JAI Press
2 Hofstede, G.(1983) Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American
Theories Apply Abroad? Organization Dynamics, 9:42-63.
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Monika Kostera
Introduction
The connections between religion and society have been explored
since Weber's fundamental work on capitalism and protestant ethics.
The influences of religion and theology on philosophy (e.g. Kolakowski,
1989a: 166; on social structure (e.g. Kolakowski; 1984); on economy
(e.g. Goulding, 1989a; Goulding, 1989b; Stein, 1989) and on
organization of industrial society (e.g. Fromm, 1989) have since long
been a topic for research and insight. The links between organization
and religion also deserve some consideration. Organizations offer their
participants rewards not only of a material kind, but increasingly also
of an existential and perhaps even spiritual nature. They give people
an identity and perform an ontological function, providing a sense of
Being to the participants (Schwartz, 1987). Finally, they are a way of
* Acknowledgements - Thank you, Waldemar Wrzesinski, for your help
with the historical queries I faced while working on this paper.
And thanks, the participants of the Seminar: Sozialanthropologie von Europa
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life (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993), cultures providing networks of
meaning (Smircich, 1987). Participants are being socialized into
organizations (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993; Czarniawska-Joerges and
Kunda, 1992) and culture is used as a means of control (Van Maanen
and Kunda, 1989). The cultural perspective (cf. Smircich, 1983) offers
us, thus, a means of understanding the vital - or, in Schwartz's terms,
ontological role of organizations to humans, and also what I would call
the religious signifiance of organizing.
Metaphors are playing an increasingly important role in social
sciences and organizational analysis (cf. Morgan, 1986; Smircich, 1983).
In this paper, the business organization is seen as a religious organization
and business administration - as religion. The metaphor, besides
pointing to an important dimension of organizing, also helps us to see
the current transition taking place in Eastern and Central Europe from
a new and slightly unorthodox perspective. What is happening is not
"only" an economic and political shift, not "just" the liberation of
repressed peoples, but can also be seen as a religious mission: the
capitalist West transmitting its managerial religion to eastern
"heathens".
Culture, Symbols and Myths
Culture I understand as the medium oflífe (Czarniawska-Joerges,
1991), through which we make sense of our lives, and that enables us
to communicate with the world, with the extensive use of symbols (cf.
Schűtz, 1982).
it is through symbols that we given meaning to an originally
intransparent reality (Schűtz, 1982;1996). Symbols are, according to
Schűtz, the outcome of choice between multiple options in the sense-
making of human perception, making experiences persistent and
continuous. The symbols, present in our memory, are open for
interpretation and reinterpretation (1982). Symbols can constitute
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important elements of the social and cultural context we live in, an
intersubjective world of our common experience (Schűtz and
Luckmann, 1973).
Besides symbols, this paper also deals with myths. Myths are,
according to Kolakowski, a specific kind of symbols, not containing
words, but occurrences and persons. The myth is accounted through,
or translated into words. Myths enable people to participate in those
events, ontologically important to them, through a symbolical
"immobilizing" of time (1967). Myth is seldom considered as a serious
tool of understanding in management literature (Bowles, 1989).
[M]yth was ... seen as something antithetical to fact; myth is
opposed to reality, an implicit assumption being that our set of
beliefs is true and not as primitive or arbitrary as those of other
cultures or epochs."
(Ingersoll and Adams, 1986 as
quoted in Bowles, 1989:406).
Mythology elicits and supports a sense of awe before mystery
of being, provides a set of ideas which enable humans to answer the
most vital questions, socializes the individual, and guides the him or
her towards maturation (Bowles, 1989, after Campbell, 1976). Bowles
(1992b) also notifies the role of myth in social life, one beyond the
"ego psychology", enabling understanding insights offered by the
collective unconscious.
Rests to settle that the author is an adherent of the interpretive
approach (cf. Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992a). The conclusions are not
claimed to be universal nor generally applicable, but as an insight that
can be shared and discussed. The empirical material is founded on my
various experiences. From these experiences I chose a few windows
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992a) that I consider "typical". I do not claim
them to be statistically representative, they are however, substantially
representative, i.e. represent the context described in the paper. I contrast
the windows with quotations from historical sources (on religious
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mission among various "pagan" peoples). The quotations come from
library research on the topic.
Religion
Religion is a kind of culture (cf. Geertz,1973), constructed as a
medium of spiritual life. According to Kolakowski, religion is the
"[s]ocially established cult of infinite reality" (1988:9). After
Kolakowski (1989b) I distinguish between two approaches to religion:
the functiońalist and the idiogenetic and holistic. The first approach i ś
grounded on the assumption that religion, through the participation in
ceremonies, rituals, institutions, etc. offers the individuals a substitute
for other values (or meanings). Religious life is thus a form of
communication that offers stability of social structures and institutions.
The other understanding of religion implies that religion is rooted in
human needs, not related genealogically nor functionally to other more
"primary" roots. Humans are seeking transcendental values through
religion understood this way.
According to Kolakowski, big religions had the ability to satisfy
all non-religious needs of past societies: the political, societal and these
of learning about reality. To achieve this, sacrum could not be
instrumentally understood and had to have an autonomous authority
(1988). This point of view is analogous with Fromm's: the "to have"
versus "to be" approach to faith.
in religious, political or personalistic understanding, the concept
of faith can have two entirely different meanings, depending on
if we use it in the sense of "to have" or "to be". In the attitude "to
have" faith is the possessing of answers not needing rational
verification. "	 (Fromm, 1989:44).
These answers are offered by others to whom we abide. These
"others" are usually a bureaucracy, that offers us a sense of certainty.
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Faith is the price we pay for this sense of security that comes from
belonging to a big social group that deprives us of the demanding
responsibility of autonomous thinking and decision ınaking. Believers
possess this certitude. Faith claims to have the ultimate, absolute
knowledge that is valid, because the people protecting and preserving
it think it to be undisputed. Faith in the sense "to be" is not connected
to beliefs in certain ideas in the first place, but
inner orientation, route. It would be a better way to express it
to say that one is in faith, rather that one has faith..." (Fromm,
1989: 45).
In this paper the religious metaphor is based on the idiogenetic,
"to be"- view on religion.
substitutes for Religion in High Modernity
In high modernity (Giddens, 1991) religion tends to be replaced
by science (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993; Kolakowski, 1989a). Fromm
perceives yet another substitute for traditional religion, more widespread
and powerful: work: Work has become the only way to get love and
respect and thus the post-ċhristian religion emerged, that ofthe industrial
society (1984). The lost meanings (of work and life) are replaced by a
surrogate - motivation (Sievers, 1986). So the economic organizations
keep humans going, in a fragmented and shallow way, yet offering
people the only meaning generally available in modern society (even
if it be a surrogate).
The religious (and related, focussing on the experiences, that
can be regarded as "religious", according to the above quoted
definitions) metaphor has been used ( fractionally or in-depth) in
management and organization literature, to achieve a literary emphasis,
or to demonstrate a certain aspect of organization and organizing.
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So, for example, eminent management theoreticians have been
called "management gurus" (Clutterbuck and Bickerstaffe, 1982).
Expressions such as "evangelism" has also been used (Bowles,
1992b:20). A lot has been said and written on charismatic leadership,
especially in the corporate culture mainstream of literature (e.g. Deal
and Kennedy, 1982; McCormack, 1986; Pascale and Athos, 1982; Peters
and Waterman, 1986). Нőpfl (1994) explicitly speaks of the religious
signifiance of leadership in modern organizations. Management
literature has been likened to mythological biographies of Late Antiquity
and Middles Ages labelled ed fiіng literature (Furusten, 1992).
Bowles has been using religious metaphors to explore
organizational myths (1989; 1992b), unċonscious (or religious, in my
perspective here) needs and symbols (1992a; 1992b) and their
consequences for organizational action, human relations (1992c), life
in organizations (1992b) and individual maturation (1992a). Bowles
(1992a) concluded that modern organizations do have a significant
impact on the individual's potential for maturation or individuation
such as Jung (1968) has defined it. Organizations model a mass mind,
proceed with collectivization and objectivization, they offer ontologic
rewards but without deeper religious sense (Bowles, 1992a).
Sievers asserts that "organization and enterprises tend to become
surrogates for the churches" (1988:36). Further, he maintains that these
organizations are based on
the assumption that there is evidently no evidence and, therefore;
no further understanding beyond what obviously is obvious: the
companies' and its' members welfare. (1988:36-37)
The metaphor: business administration as religion and business
organization as religious institution is not only an interesting way of
depicting the phenomena but, in modern society, also a useful tool to
achieve a greater understanding of the organizational world. In
Alvesson's (1993) terms, the religious metaphor is thus a "second level",
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while the cultural-symbolist (see e.g. Turner, 1986, 1990) - a "first
level" metaphor.
In my opinion the cultural perspective is fundamental in the
undertaking to understand the ontologis role that organizations play in
the human life. Looking through the cultural glasses helped people to
realize that organizations are not only a "tool" or "instrument" (or
machine) for the achievement of goals, intended by the constructor,
but a way of life. Organizations are, furthermore, a way of spiritual
life, offering to their participants a set of meanings, together with proper
interpretations (also a mental escape from the inevitability of death, as
organizations are a substitute for immortality, cf. Sievers, 1986). They
offer myths and other important symbols, helping them to deal with
the irrational and non-rational, they become a moral frame of reference,
through the shared norms and values.
The ones to lead their sheep in this kind of religious institutions,
are the managers and organizational leaders. They know how to interpret
symbols, they, together with the"experts", the management consultants,
offer meanings to the (organizational) people. Leaders perform a vital
societal role - the one belonging to priests, namely, in Czarniawska-
Joerges' words,
to provide the rest of the cast and the audience with the illusion
of controllability... The arbitrariness of life - especially
organizational life - is toofrightful to envisage. A leader who
fails to provide the illusion.., by showing us the illusion for
what it is, cannot be applauded. The illusion must be supported
at whatever cost.	 (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993: 42)
Management educators and consultants teach managers how
to perform this role.
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Religion of Business Administration comes
to Eastern Europe - the Mission
Їhe modern business organization of the western type I see as a
religious institution, providing the fulfillment of religious needs (as I
have defined above) of the participants. Business administration as a
modern religion has its priests: the managers and leaders of business,
its missionaries: management consultants, management educators and
its prophets: the authors of management books. While the priests look
to their church-attendants, the missionaries are busy with transmitting
the symbols and myths of their religion to the heathens, and supporting
the priests. After the fall of the BerlinWall a thriving field for missionary
quest has been opened. The not yet redeemed peoples are a thrilling
opportunity to strengthen the faith of the own believers - to convert the
idolatrous has perhaps always been a means of strengthening the faith
of the ones already saved.
It is widely believed that the East should "learn" from the West
(this is particulary visible to the reader of Est European press, such as
myself) and that it has a long way to run before it "catches up" (this
point is often stressed in Polish mass media). The desire to "catch up"
(or, as Orgogozo put it, "East European aspirations towards Eldorado
now", 1992:596) is reflected in the flood of western models,
publications, visiting professors and consultants coming to Eastern and
Central Europe. First of all, the Polish language became enriched
immediately after 1989 with such terms as: management (or
menedzment - instead of or simultaneously with the Polish term:
zarzadzanie), manager (or menedzer - instead of kierownik), cash flow,
controlling, businessman and businesswoman, business or biznes, etc.
Marketing existed since long already, as did dywizjonalizacja and
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The white missionaries showed a greater or lesser sensitivity to
the native languages of the pagans they sought to convert to
Christian faith. Some, like the Jesuits of Missiones in Latin
America, used the native language, while communicating with
the Indians. Others failed to do so. It is however true that  ınissions
spread the original language of the missionaries, which
ultimately became the national - as Spanish in Latin America -
or the official language - as English in the colonial India and
French in Algeria.
Sometimes the catholic missionaries, who sometimes used Latin,
especially to write more important letters and documents, could
be met with adversity from suspicious natives. The following
conversation took part between a Chinese dignitary and a
Catholic missionary, whose letter the former had confiscated:
`In which language is [this letter] written?'
`In Latin.'
This is very suspect indeed! Why don't you write in Chinese?'
(Hunermann, 1961:273)
The above conversation reminds of some complaints by Polish
postgraduate students. The students, most of them in their late 40s,
complained that some of the lecturers used foreign words. One
commented: "I feel like listening to a Turkish sermon" (this is a common
Polish expression, meaning that you listen to something you do not
understand). They expressed their anger with this kind of treatment:
"Why can't they speak Polish?", but at the same time they refused to
talk about it with the lecturers in question. They probably felt ashamed
of not being "adequate", not au courant.
Being "international", "American" or "British" became a virtue
per se, which is also reflected in the way other products are marketed.
Says a private entrepreneur leading a marketing agency:
I often have to put English text and names on the labels of my
clients' products, the clients insist. Sometimes the description
of the product is in English, I think it is weird, the consumer
often does not understand the text. Somewhere on the label, in
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a corner, with a small font, they add `Made in Poland'. But this
is how products sell nowadays in our country.
Also genuine western made products invade our markets. They
are marketed and advertized on TV, sometimes, in the case of the Polish
TV, direct translations (often in incorrect and hardly understandable
Polish) are accepted and broadcasted. The already quoted entrepreneur
remarks:
Many of the advertized western products have already run their
life cycle out in the West. They advertize for the `old version'
in Poland and for a `new', improved one on Sky or MTV.
The white missionaries brought with them glass pearls and
mirrors to attract the 'pagans'. The Africans and the Indians
would do almost anything to get the 'precious' goods of the
white people. `1-laving learned that the [Indians] willingly sell
their women for European 'glitter', such as beads, hair pins,
metal buckles, they [the white settlers] threw themselves to
initiate contacts with the Indians. A [...] Brazilian historian,
Varnhagen, found through studies of Jesuit chronicles from
the 15th Century, that in that epoch it was possible to buy a
young Indian girl for a... hair-pin. (Wojcik, 1974:23).
It has to be remembered that before 1989, Eastern and Central
Europe were ruled in an undemocratic and totalitarian way (Staniszkis,
1989; Wesolowski and Wnuk-Lipinski, 1992). Totalitarian rule, is,
according to Wesolowski and Wnuk-Lipinski, "the rule of an
uncontrolled elite, supported by a mass political party, and executed
by bureaucratic institutions that pervade public life" (1992:85). The
people were suffering from more or less direct oppression and their
human rights were frequently and notoriously violated. Market economy
and western type democracy seemed to them after 1989 almost as the
"coming of the Messiah" and this is also what my American interlocutor
(private communication, Winter 1991; young American participating
in assistance program) alluded to, while describing his task:
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I think my job is very important. The Polish people have fought
for their freedom, now they are trying to create a democratic
society, for the first time since the beginning of World War  II.
They really had a tough time under communism.
It seems indubitable that among pre-cortesian Indians morality
did not reach their level of intelligence. Their religion, indeed,
does not appear as anything but an ensemble of mere rituals:
human sacrifices, ritual drunkenness and anthropophagy; they
were all too often bloody and immoral. (Ricard, 1933:43)
The West is supporting the ex-communist countries financially,
through the activity of many foundations, offering important loans,
grants, programs, etc. This help is more than welcome by the often
underinvested and poor countries. It is, however, often difficult to
acquire credit or financial support for the East and Central Europeans,
as the formal requirements are viewed as complicated and far from
what the ex-communist societies are used to. "It is impossible and
infuriating; they make me paranoid and I start thinking they do it on
purpose" - so the difficulties with filling application forms and taking
care of the formalities when applying for western grants were
commented by a young researcher (private communication, Spring
1993). Many of the Polish loans "wait" unused (J. Kostera, 1992). What
more, they are often connected to specific western services and products
which have to be bought if the credit is granted, or so at least my
interviewees affirmed (explorative effort: interviews with academics
and businesspeople, Spring, 1993).
It should be remembered that white missionaries often offered
genuine valuable help to the natives they were (and still are)
working with. The best known example is, perhaps, the one of
the Missiones mission in Latin America. But there are other as
well (e.g. Si-ing, 1940, Ricard, 1933). However, with this help
went the new faith as an 'additional' offering.
The most important feature of the "new era" of transition is,
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As an addition to already existing management education
institutions (they were not many; in Poland it was in the first place the
School of Management of the Warsaw University and also the Central
School of Planning and Statistics, currently: the Warsaw School of
Economics), new institutions started to mushroom throughout the ex-
Eastern Bloc. They often have "international" in their names, or
including an English word, e.g. "management" or "business".
Management education is growlingly popular in Poland and is viewed
as one of the most dependable (or perhaps even the most dependable)
path to professional career (before studies in foreign languages, law
and international trade), as a pilot study presented in the popular weekly
Polityka indicates (Nowakowska,1993).
The interest in management is enormous. An employee of a
Polish publishing company said: "Say `management' and people will
come running to buy it, whatever it is." It is also easy to observe: the
bookstores are full of publications on management, of various quality.
According to the vendors the clients ask for these books and they sell
very well (my interviews, Warsaw and Karpacz 1993).
Throughout the country numerous seminars, courses and
complete studies are arranged by western institutions. These programs
are sometimes of high and sometimes of poor quality. Some are
organized together with Polish institutions, private or public. They have
though one thing in common: they teach not only "new methods,
techniques and concepts", but also (or is it: in the first place?)  a new
set of norms and values.1
in 1989 I have participated in a seminar organized by an eminent
western institution, aimed at training in management and management
consulting.
The participants found themselves seated in a classroom,
reminding of a school-class. A group of people from industry sat in the
front half of the class. The back was occupied by University people,
among them one tenured professor and two assistants. Into the class
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came in the visiting lecturer and his young assistant. They presented
themselves as professional consultants with academic backround and
the lecture started.
First, the senior lecturer explained that communism had a very
demoralizing impact on the society and in order to achieve wealth and
succes the Eastern and Central Europeans will have to work hard. It is
not an acceptable attitude any more to wait for the state "giving" the
citizens all they demanded. Market economy meant competition, hard
work and problem solving. Communism was not a sustainable economic
system, anyone could see that.
The Indians were not used to hard work, they lived a life in
harmony with nature and they had to be 'persuaded' to work
by the Jesuits in a special way - work was associated to religious
ceremonies so that the natives understand its importance
(W6jcŕk, 1974). The natives do not cultivate the soil, nor do
they keep any tamed animals. Here there are no cows, horses,
goats, sheep nor chicken. The natives do not eat anything except
for maniok roots, fish and fruit growing abundantly in the
forests. In spite of this they are of remarkably high stature and
good health [...J' (ibid:18).
The Poles were, however, a very dynamic nation, the lecturer
went on. He himself, as well as his assistant, were of Polish origin. It
was here in Poland, that democracy was born in the Eastern Bloc.
Solidarnosc, the great social movement of 1980 was an event that shook
the world. Now, after the fall of communism, the Poles would easily
adapt to the new environment. They have an "economic mind", they
will learn fast and outwit their teachers. Here the lecturer smiled with
benevolence.
If our colonists, that settle down on these territories, learn the
language of these natives, with facility they will convert them
to the true religion, in which with God's help they may succeed!
It should be noted, that these natives seem to be honest people.
God gave them human faces and postures, to become like us,
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and the Lord, Jesus Christ, did not direct us here by accident,
knowing that Your highness wants to muliply His honor through
the redemption of new souls to the sacred catholic faith! [...]
(Wojcik, 1974: 17-18).
The lecturer told us a few anecdotes, acquainted us briefly with
his job and explained,that the assistant would now introduce some basic
western managerial concepts and theories we will certainly be needing.
He left the r000m and the assistant, in heart breaking poor Polish,
explained the concept of costs, fixed and variable. Then he wėnt on to
the price-setting and the relationship between demand and supply in a
market economy. To the academics and many of the industry people
these issus were trivial, but made almost unrecognizable through the
language. The assistant emphasized strongly what he was saying: this
was certainly the "good news" of market economy.
The Augustins admitted the pagans to the Holy Mass before
their baptism. After the Gospels, a minister explained to them
the meaning of the ceremonies ... Finally, he held a short lesson
in catechism. The Indians were not admitted to baptism before
they knew the 'Pater', the 'Credo', the commandments of God
and the Church and before they had sufjicient comprehension
of the sacraments. (Ricard, 1933: 105).
Now the junior lecturer returned. He was carrying a video. He
explained that we were to see a lecture of the "big economic guru",
Michael Porter. He told a few anecdotes from Porter's life, and then
we watched the film. The video was attractive to watch, and included
many suggestions about"how to succeed in business", both recipies
and insights. The video offered the participants a possibility to review
what they already knew or believed in, in a splendid "package".
The more modern Catholic missionaries educate the pagans in
the newfaith not so much by making them learn the cathechísme
by heart, but by teaching them about what being a good
Christian means in practice. They often account the stories of
the saints and other pious Catholics.2
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After having acquainted us with the new "religion", the lecturers
conducted a computer game. The participants filled in questionnaires,
after having discussed matters through in small groups. Then the lecturer
collected the papers and left the room to "process the data in his
computer", which we did not see. It was located somewhere else, in
the lecturer's individual room. Then he came back with the results.
The winning team was honored and celebrated. Other teams were also
celebrated - they had "done a good job". Everybody felt satisfied, this
was perhaps the most gratifying moment of the course, judging from
"break gossip". None of the gossip, neither critical or complimenting,
were given voice in class.
The course participants reacted ín a way, that e.g. Jankowicz
(1994) describes as common among Polish managers and hindering
creative learning. Jankowicz, involved in management education ín
Poland, observed a passive attitude among Polish managers, waiting
for the lecturer "to teach them". On explicit request from the lecturer
that they participate in a more active way, people tended to react with
embarrassment or even started to protest.
The participants were more loquacious in between classes,
commenting and forming networks. They formed a lobby that ultimately
would have the aim of grouping influential people within industry and
management consulting. "This was the main benefit from the course"
- a participant commented. The redeemed souls would now carry the
mission further.
This kind of brief course is, of course, not the only way of
communicating the Good News of Market Economy and Business
Administration to the post-communist heathens. An elite must be
formed, competent natives who will further the faith in practice and
theory.
A modern Church cannot live without leaders. The humble mass
of peasants, craftsmen, all who live of the work of their hands
and to whom, in the New Spain, the missionaries had brought
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the security of tomorrow, this humble mass should be directed,
schooled and educated by an elite. A laique, a clerical and an
elite of religious orders. The indispensity of [such elites] is not
to be disregarded, it is, to put it this way, of a theological
importance.	 (Ricard, 1933: 160).
Knowing about the importance offormation of such elites, the
white missionaries established some colleges for education of
future priests and civil leaders. The most succesful schools
educated natives	 (Ricard, 1933).
Thus, several high-standard, prestigious institutions have been
established, based on cooperation between eminent Polish and western
educational institutions. One of them is offering full fledged MBA
studies. some of the lectures are in Englsh and, probably, most of the
course materials are. The students, selected out of many candidates,
are highly motivated and hard working. The work load is immense,
compared to other management education curricula I know of in Poland.
The students receive regularly bulky readings and pass demanding
exams, even though they are busy with their work elsewhere - most of
them are executives for various enterprises, some of which are of
considerable size and importance. The course includes, among others,
sophisticated financial management techniques, modem accounting,
computer sciencė, going into details and demanding memorizing of
long and complicated texts and procedures.
If the preliminary education of Motolinie represented a
minimum, it seams certain that the Pláticas des Douze
represented, on the contrary, the maximum. Certain indications
about the different categories of angels, seraphins,
Cherubins, Thrones, Dominions seem excessive for a
preliminary education and extremely complicated.
(Ricard, 1933:108).
The courses, more or less high prestige and more or less
advanced, all result in a diploma or degree, from MBA to a simple
certificate of completing the course. This document is highly valued
by the students and candidates - it gives them a good position on the
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labor market. in the terms of my metaphor they acquirė a certificate of
being baptized and thus members of the "new church".
The administration of baptism was [...] always preceded by a
schooling which could be in ore or less abbreviated, more or
less rapid, depending on the case and the circumstances.
(Ricard; 1933:105).
There are of course different guest lecturers. I see two broad
categories of "the management missionaries": the "free-marketeers"
and the "culture sensitive". While the former tend to concentrate on
free market values and classic economics, often explicitly suggesting
that the Polish students are to learn the "universally accepted" rules of
the game and typically address to an intellectual elite, the latter show
concern for the Polish "common man and woman", gathering
information on the culture and students before the lecture and adapting
the style and language as much as possible to the listeners. The latter
also show interest in the material situation of their listeners, while the
former stress the importance of holding on to the crucial values (such
as competition, individualism, pragmatism etc.), usually performing
in front of middle and upper class students. However, the message
taught is typically very much the same: "if you work really hard and
economize, you will enjoy the fruits of your labor when the times
comes".
The Catholic and Protestant missionaries resembled each other
in the way of thinking. The same sentiment of superiority of
Christians, having the knowledge about the revealed truth
toward the Chinese: `these ignorant pagan 's and the same
combination of religious zeal and imperialist ambition... So,
the religious practices could be different among the Catholics
and Protestants...[but] before their eyes the Chinese pagans
appeared in the same condition of ignorance and misery.
(si-ing, 1940:105).
The method of recruitment of the Catholic missionaries was
typically the one of protection of the peasants or of the poor.
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they could not have found better protectors against the abus of
local authorities or better suppporters than the Catholic
missionaries...	 (Si-ing, 1940:106).
Simultaneously, the method of recruitment of the Protestant
missionaries was based on humanitarian works. Because they
were rich in personnel and money, thanks to the American
element, they occupied themselves much more often with the
citizens than with the peasants. They devoted much money at
works having to do with hygiene and assistance.
(Sí-ing, 1940:107).
I would like to point out that according to my experiences the
role of the "culture sensitive" missionaries is more advantageous and
helpful than that of the "free marketeers". The former often stay at
Polish hotels, let themselves be invited to people's homes and thus
learn about the culture and the people's needs and expectations. The
"free-marketeers" usually stay at the Marriott in Warsaw (thus their
nickname: "the Marriott brigades"), and are said never to leave the
hotel except in one of the hotel's taxis. The "culturally sensitive" often
ultimately develop reciprocal relationship with the students.
Communication between West and East:
Sermoning the idolatrous
As the above windows show, the communication East-West
seems to be pretty uni-directional. It is exactly what I would like to
point out in this paper: the general direction for the transfer of symbols
and meanings in the world after 1989 is that from West to the East. It is
thus not a process of conversation, it is a monologue, or, in the terms
of my metaphor, a serınon. The West is teaching the East to adopt its
religion. The missionaries are sometimes cynical, sometimes genuinely
devoted and pious, wishing sincerely to see their eastern brothers and
sisters saved through the adoption of the "right" faith. They
communicate to them the "right" symbols, norms, values and myths -
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with the assumption that if they only be espoused and used properly,
salvation (prosperity and modernity) will be possible for these peoples.
The symbols that the eastern societies are to embrace are various:
from the"right" words (the prayers): management, marketing,
divisionalization, strategy, etc., through physical artifacts (such as
"right" clothes, cars, products) to "mystical" ones, such as
advertisements, titles (MBA), prices, costs, taxes, etc. It is the "mystical"
symbols that deserves, in my opinion, some more attention. I will here
shortly address one of them: the advertisements.
TV-ads are an interesting source of mystical symbols that pervade
the Polish everyday life. They are a popular topic for jokes, both at
reunions of academics and at country weddings. They are often recited
by children, to their parents' delight. Also my students quote TV-ads,
most often ironically. Inevitably, the citations awake laughter, even
when repeated for the 20th time. Once I have observed children playing:
a few run and one was following after them. One of the running kids
screamed: "Watch out! WC-Picker is chasing us!" (WC-Picker is a
brand aggressively advertized for at the Polish TV currently). Some of
the phrases from the ads became a common feature of the everyday
language, typically used ironically (the ads are often direct and maladroit
translations from English and German).
Myths are a particular kind of symbols. Eastern societies also
receive a set of myths that they can now participate in to experience
the fundamental truths of the new religion. The most important myths
are: the myth of hard work, the myth of the free market and the one of
economizing.
An example of the myth of hard work is the well known story of
the shoe-shiner who became millionaire ("rags to riches"), also know
as the American Dream. This story is being repeated now to the Poles,
and the lecturers emphasize the moral lesson: all you have to do is to
work hard, and believe in your product. If you do work hard, succes
inevitably will follow. There is a protestant ethic moral in the story, a
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belief in predestination. Similar myths on the free market are being
communicated: the Market as a just judge and the fair allocator. if you
only rely on the Market in a 100%, prosperity and justice will follow.
These myths (often the British example) are told especially during
lectures on privatization. Finally, the third Grand Myth, the one on
economizing, is told in its various versions, but perhaps most often
about the Japanese, who do not consume what they produce but invest
and save. This is offered to the Polish students as the recipie for success
and virtue in itself.
The central value of the religion of business administration is
the one of rationality. It has been pointed out before (Czarniawska-
Joerges,1993; Kostera and Wicha, 1994) that modern organizations
are primarily rationality-producing constructs. It is true about both
communist and capitalist enterprises. However, their rationality criteria
were different, as Kostera and Wicha (1994) show. The communist
enterprise was based on political rationality, the capitalist - on economic
rationality. By economic rationality I mean maximization of material
utility. By political rationality I understand maximization of influence
and power "utility" (Kostera and Wicha, 1994). Rationality is socially
constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966/1983; Czarniawska-Joerges,
1992b), and the rules for this construction are contingent with, among
other factors, the basic kind of "utility" the society is concerned about
to achieve. Thus, the eastern peoples are not only un-believers, they
are idolaters and this is exactly what the western missionaries are trying
to demonstrate to them: that their way of perceiving the organizational
world is "irrational" and that there are "more effective" alternatives
(i.e. better suited to reach the desired ends, salvation or well-being).
Economic rationality is such an important and self-justifying value
that I would claim it is the god of the new religion. In the name of
rationality we prepare our accounts, just as Christians do in order to
face God at the day of judgement. This does not apply only to purely
economic accounts (such as the Annual Report), but everyday life in
modern society. In organizations, rationality is produced by introduction
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of specialized rationalization actions into the system and through
preparing rational accounts for external use - the two methods are
interrelated (Czarníawska-Joerges,1993). In modern society this
rationality production process is taken for granted and obvious, it is
regarded as the unquestioned, most often, unconscious ultimate end
and also meaning of (organizational) life.
salvation, as communicated by the missionaries, is, besides
economic well-being and prosperity (measured in GNP per capita),
also the modern society itself, seen as a value in itself. To be "well-
organized" and "hard-working" on the societal level is an aim as
laudable as prosperity. In the "good news" there is a hidden message:
"You don't have to be as wealthy as we are, as long as you are tidy,
hygienic, hard-working and frugal". Wealth is not a value of a new
religion, in the western societies people are often living modestly and
are very careful about how they spend their money, not at all how the
Easterners imagine life in the wealthy ("prosperous") West.
The most important thing to me is not so much that missionaries
from the West are trying to convert Easterners to their religion. What I
see as crucial is the fact that the communication is uni-directional.
And yet, as Orgogozo (1992) points out, we have so much to learn
from each other and together, I would add. Orgogozo notes:
[T]he discoveries being made by those fleeing to Western
Europe regarding relations of mutual aid and cooperation, the
coolness and indifference of wealthy Europeans towards each
other, can help us become aware ofour most serious deficiencies
(Orgogozo, 1992:598).
She explains, that the capitalist society has disregarded the cost
free relations, such as family, education and replacing them with sellable
goods or services. Easterners have experienced life in a differently
constructed society, with other goals and rationalities. In the case of
Poland many valuable societal meanings and symbols derive from a
powerful experience people have made: the Solídarпosc era of 1980-
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1981, and-to a certain degree the years ofpopuiar dissent and skepticism
during the martial law. Furthermore, under communism it was quite
"normal" for working class people to go to cinema, theater, to read
books. Especially during the 80. there were many "people's flying
universities" active in Poland, among them one lead by Jerzy
Popieluszko, a catholic priest, who organized high quality cultural
activities in his church, including lectures by eminent professors,
concerts, theater performances, directed primarily to blue collar workers
of Huta Warszawa (Warsaw Steel Mill). Another typical example: a
note in a Polish daily Zycie Warszawy of may 7, 1993 about the yearly
film festival. The western partners were surprised, according to the
note, that such a "post-communist festival of ambitious films" be
arranged in Poland, but since it promised to be profitable, they accepted
the idea. The festival lasted for two weeks and was a feast for those
interested in non-commercial, ambitious films. According to the media,
the overall interest in such events, the tendency to read books other
than Harlequin, see films other than Hollywood productions and video
tapes, is in decline in Poland. What people from Eastern Europe so
light heartedly give up today seems to be non-negligible. It is, by the
way, not what the conservative-nationalist parties in today's Poland
mean by "taking care of taditional values". What they mean is reviving
the values from before World War II and decreasing some of the human
rights (for example those of women and sexual minorities) (cf. e.g.
Kostera et al., 1994).
Moreover, the adoption of the new religion in itself might not
bring the desired ends. What Western Europe achieved they had a high
price to pay for, and also it was to an important extent the result of the
Marshall plan, not just "hard work and economizing". Are the East
Europeans willing to (and able of) pay this price? And would it lead
them in the desired direction, considering the role of the Marshall plan
for the development of the economy of Western Europe? And then,
would it really be worthwhile? These questions will probably stay
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To summarize: it is time that we acknowledge that the East has
a culture of its own, an own religion. Eastern Europe was long supposed
to suffer a kind of "no-culture", negligible or even simply negative, in
other words "not deserving" to be labelled a "culture", instead it was
designated as a "system".
Heathens waiting to be sermoned
There is another side to the management crusade in Eastern
Europe. People reacted with solidarity and ironic resistance toward
administered symbols during the 80s of martial law in Poland, and
there is a dear myth about the Polish society as being particularly
unsubmissive and ironic to attempts at colonization. People pride
themselves in the Polish history of contradiction and sarcasm: how the
Poles make jokes during Nazi occupation, then during communism.
This attitude seems lost somehow in the recent development. How
come?
One of the answers may be that the colonized somehow allow
colonization through their passivity or even active expectations. A
western academic told me a story about a help project that he was
engaged in. Before 1989 the Polish partners were eager to act as partners
and he thought of that period as cooperation, even if the material support
went in just from one direction. The Poles offered other kinds of support
and advice that the Westerners appreciated. After 1989 the attitudes
changed: the very same people began to expect to be helped, to be
offered material support no longer as a link in cooperation but as a
"gift". The story tells about a mysterious metamorphosis in the minds
of people. More often, the Westerners coming as missionaries are not
the same people who came in the 80, to participate in the Polish
experience of Solíarпosc and then martial law. These Westerners were
typically remarkable people, coming to Poland to give and to take, to
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participate and to experience. The contemporary "missionaries" are
usually consultants, profit minded and economically oriented. The
"disciples" are typically not the same people who cooperated with the
Westerners coming during the 80s. Those were dissidents, workers,
academics, people dissatisfied with the regime. Today's disciples are
managers, Polish consultants, also economically oriented. However,
the metamorphosis of societal attitudes at large remains as a reality.
The phenomenon has certainly complex roots, that can be traced to
feelings of helplessness that the public opinion polls tell about (CBOS,
1993-July 1994), Polish myths about the "rich western society",
attitudes that the communist era has succesfully developed in people:
that the "rich" should give to the "poor" who just have to take and
nothing more, etc. However, the picture again reminds of the proud
Native American cultures, that nevertheless gave up their dignity when
western missionaries came to preache them about the white man's
condition. The Polish people have long believed that the western god
is more powerful: his or her disciples are rich, happy and young. When
the Wall fell down (who knows? maybe it was the western god who
performed this miracle?), the Easterners resolved to abide, "open their
minds", and this is precisely a question of faith , to which I shall return
again in the conclusions.
Conclusions: No happy endings
In modern society, religious needs were (and still are ) being
fulfilled in a superficial way by organization and especially the business
organization. The modern religion of business administration with
economic rationality as god has long served as a surrogate for deeper
spiritual experiences. It is now being transferred to Eastern Europe,
trying to find a model for organization of social life after the fall of
communism. This process I have here described as mission. The uni-
directional communication is not only an imperfection and a relative
loss of values that the Eastern Europeans could offer their western
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neighbors. The Westerners probably need these values as much as the
Easterners need western experiences. The fact that the communication
is so intense (as the metaphor of"mission" suggests) and uni-directional
also means that we all are likely to loose some important values forever.
If the East Europeans convert, there will be nowhere to look for the
values given up and nobody to learn from.
Even if the profit oriented practitioners (the economic rationality
driven priests of business religion) may be moderately inclined to "learn
from the East", then perhaps the academics might be more interested
to honestly examine reality. Both eastern and western researchers could
seriously consider a closer and mutual cooperation for shared insights
about a common future.
Another important conclusion concerns the attitudes to
democracy. When they finally recognize the current situation as
colonization and start to resist it, they may refuse to believe in
democracy as well. The attitudes toward both free market and
democracy are already declining, as public opinion surveys show
(CBOS, 1993- July 1994). In a recent survey a majority declared that
the Polish democracy was faulty. While 62 % said that they in principle
were for democracy, as many as 37% considered dictatorship as
necessary "in certain cases". The same percentage claimed that they
would welcome a "strong person" as Poland's leader (CBOS,1993/
7:5-18). This parallels with people's growing disillusion with the free
market, as a source of injustice rather than justice, oppression rather
than freedom and poverty rather than wealth. The western god can be
rejected just as easily as he or she was accepted. Together with the
"new rationality" all other values can be refused, among them
democracy. The religious metaphor helps to discern this dimension of
social reality, and also perhaps provides with a perspective to understand
the dynamics that pervades it. Democracy and the culture of organizing
of a society are also about faith, and lost faith is not only a consequence
of the deteriorating material situation. There is a need to believe
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common for humans, thus a readiness to trust and to distrust, beyond
the obvious. These needs deserve to be taken more seriously.
Notes
I speaking of missionaries here, I mean only the lecturers and consultants
who come to Poland on behalf of institutions and firms, pursuing well defined
and material interests, earning very good money, and coming with ready made
"packages" of knowledge and know-how. There are lecturers who come from
entirely different reasons and work together with Polish partners, often in
answer to their explicit questions and problems.
2 Modern mission activity is familiar to me mainly through correspondence
with a Catholic missionary working in New Guinea.
3 The Pláticas of Br. Bernardino de Sahagún, found by K.P. Pascual Saura
and published in 1924 by P. Póu y Marti.
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Produktivität und Profit in einem
Moskauer Joint Venture
Birgit Müller, Elena Mechtcherkina, Kirill Levinson,
Isabelle Cribler, Andrej Onikienko
Während sich Moskau im Herbst 1993 unter und Ober der Erde
in einen Straßenmarkt verwandelt hatte, waren die Strategien und
Perspektiven der russischen Betriebe von der Zerschlagung von
Staatsmonopolen, Privatisierungen und Joint Ventures geprägt. Mit
welchen Vorstellungen die Beschäftigten eines mittelgroßen Moskauer
Betriebes sich für ein Joint Venture entschieden und was sich dadurch
in ihrem täglichen Leben und Arbeiten veränderte, war Ausgangspunkt
unserer Untersuchung in der Ersatzteilfertigung einer Moskauer Firma
für Aufzugsservice - wir wollen sie hier "Víjshe"2 (höher!) nennen -
die seit 1. Januar 1993 Teil eines Joint Ventures mit der amerikanischen
Firma - nennen wir sie "INTEC" (International Elevator Corporation)
- geworden war. In der Ersatzteilfertigung mit im Oktober 1993 noch
230 Beschäftigten und einer eigenen Verwaltungsstruktur, führten wir
im Herbst 1993 mit sozialanthropologischen Methoden über einen
Monat Erhebungen durch. Wir interviewten, jeweils zu zweit, 15
leitende Angestellte und mehr als 19 Arbeiter und Brigadeleiter an
ihrem Arbeitsplatz. Wir besuchten einige von ihnen zu Hause und
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Unsere Forschergruppe3 bestehend aus fünf deutschen,
französischen und russischen Forschern und einem Obersetzer
debattierte in vier Sprachen und war in der täglichen Forschungsarbeit
beständig mit den unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen der Russen und
Westeuropäer auf das jeweils "Eigene" und aufdas "Fremde" im Betrieb
konfrontiert. Was einerseits eine Schwierigkeit in der Koordination
der gemeinsamen Forschungsarbeit darstellte, war aber gleichzeitig
auch ihre Stärke, da wir so auf Aspekte aufmerksam wurden, die
Forschern aus einem einzigen kulturellen Hintergrund wohl entgangen
wären. Der in der westeuropäischen Marktwirtschaft aufgewachsenen
Deutschen und der Französin schienen die Argumente der westlichen
Joint Venture Partner und ihre Entwicklungsstrategien für das
Unternehmen vertraut, während sie für die russischen Forscher den
Reiz der Neuheit hatten. Während sich die russischen Forscher vor
allem fdr die Frage interessierten, ob das Joint Venture dem Betrieb
und den dort Beschäftigten überhaupt Vorteile gebracht hat, und ob es
nicht besser für sie gewesen wäre, unabhängig zu werden, suchten die
westeuropäischen Forscher nach Spuren des Alten im Neuen. Sie fragten
nach den Inhalten, die in den Schulen sozialistischer Arbeit vermittelt
worden waren, nach der Funktionsweise des sozialistischen
Wettbewerbs und den Űberbleibseln der planwirtschaftlichen
Organisation in der Verwaltung des Joint Venture. Die unter-
schiedlichen Sichtweisen beflügelten die Debatten unter uns Forschern
und die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den Aspekten des betrieb-
lichen Alltags, die uns sonst leicht selbstverständlich vorgekommen
wären.
Der Betrieb lag in einem Wohngebiet: zehnstöckige graue
Wohnblocks, die Straße voller Löcher, einige Müllcontainer, die
scheinbar nie geleert wurden und auf denen sich die Krähen tummelten.
Der Betrieb mit seinen neuen Fertigungshallen, die schon seit fdnfzehn
Jahren im Bau waren, hob sich zunächst kaum von dieser Atmosphäre
ab. Aber im Laufe unseres Aufenthaltes konnten wir jeden Tag die
Fortschritte begutachten, die die Renovierung des Betriebes machte.
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Eine hohe Mauer wurde errichtet, so daß es bald nicht mehr m őglích
sein würde, von der Straße aus auf den Hof zu sehen. Entlang der Mauer
wurde ein Beet angelegt, auf dein vielleicht einmal Gras und Blumen
wachsen wurden nach dem Vorbild mancher westlicher Betriebe. Von
der Eingangshalle aus konnten die Beschäftigte durch die offene Tür
in die neue Halle blicken, die frisch gestrichen, hoch und hell war und
damit im starken Kontrast zu den anderen alten Fertigungshallen stand.
Jeden Morgen, sobald alle Mitglieder der Gruppe eingetroffen
waren, versuchten wir bei der Direktionssekretärin ein kleines
unauffälliges Büro zu bekommen, in dem wir den Stand der Forschung
besprechen und die Erhebungen in den Werkstätten und Büros planen
konnten. in den vier Wochen unseres Aufenthalts gelang uns dies nicht.
Stattdessen residierten wir im B űro der Direktorin, während sie zu einer
zehntägigen INTEC Schulung in die USA gereist war, im B űro des
deutschen Beraters, in dem des Chefingenieurs, in dem der Personal-
direktorin und im großen Versammlungsraum. Die Arbeitsräume der
Betriebsleitung waren für die Beschäftigten in der Fertigung die Räume
der Macht, die sie nach dem Parlamentsgebäude in Moskau "das weiße
Haus" nannten. Um nicht sogleich als Gehilfen der Direktion und
Mitglieder des "weißen Hauses" zu erscheinen, versuchten wir, uns in
jedem Gespräch deutlich von dieser Macht abzugrenzen und immer
wieder zu betonen, daß wir nicht für die oberste Betriebsleitung oder
den Joint Venture Partner spionierten und von einer unabhängigen
Forschungsorganisation finanziert werden.
Wir versuchten, in der Untersuchung dieses einen Betriebs zu
ergründen: Wie wirkt sich die Managementphilosophie der westlichen
Partner im Reden und im Handeln der russischen Verwaltung aus?
Was erwartete die Belegschaft von dem Joint Venture Partner und
inwieweit erfúllte oder enttäuschte er diese Erwartungen? In ώieweit
setzten sich die alten paternalistischen Strukturen zwischen
Betriebsdirektion und Arbeitern mit all ihrer Willkür und Wärme fo rt?
Bis zu welchem Punkt erkannten die Beschäftigten ihre alte
Betriebsleitung nun als Arbeitgeber an, dem sie ihre Arbeitskraft ver-
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kauften und mit dem sie um bessere Arbeitsbedingungen und Bezahlung
ringen mußten? Welche Bedeutung hatten Begriffe wie Produktivität
und Profit for die russischen Beschäftigten? Inwieweit unterschied sich
diese Bedeutung von der Managementphilosophie des westlichen Joint
Venture Partners?
I. Das Joint Venture: Hoffnungen und Enttäuschungen
Im Herbst 1992 standen die Arbeiter und Angestellten der
mechanischen Fertigung der Moskauer Aufzugsfirma Vijshe vor der
Wahl, sich von der Mutterfirma Vijshe Kombinat zu lösen, ihre Fabrik
zu privatisieren und in Belegschaftseigentum zu überführen oder einem
Joint Venture mit der großen amerikanischen Firma INTEC
zuzustimmen. Das Joint Venture war seit Februar 1992 vorbereitet und
von Vertretern der Firma INTEC mit einigen Direktoren der Firma
Vijshe Kombinat ausgehandelt worden. Die Antimonopolgesetze
erlaubten es, maximal 35% der Firma Vijshe mit der Firma INTEC zu
verbinden. Die Privatisierungsgesetze vom Juni 1991 erlaubten es den
Belegschaften von Betrieben mit eigener Rechnungsfúhrung, eíne
Eigenbeteiligung von 51% zu erwerben. Ein Joint Venture mit einer
ausländischen Beteiligung von 51% konnte daher nur mit Zustimmung
der Belegschaft erfolgen, die damit auf ihre Kontrollmajorität
verzichtete.
Die Beschäftigten der mechanischen Fertigung von Vijshe, die
Ersatzteile fúr die 100000 Aufzüge im Raum Moskau herstellte,
Aufzugsmotoren reparierte und Kabinen mit neuen Türen und
Sicherheitssystemen ausstattete, hatten 1992 kaum eigene Quellen der
Information, die es ihnen erlaubt hätten, die Vor- und Nachteile einer
Übernahme des Betriebes durch die Belegschaft abschätzen zu können.
Dennoch waren die Arbeiter zunächst fasziniert von der Möglichkeit,
sich von der Mutterfirma unabhängig zu machen, und sie fúhlten sich
zum ersten Mal - wenn auch nicht als Besitzer - so doch als Herren
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ihrer Fabrik. Die Angestellten in der Verwaltung hingegen ha tten nicht
das Gefühl die "wahren Herren" ihres Betriebes werden zu können.
Manche Angestellten betrachteten die Möglichkeit der Übernahme des
Betriebes durch die Belegschaft eher mit Skepsis und stellten fest, daß
die Beschäftigten schon "zu frei" und "furchtlos" geworden wären.
Der Chefingenieur faßte die Zweifel, die er 1992 an der Privatisierung
durch die Belegschaft gehabt hatte, zusammen:
"Das Privatisierungsgesetz schreibt vor, daß wenn die Beschäf-
tigten ihr Geld oder ihre Voucher in den Betrieb stecken, erhalten
sie 51% der Anteile. Wir aber haben fast 300 Beschäftigte. Es
gibt kein Gesetz über geschlossene Aktiengesellschaften. Das
bedeutet, daß jeder Arbeiter, der morgens aufwacht und gerade
nichts da hat, um seinen "Kater" zu pflegen, seine Aktien
verscherbeln kann, um an Geld zu kommen. Dann haben wir
schon nicht mehr 51 sondern nur noch 50% und so weiter. Wir
könnten durchkommen, nachdem wir unser Geld investiert haben
und eine Aktiengesellschaft gegründet haben, aber wir könnten
auch scheitern. Das ist die erste Seite und die andere ist wie die
erste: Wenn der wahre Herr des Betriebes 300 Arbeiter sein
werden, die nicht bereit sein werden, mit ihrem Geld ein Risiko
einzugehen, wird das nicht wie in einer Kolchose sein, in der
alle Profite fúr das tägliche Brot ausgegeben werden, in der es
Beschlüsse geben wird, die verbieten, Anteilseigner zu entlassen
oder zu bestrafen? Das würde bedeuten, statt Fortschritt wurden
wir Rückschritt haben."
(Jewgenij Lykow, Chefingenieur, 2. 11. 1993)
Jewgenij Lykow befürchtete, daß der Verwaltung bei der
Privatisierung durch die Belegschaft die disziplinarische Kontrolle  Ober
die Arbeiter entgleiten könnte und daß bei einem freien Verkauf der
Anteile Fremde - oder wie es andere Beschäftigte ausdrückten -
"kaukasische Mafia". Herren des Betriebs werden könnten. Die
Verwaltungsangestellten knüpften dreierlei Hoffnungen an ein Joint
Venture:
Erstens erhofften sie sich Investitionen in moderne westliche
Technologien und neue Gebäude für die Fertigung und versprachen
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sich davon bessere Arbeitsbedingungen, mehr Sauberkeit und Ordnung
und höhere Produktivität. Síe hielten die Erneuerung des Maschinen-
parks, der im Durchschnitt 20 Jahre alt war, für absolut notwendig.
Auch hatte der Betrieb zunehmend Schwíerigkeíten mit der Stadt-
verwaltung, die ės nicht mehr zulassen wollte, daß die neu gewickelten
Motoren weiterhin in einem alten Ofen gebrannt wurden, der giftige
Gase in die Moskauer Luft schickte. Neben dem Verwaltungsgebäude
'vartete seit 15 Jahren eine dreistöckige Fertigungshalle darauf,
fertiggestellt zu werden.
Zweitens erwarteten sie, daß sie ihre Produktpalette erweitern
und sich neue Märkte erschließen könnten. Ihre Mutterfirma, die große
Servicefirma Vijshe Kombinat, die 1992 noch 8500 Beschäftigten
gehabt hatte und fúr deren 16 Wartungsbetriebe sie die Ersatzteile
hergestellt hatte, war dabei, sich in viele kleine unabhängige
Servicebetriebe aufzulösen mıııd drohte damit zu einem unzuverlässigen
Kunden zu 'verden.
Drittens rechneten sie mit einer Verbesserung ihrer finanziellen
Basis. Bei den Verhandlungen versprach die Firma INTEC ihren
Moskauer Partnern, Investitionen in neue Ausrüstung und
Produktionsmaschinen, sie stellte die Produktion von neuen Sets von
Ersatzteilen auch fúrdie INTEC Šervice-Firmen im Ausland in Aussicht
und präsentierte sich den Teilbetrieben von Vijshe Kombinat, mit denen
sie zusammenarbeiten wollte, mit dem ganzen Glamour einer
internationalen Firma. Ausgesuchte Angestellte wurden noch vor
VertragsabschluB zu einer Informationsreise nach Paris eingeladen und
fúr das Joint Venture gewonnen.
Diese wiederum hatten nun die Aufgabe, die Zustimmung der
Belegschaft for das Vorhaben zu gewinnen. Die Direktorin erinnerte
sich an die Informationsveranstaltungen, die sie im Herbst 1992




Contributeur : Eliane DaphyMoskauer Joint Venture	 189
"Was die positiven Seiten des Joint Venture anbelangt, da habe
ich folgende Punkte angesprochen: die Gegenwart des
ausländischen Kapitals würde es uns erlauben, in die Produktion
zu investieren in diesen schwierigen Zeiten - niemand hatte mir
etwas von einem Abbau der Produktion gesagt. Und ich sagte
ihnen, daß sicher ein Teil des ursprünglichen Kapitals dafür ver-
wendet werden würde, neue Uniformen, Werkzeuge und
Sicherheitseinrichtungen zu kaufen, und so ist es ja dann auch
geschehen. Das Hauptargument war - und ich glaube, ich habe
die Leute damit nicht betrogen- : wenn wir diese Strukturen
schaffen, werden wir die INTEC Servicepackages und Ersatzteile
produzieren und damit unsere Produktion auslasten können.
Schließlich erklärte ich ihnen, wir wurden ein Service Center
werden und damit das Profil unserer Aktivitäten so verändern,
daß wir Arbeitskräfte von der Produktion in den Service transfe-
rieren könnten. Fur mich war es allerdings auch sehr wichtig,
daß das Gebäude immer noch nicht fertig war. Wenn wir den
Betrieb mit unseren eigenen Mitteln privatisiert hätten, hätten
wir für das Gebäude einen Investor finden müssen, der dann
Mitbesitzer geworden wäre....
`INTEC hat Weltruhm', und das ist es, was ich auf dieser
Versammlung gesagt habe..." (Katerina Selenzowa, 17.1 1.1993)
Zum Teil durch eine etwas mythologisierte Vorstellung vom
westlichen Unternehmen, zum Teil auch wegen der konkreten
Versprechungen, die ihnen auf zahlreichen Versammlungen im Herbst
1992 gemacht worden waren, entschied sich die Belegschaft schließlich
gegen die Übernahme der Mehrheit der Anteile und für das Joint
Venture. Wie der stellvertretende Betriebsgewerkschaftsvorsitzende
Matwej Studenkin meinte, hing die Entscheidung letztendlich stark
von der Art und Weise ab, wie den Beschäftigten das Joint Venture
vorgestellt wurde:
"Das ist alles eine Sache, wie man den Beschäftigten die Infor-
mation gibt. Wenn der Direktor kommt und sagt: `Hej, Kumpels,
wollt Ihr, daß INTEC kommt und Euch 51% Eures Profits
wegnimmt? Oder wont Ihr es nicht?' Natürlich werden die dann
sagen, sie wollen es nicht. Es hängt alles von der Persönlichkeit
des Inform ierenden ab."
(Matwej Studenkin, 15. 11. 1993)4
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Die Beschäftigten erwarteten viel von dem Joint Venture für
das sie ihre Hoffnung auf Selbstbestimmung aufgegeben hatten. Manche
glaubten sich durch das Joint Venture der Lösung auch ihrer privaten
Wohnungsprobleme näher. Es gab bei einigen Arbeitern die Vor-
stellung, daß nach dem Joint Venture ein Teil des Lohnes in Dollar
ausgezahlt werden würde. Die Direktorin bemerkte dazu:
"Was die sozialen Fragen anbelangt,.... Ich habe schon gemerkt,
daß die Leute mehr erwartet hätten, aber es ist normal für den
menschlichen Charakter, immer mehr zu erwarten."
(Katerina Selenzowa, 17.11.1993)
Die meisten Erwartungen waren jedoch pragmatischer und
kristallisierten sich um die beiden Faktoren Technologie und Profit.
Neue Maschinen wurden mit Spannung und Ungeduld erwartet. Die
Arbeiter rechneten damit, daß die neue Technologie die Qualität der
Produktion erhöhen würde und daß sie sich dann die Hände bei der
Arbeit nicht mehr so schmutzig machen würden. Auch Arbeiter wie
der stellvertretende Betriebsgewerkschaftsvorsitzende Matwej Stu-
denkin, der lieber auf alten Maschinen arbeitete und wie er sagte: "drei
neue computergesteuerte Maschinen fur eine alte geben würde"
(3.1 1.1993), erwarteten die neuen Maschinen als Zeichen dafŭr, daß
es mit dem Betrieb weitergehen wurde. Allerdings äußerten einige
Arbeiter schon den Verdacht, daß die neuen Technologien nicht fŭr
alle sein wurden. So meinte die Arbeiterin Marja Gulajewa, "in den
neuen Werkstätten werden die Auserwählten arbeiten".
Die Vorstellung, daß neue Technologien kommen müßten, ging
einher mit der noch recht unpräsizen Vorstellung, daß mit den
westlichen Partnern auch der "Profit" kommen wurde. Während die
einen, wie der Elektromonteur Maxim Pjatjorski, meinten:
"Die ausländischen Companies arbeiten nur aus Profitinteressen.
Wenn sie gewinnen, bekommen wir auch etwas ab." (9.11. 1993),
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sahen Arbeiter, wie Matwej Studenkin das Streben nach Profit weni-
ger optimistisch:
"Die Bourgeois haben uns gekauft. Síe werden nun Profit aus
uns ziehen. Síe werden uns auch einigermaßen fdttern, sonst aber
nichts."
. Arbeiter wie (gnat Gmysin hatten air das Joint Venture mit
INTEC gestimmt, weil sie die große Firma INTEC ais Konkurrenten
ffírchteten:
"Ohne INTEC wäre der Betrieb bankrott gegangen. Mit INTEC
kёпnе ı wir schwimmen, ohne INTEC würden wir ertrinken. Es
geht .INTEC darum, die Konkurrenten aufzufressen. Die Firma
Vijshe wäre ein Konkurrent von INTEC gewesen und jetzt ist
sie ein Teil von INTEC geworden. Wir haben von Marx und
Lenin gelernt, daß man die Konkurrenz auffrißt. INTEC hat schon
30% der Aufzugsproduktion in der Welt und will jetzt auf den
russischen Markt. Sie wollen ein Monopol machen." (9.1 1.93)
Was war im Herbst 1993, ein Jahr nach der Entscheidung für
das Joint Venture, von diesen Erwartungen und Befürchtungen in
Emillung gegangen? INTEC entschied sich nur sehr zögerlich fúr
Investitionen in die Fertigung von Ersatzteilen. Nach Großinvestitionen
in die von INTEC gekauften Aufzugsfertigungen in Petersburg und
Scherblinka, wollten sie nun abwarten, wie sich der russische Markt
entwickeln würde und ob sie tatsächlich Bedarf haben würden für eine
eigene Ersatzteilfertigung in Moskau. Die Aussage "VijsheINTEC soll
ein Service Center werden", erwies sich als durchaus ambivalent. Síe
beinhaltete nach Meinung des deutschen Vertreters von INTEC in
Moskau auch die Möglichkeit, die Fertigung in der von uns untersuchten
Fabrik auf das strikte Minimum zu beschränken, die Ersatzteile von
fremden Firmen oder anderen eigenen Fertigungen herstellen zu lassen
und über das Service Center zu vertreiben.
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Im Herbst 1993 wurde das neue Gebäude fertiggestellt. Die
Fertigstellung wurde von der Stadt Moskau finanziert, die 1993 noch
49% der VijsheINTEC Anteile hielt. Eine der drei Hallen wurde aber
nicht far die Fertigung, sondern als Auslieferungslager fur Ersatzteile
bestimmt. Alle Fertigungsabteilungen arbeiteten immer noch auf ihren
alten Maschinen. Nur die Motorenreparatur hatte Aussicht auf
Verbesserung. Für sie wurden neue Maschinen gekauft, die in einer
der neuen Hallen aufgestellt werden sollten. INTEC kaufte auch einen
neuen Brennofen zum Brennen der reparierten Motoren, die dadurch
eine längere Lebensdauer erhalten sollten.
Die mėisten Beschäftigten waren enttäuscht von den geringen
Investitionen und auch einige leitende Angestellten zweifelten, ob die
Entscheidung fur das Joint Venture die richtige gewesen war. Vor allem
die Bestimmung des Erdgeschosses der neuen Halle als Auslieferungs-
und Ersatzteillager beunruhigte die Produktio ńsarbeiter, weil sie darin
ein Zeichen gegen die Modernisierung der Produktion und zugunsten
einer reinen Servicetätigkeit des Betriebes sahen. Auch wenn die
wenigsten unter ihnen konkret befürchteten, daß die Produktion
eingestellt werden könnte und sie ihren Arbeitsplatz verlieren könnten,
so Whiten sie doch eine generelle Unsicherheit und einen Mangel an
klaren Perspektiven fur ihren Arbeitsplatz in der Produktion. Der
Arbeiter Ignat Gmysin kommentierte dazu:
"Ich möchte gerne, daß sich die Arbeit verändert. INTEC sagt:
`Ihr arbeitet schlecht'. Aber wir haben hier alte Technologien
und schlechte Maschinen. Ich denke, daß unsere Hände nicht
schlecht arbeiten."	 (9.11. 93)
Den Beschwichtigungen durch die Betriebsleitung wurde
weniger Glaube geschenkt als den Gerüchten, die von den Arbeitern
selbst ausgingen. Besonders glaubwürdig schien der Arbeiter Iwan
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"Die Perspektiven des Betriebes sind unklar. So hat mir zum
Beispiel der Arbeiter Iwan Slegow, der in Frankreich war, gesagt,
er weiß überhaupt nicht, mit welcher Produktion sich der Betrieb
nach dem Neujahr beschäftigen wird."
Die Reformen, Umgestaltungen und Neuerungen in den letzten
Jahren der Sowjetökonomie hatten die Menschen im Betrieb
mißtrauisch gemacht gegen Veränderungen und Versprechungen. Auch
die Hoffnungen, die sie in die Entwicklung des Joint Ventures gesetzt
hatten, zerstreuten ihre grundsätzlichen Befürchtungen nicht.
"Wir haben schon so viele Renovierungen und Umgestaltungen
gehabt, daß wir es gewohnt sind, sie zu fürchten. Wenn alles gut
geht... Verstehen Síe, was im Westen effizient wäre, nützt
möglicherweise hier bei uns nichts. Ein frisches Beispiel:
Petersburg. Dort ist ein schicker nagelneuer Betrieb von 1NTEC
gebaut worden, der aber fúr eine Technologie geeignet ist, die
bei uns nicht geht. Er ist völlig auf Lieferanten angewiesen und
arbeitet jetzt mit 60% der Auslastung.
Unsere Umstände sind etwas anders, aber wir haben es jetzt auch
sehr schwer. Wir haben also Angst vor all diesen Neuerungen.
So oft haben wir uns schon gedacht, alles würde gut gehen... Ein
neues Beispiel, der Farbgebungsraum. Auf dem Papier ist das
ein traumhafter Farbgebungskomplex gewesen. Aber jetzt steht
er seit zwei Monaten wegen vieler kleiner technischer Mangel
still - nach nur zwei Monaten der Arbeit. ich will also jetzt nichts
beurteilen. Ich hoffe nur. Verstehen Sie, ich bin es nun gewohnt,
nur auf meine eigenen Kräftezu hoffen. Wir heißen alle diese
Neuerungen gut,.aber ich hoffe nur auf meine eigenen Kräfte."
(Ilja Romadski, 12. 11.93)
II. "Wir" und dus "Weiße Haus"
Früher, so meinten viele Beschäftigte, wäre der Betrieb "wie ein
zweites Zuhause" und die dort Arbeitenden wären wie eine Familie
gewesen. Auch die Beschäftigten, die aus anderen Betrieben gekommen
waren, betonten den besonders familiären Charakterdes Betriebsklimas:
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"Dort, wo ich früher arbeitete, kam der Leiter nur zu uns, um
uns "aufzupumpen" (das heißt, eine Rüge zu erteilen oder zu
fordern, daß die Arbeit schneller gemacht wird). Und hier gab
es einen so engen Kontakt zwischen der Betriebsleitung und den
Arbeitern, daß es manchmal irreal schien. Der Direktor drückte
den Arbeitern die Hand, fragte sie nach ihrer Gesundheit, nach
der Familie usw. Ich war am Anfang erschüttert, dann gewöhnte
ich mich daran."	 (Ilja Romadski 12. 11. 1993)
Viele Betriebsmitglieder waren in der Tat miteinander verwandt
oder verheiratet. Die meisten Arbeiterinnen hatten über den Betrieb
die Erlaubnis erhalten, aus den Gebieten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion
nach Moskau zu kommen, um dort zu arbeiten. Sie erhielten zuerst
eine befristete Aufenthaltsgenehmigung (Propiska), die bei guter
Führung im Betrieb oder bei Heirat mit einem Moskauer in eine
unbefristete Genehmigung umgewandelt wurde. Der Arbeiter
Alexander Komeljow beschrieb die Situation:
"Um das Recht zu bekommen in Moskau zu wohnen, mußte
man vier Jahre lang unter Polizeiaufsicht leben. Man mußte
niedriger als das Gras und stiller als das Wasser sein."
(3.1 1.1993)
Im Arbeitsvertrag der jungen Arbeiterinnen stand drin, daß sie
während dieser Zeit nicht schwanger werden durften. Wenn sie trotzdem
ein Kind bekamen, verloren sie nicht nur ihren Arbeitsplatz, sondern
auch das Recht in Moskau zu wohnen und mußten aufs Land
zurückkehren.
"Bei uns wurde einer Frau während dieser vier Jahre das Recht
auf Propiska genommen und damit war sie entlassen. Sie hatte
verborgen, daß sie auf dem Dorf schon ein Kind hatte. Wir
sammelten mit Hilfe der Gewerkschaft Unterschriften zu ihrer
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Der Betrieb versorgte die alleinstehenden jungen Arbeiterinnen
und Arbeiter mit Plätzen im betriebseigenen Wohnheim und oft fanden
sie im Betrieb auch ihre zukünftigen Ehepartner.
Auch die heutige Direktorin war als junge Arbeiterin von Baku
in den Moskauer Betrieb gekommen, hatte dort ihren Mann, einen
achtzehn Jahre älteren Arbeiter, kennengelernt und hatte - die
Weiterbildungsangebote und Parteiverbindungen nutzend - ím Betrieb
Karriere gemacht. Auch der Mann der Direktorin für Gehälter und
Normen, die gleichzeitig Gewerkschaftsvorsitzende war, arbeitete als
Meister in der Produktion. Diese beiden Ehebeziehungen bildeten den
Kern des persönlichen Verhältnisses zwischen Arbeitern und
Angestellten, zwischen Produktion und Verwaltung. Sie mündeten in
dem informellen Anspruch der Beschäftigten, von der Verwaltung
"fürsorglich" behandelt zu werden.
"Wir nennen die Verwaltung `das weiße Haus'. Der Verwalter
muß sich bewegen, sich drehen. Er ist unser Gehirn. Er soll uns
die Arbeitsbedingungen schaffen, die neuesten Technologien
einfuhren, ohne uns von unserer Arbeit abzulenken. Der
Verwalter muß ständig bei uns sein. Es wäre gerecht, wenn sich  O
die Verwaltung auch noch um andere Fragen kümmern würde.
Manchmal brauchen wir ihre Hilfe, weil wir Sorgen haben... ich
habe zum Beispiel eine neue Wohnung bekommen. Jetzt muß
ich die Hausverwaltung besuchen, aber die Verwaltung gibt mir
keine Zeit dafür. Nur die Arbeit ist ihnen wichtig. Ich brauche
ein Telefon, aber ich kriege keine Hilfe vom Betrieb"
(Valeri Tschistych 9. 11. 1993)6
Die in der Produktion beschäftigten Arbeiter, Brigadiere, Meister
und Werkstattleiter unterschieden zwischen der Direktorin, der sie eine
sorgende Rolle zuschrieben und dem Rest der Verwaltung, fúr die sie
den Begriff "das weiße Haus" pragten. Die Direktorin war aus ihren
eigenen Reihen aufgestiegen, auch sie war keine gebürtige Moskauerin.
Die meisten anderen Verwaltungsangestellten hingegen kamen aus
Moskau, hatten immer einen gesicherten Aufenthaltsstatus besessen
und fühiten sich den Limitschikis7 überlegen.
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"In unserer Werkstatt ziehen die Moskauer in schnellem Wechsel
durch. Fast keine Moskauer bleiben bei uns, sondern die
`Limitschiki', die Leute aus dem Dorf, die mehr arbeiten, die
fleißiger sind. Die Moskauer bei uns sitzen in der Verwaltung."
(Alexej Ljapunow 9. 11. 1993)
Die Mitglieder der Verwaltung wurden von den Arbeitern als
unfáhig und pаѕsiv charakterisiert.
"Die Betriebsleitung ist sehr passiv. Sie verlangen von den
Arbeitern nur, diesen Plan zu erfüllen. Sie lenken den
Produktionsprozeß nicht. Sie haben keine Initiative. Sie haben
feste Gehälter und daher keine materiellen Interessen. Ich bin
hier acht Stunden und fünfzehn Minuten lang. ich mache die
Löcher und es bringt etwas. Sie sitzen hier auch acht Stunden
und fünfzehn Minuten lang, aber sie bringen nichts."
(Ignat Gmysin, 9.11. 1993)
Dem Chef der Materialwirtschaft warfen sie vor, zwar sehr aktiv
zu sein, aber meist die falschen Materialien zu besorgen. Ober die
Technologen sprachen die Arbeiter nur mit Verachtung. Sie wurden
als fachlich völlig unfáhig bezeichnet. Die Arbeiter warfen ihnen vor,
sie gäben keine technischen Hinweise, um den Produktionsprozeß zu
optimieren und arbeiteten meist von ihrem Schreibtisch in der
Verwaltung aus.
"Die Technologen müßten meiner Meinung nach die Technologie
im Betrieb einschätzen und vervollkommnen, auch zu anderen
Betrieben fahren, dort forschen und das Beste übernehmen. Aber
hier arbeiten wir fast ohne Technologen. In die Werkstätten gehen
sie nicht. Sie beobachten uns nicht. Sie beschäftigen sich mit
den technologischen Prozessen nur auf dem Papier. Wenn sie
sie unmittelbar in die Produktion einführen könnten, würden wir
einen größeren Effekt haben und wir könnten uns korrigieren
und verbessern... aber sie schreiben ihre Papiere und sitzen auf
ihrem festen Arbeitslohn." (Valeri Tschistych, 9. 11. 1993)
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Nur die Direktorin wurde von harter Kritik verschont. Allerdings
fühlten sich vor allem die Beschäftigten mit der Direktorin verbunden,
die in der gleichen Abteilung wie sie und ihr Mann gearbeitet hatten
oder mit ihr zusammen in der Betriebsparteiorganisation aktiv gewesen
waren. Sie wandten sich mit Beschwerden und Sorgen direkt an sie,
ohne die Vermittlung von Brigadieren und Meistern in Anspruch zu
nehmen. Andere Arbeiter, die sich nicht so vertraut mit der Direktorin
fühlten, betonten, daß sie eine reine Arbeitnehmerbeziehung dem
komplexen Geflecht persönlicher Beziehungen vorziehen wurden:
"Sollte die Verwaltung jenseits der Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer
Beziehung etwas Ober mich zu sagen haben? Nein, ich ziehe es
vor, sie geben mir Geld fur meine Arbeit und meine Erholung
kann ich selbst organisieren." (Alexej Ljapunow, 9. 11. 1993)
Zu Zeiten der Planwirtschaft wirkte der Betrieb über die
betrieblichen Partei- und Gewerkschaftsorgane mit bei der Beschaffung
von Wohnraum, dem Recht ein Auto zu kaufen, bei der Verlängerung
der Aufenthaltsgenehmigung fur Nichtmoskauer und bei der
Beantragung von Visa fur Auslandsreisen. Die umfassende pėrsönliche
Betreuung und Gängelung reduzierte sich zwar, seit der Betrieb
gezwungen war, sich marktwirtschaftlichen Kriterien anzupassen, aber
auch als Joint Venture bot der Betrieb seinen Beschäftigten noch soziale
Leistungen an, die als "Privilegien" bezeichnet und gehandhabt wurden.
Über seine Gėwerkschaftsorganisatíon (Profsojus) organisierte er
Pionier- und Sportlager gegen geringes Entgelt. Er stellte den Fami-
lien von Betriebsangehörigen Ferienhäuser oder von ihm gemietete
Etagen in Hotels zur Verfügung. Ober die Gewerkschaftsorganisation
wurde aus einem sozialen Härtefonds an Familien in besonders
schwierigen Situationen (zum Beispiel bei einem Todesfall in der
Familie, bei langer Krankheit, Naturkatastrophen etc.) einmalig eine
größere Summe vergeben. Über die Höhe der Summe entschied die
Direktorin. Der Betrieb gab Prämien fŭr besonders lange Betriebszu-
gehörigkeit und besondere Leistungen, wie beispielsweise Erfindungen.
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All diese sogenannten "Privilegien" verloren die Beschäftigten,
wenn sie sich Verstöße gegen die Betriebsdisziplin zuschulden kommen
ließen: zum Beispiel, wenn sie in größeren Mengen Ausschuß
produzierten, die Sicherheitsbestimmungen nicht beachteten, betrunken
am Arbeitsplatz angetroffen wurden, mehr als drei Tage unentschuldigt
fehlten, wegen krimineller Handlungen angeklagt wurden oder in der
Ausnűchterungszelle der Polizei gehalten wurden (Zusätzliches
Abkommen zum Betriebskollektivvertrag zwischen der Verwaltung
und dem Arbeitskollektiv der Aktiengesellschaft "VijsheINTEC" vom
25. 3. 1993). Die Privilegien waren zwar im Kollektivvertrag
niedergelegt, konnten aber dennoch relativ willkürlich entzogen oder
gewährt werden, da die Liste der Verstöße gegen die Betriebsdisziplin
breit ausgelegt werden konnte. Die Kehrseite der paternalistischen
Fürsorge war daher der willkürliche Entzug von Fürsorge und
"Privilegien", wenn das Betriebsmitglied sich nicht den geschriebenen
und ungeschriebenen Gesetzen und Regeln des Betriebsleben anpaßte.
Am deutlichsten wurde das direkte persönliche Abhängigkeits-
verhältnis zwischen Produktionsarbeitern und Betriebsleitung beim
Lohnsystem. Seit 1990 erhielten die nicht in Brigaden organisierten
Produktionsarbeiter einen Lohn, der sich aus einem Grundlohn, einer
Prämie und einem Stücklohn zusammensetzte. Der Grundlohn machte
dabei den geringsten Teil aus und wurde nach der Lohngruppe des
jeweiligen Arbeiters berechnet. Dazu kam eine Leistungsprämie, die
sich auf die Arbeitsdisziplin bezog. Den größten Teil des Einkommens
machte der Stücklohn aus. Waren jedoch keine Aufträge da, oder war
die Materialzufuhr nicht gesichert, so reduzierte sich der Stücklohn
erheblich. Einen Anspruch auf fіnanziellen Ausgleich für diesen Ver-
lust gab es nicht. Es blieb den Arbeitern nur die Möglichkeit, sich
persönlich bei der Direktorin zu beschweren oder zu hoffen, daß sie
bemerkte, daß einige Arbeiter ohne ihr Verschulden wesentlich weniger
verdient hatten als in den vorangegangenen Monaten.
"Wie ich meine Direktorin kenne, so schaut sie normalerweise
noch einmal durch die Ausgabenlisten, wenn sie abgeschlossen
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sind. Und wenn sie dann sieht, daß - sagen wir mal - Kirill nur
72.000 Rubel verdient hat, obwohl er im vergangenen Monat
100.000 Rubel verdiente, ruft sie die Leiterin der Abteilung
Löhne und Gehälter und fragt sie, was los ist. Gut, diese weiß es
nicht. Dann kann die Direktorin den Fertigungsleiter oder den
Meister rufen und sie fragen: `Warum hat er weniger verdient,
obwohl er jeden Tag gearbeitet hat?' Aber eigentlich braucht
sich die Verwaltung um diese Sachen nicht zu kümmern. Das
hängt nur mit dem guten Charakter unserer Direktorin
zusammen...	 (Matwej Studenkin, stellvertretender
Betriebsgewerkschaftsleiter, 15.11.1993)
Der Lohnverlust, den die Arbeiter hinnehmen mußten, konnte
durch die Verwaltung auf informellem Wege ausgeglichen werden,
ohne daß die Arbeiter jedoch ein Recht darauf gehabt hätten.
"Unser Betrieb hat einen Fonds... Zum Beispiel, hatte ich drei
Tage lang nichts zu tun, aber der Betrieb will mich nicht verlieren.
Dann schicken sie mich zwei Stunden lang zum Saubermachen
in die Werkstatt und ich kriege dafür 25.000 Rubel (bei einem
monatlichen Durchschnittsgehalt von 150.000 Rubel B.M.)"
(Matwej Studenkin, stellvertretender
Betriebsgewerkschaftsleiter 15.11. 1993)
Vor allem die Arbeiter, die schon lange im Betrieb waren und
direkte Beziehungen zur Verwaltung hatten, konnten auf diesen
Ausgleich hoffen. Bei den anderen führten die Engpässe in der
Materialversorgung zwar zu erheblichen Spannu ńgen in der Werkstatt,
aber nicht notwendigerweise zu Eingaben bei der Direktorin.
Unabhängiger von der Verwaltung waren die Arbeiter, die noch
freiwillig in Brigaden organisiert waren. Das waren im Herbst 1993
noch rund ein Drittel der 108 produktiv arbeitenden Betriebsange-
hőrigen. Die Brigaden hatten vor rund vier Jahren bei der Verwaltung
durchgesetzt, den Leistungslohn, den die gesamte Brigade für ihre
kollektive Arbeit bekam, nach eigenen Kriterien zu verteilen. Wenn
alle Brigademitglieder einverstanden waren, konnten sie gemeinsam
entscheiden, den von der Gruppe erarbeiteten Leistungslohn nicht nur
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nach Lohngruppen sondern nach einem selbst bestimmten "Koeffi-
zienten der Arbeitsbeteiligung" zu verteilen. Wie groß der Anteil des
nach Lohngruppen und nach Koeffizienten verteilten Lohnes war,
konnte die Brigade selbst entscheiden.
"Ich wandte mich an die Meisterin, um sie davon zu überzeugen,
daß man den Lohn nicht nur nach der Lohngruppe berechnen
kann. Zu unserer Brigade stießen zwei Neulinge mit einer
höheren Lohngruppe, als ich sie hatte, aber sie erfúllten die Norm
nicht, fragten mich sehr oft um Rat und im Vergleich zu mir und
den alten Kameraden hatten sie sehr wenig gemacht. Wie kann
ich sie da nach ihrer höheren Lohngruppe bezahlen? Nein! Das
ist nicht gerecht! Deshalb entschieden wir alle, nach dem
Koeffizient der Arbeitsbeteiligung und reell in gleichwertigen
Anteilen das Geld zu verteilen." (Marja Gulajewa, 9.1 1.1993)8
Bestandteil des Koeffizienten war außer der quantitativen
Arbeitsleistung auch ein Qualitätskriterium. Die Brigade konnte auch
entscheiden, den Mitgliedern, die sich in einer schwierigen
Lebenssituation befanden, mehr zu bezahlen, auch wenn die Leistung
nicht entsprechend war. Eine Brigade gab zu, ihre Mitglieder nach
Absprache auch fúr die Tage zu bezahlen, an denen sie gar nicht im
Betrieb anwesend waren, während ihre Meisterin diese Praxis strikt
abstritt.
Allerdings kontrollierte die Brigade auch nach innen, daß die
Brigademitglieder nicht aus der Gruppe ausscherten. Diese Kontrolle
ging im Sommer 1993 so weit, daß die Brigade die Entlassung von
Kollegen forderte, die zwar fachlich qualifiziert waren, sich aber
persönlich nicht in ihre Arbeitsgruppe eingepaßt hatten:
"Vor kurzem wurden zwei junge Arbeiterinnen entlassen. Da
wollte sich die Gewerkschaft zunächst einmischen, verzichtete
dann aber darauf. Es war nämlich so, daß ein Arbeiter von der
Brigade abends im Betrieb blieb und sehr viel machte Da er
hochqualifiziert war, begann er wesentlich mehr zu verdienen.
Zwei junge Frauen wollten das auch machen, traten aus der
Brigade aus und begannen alleine zu arbeiten. Aber sie mußten
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vieles machen, was früher von anderen gemacht wurde: bohren,
schwere Dinge tragen. Und sie verdienten weniger als früher.
Siıe waren aber Frauen, nicht Manner und Sie wissen, was das
bedeutet... Síe erwiesen sich als zänkische Persönlichkeiten und
beschwerten sich, daß man ihnen schlechte Arbeit gäbe usw.
Ihnen wurde vorgeschlagen, stattdessen zu stanzen. Stanzen ist
aber eine schmutzige Arbeit. Sie wollten sie nicht machen. Und
die Brigade wollte sie auch nicht wieder aufnehmen. Die Brigade
schrieb eine Bittschrift, in der sie bat, die beiden Kolleginnen zu
entlassen. Die Gewerkschaft konnte nicht dagegen protestieren,
weil es die Meinung der Mehrzahl war. Und sie hatten es auch
verdient. Ihre Ansprüche waren zu hoch. Hier war alles richtig."
(Matwej Studenkin, 3.11. 1993)
Manche Brigadeleiter sahen es auch als ihre Aufgabe an, der
Direktorin, die Mitglieder ihrer Brigade zur Entlassung vorzuschlagen,
die sie fúr besonders inkompetent hielten. Diese reagierte aber, wie
man uns sagte, äußerst reserviert, wenn ihr solche Vorschläge
unterbreitet wurden. Nur wenige Beschäftigte teilten allerdings die
Auffassung des Brigadiers Alexej Ljapunow, der sogar den Großteil
seiner Kollegen fur völlig unfähig hielt und ihre Entlassung be-
fűrwortete.
"In unserer Werkstatt kann man wirklich die meisten entlassen.
Ungefähr sieben bis acht kompetente Arbeiter könnten bleiben.
Die anderen haben ein solches Niveau, daß man sich keine
Vorstellung davon macht, wie sehr man die Qualität ihrer
Produktion überprüfen muß." (Alexej Ljapunow, 10. 11. 93)
Die Brigade legte härtere Leistungskriterien an ihre Mitglieder an, als
bisher von der Betriebsleitung an die individuell nach Leistungslohn
arbeitenden Beschäftigten angelegt wurde. Allerdings ging dies auch
zu Lasten des guten freundschaftlichen Verhältnisses innerhalb der
Brigade.
"Die Beziehungen in der Brigade sind nicht mehr so freundlich.
Früher gab es Geschlossenheit in den Brigadebeziehungen. Wir
feierten die Geburtstage zusammen mit Torten, Tee und irgend-
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wann auch mit Alkohol. Noch früher sind wir zusammen auf die
Kolchose gefahren und am 1. Juni haben wir immer gemeinsam
Flußkrebśe gesammelt. Aber heute... Ich hatte zum Beispiel den
Vorschlag gemacht, gemeinsam ein Picknik zu organisieren.
Dafür hatte ich sogar mein Schwein geschlachtet. Alle wollten
teilnehmen, aber als der Tag des Picknicks kam, fand ich mich
zusammen mit einem anderen Organisator alleine wieder...
Dasselbe Schicksal fand der Vorschlag, eine Fahrt zum
Pilzesammeln zu organisieren."
(Alexander Komeljow, 3.11.1993)
Auch die nicht in Brigaden organísiėrten Arbeiter betonten, daß
sich ihr Arbeitsrhythmus seit der Aufhebung des sozialistischen
Einheitslohns enorm gesteigert habe und daß sie sich glücklich schätzen
wurden, wenn sie viel Arbeit hätten, keine Pausen zu machen bräuchten
und daher auch mehr verdienen könnten. Die Möglichkeit das
Einkommen zu steigern, wenn genügend Material zur Verfügung
gestellt würde und sie technische Hilfestellungen bekämen, wurde als
schier unbegrenzt angesehen. So viel Geld wie möglich zu verdienen,
wurde zur ersten Priorität, vor allem um den Lebensunterhalt zu sichern,
den der Staat nicht mehr garantierte.
"Meine Aufgabe ist es, das altgewohnte Lebensniveau fúr meine
Familie zu sichern. Heute ist es wichtiger geworden, das
Existenzminimum zu halten, alle Aufmerksamkeit dem Arbeits-
lohn zu schenken und nicht mehr den Arbeitsbedingungen."
(Marja Gulajewa, 9. 11. 1993)
Die existentielle Unsicherheit, die die meisten Beschäftigten
verspürten, mit denen wir sprachen, bezog sich nicht direkt auf die
Angst vor dem Verlust ihres Arbeitsplatzes, sondern auf die steigenden
Lebenshaltungskosten und die politischen und sozialen Umwälzungen,
die ihren Alltag veränderten.
Die Arbeiter forderten von der Verwaltung und vor allem von
den Technologen Hilfestellungen, um ihre Arbeit noch mehr inten-
sivieren zu können, um noch mehr zu verdienen.
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"Wenn wir bessere Werkzeuge hätten und kleine mechanische
Vorrichtungen, dann könnten wir noch mehr herausarbeiten. Aber
die Technologen kommen nicht zu uns. Wir bitten sie und bit-
ten, aber wir bekommen keine Antwort."
(Marja Gulajewa, 9.11. 1993)
In diesem Stoßseufzer einer Arbeiterin drückte sich einerseits
der Wunsch aus, die Arbeitsbedingungen zu optimieren, um mehr
leisten zu können, andererseits aber sicherlich auch das Bemühen dem
Forscher zu zeigen, daß andere, nämlich die Technologen aus der
Verwaltung, dafür verantwortlich waren, daß sie nicht optimal arbeiten
konnten. Die Leistungsfähigkeit der Produktionsarbeiter wurde zu einer
Frage des Nationalstolzes den ausländischen Joint Venture Partnern
gegenüber. Sie waren aufgefordert, den talentierten russischen
Menschen endlich ihre Chance zu geben und sie mit Maschinen
auszustatten, die ihren Fähigkeiten entsprachen.
"Wir schleppen diese Maschinen mit bei allen Umzügen, wir
hegen sie, streichen, ölen und reparieren sie. Aber das Metall
wird alt. Und wenn der Bohrer 0,01 mm Fehler bringt, dann sind
es am Stück schon 0,1 mm. Verstehen Sie? Es ist nicht unsere
Schuld, aber es beeinträchtigt unsere Produktivität und
Arbeitsqualität. Daher hoffen wir, daß man uns neue Maschinen
gibt. Wenn alle Staaten, auch (damals) die Sowjetunion, in
rückständige Länder nagelneue moderne Maschinen schicken,
und ein Mensch - entschuldigen Sie, ich will niemanden beleidi-.
gen -, der erst vom Baum heruntergeklettert ist, in Afrika zum
Beispiel, bekommt einen Traktor oder eine neue Werkbank und
versteht damit zu arbeiten... Und wir, die einen Floh beschlagen
haben, wir haben seitdem noch vieles erlernt, und die Hände
haben wir an der richtigen Stelle9 und der Kopf arbeitet."
(Fjodor Perchunov, 9.11. 1993)
Auch fur Arbeiter wie diesen, der gar nicht an Maschinen
arbeitete, sondern kleine Elektroteile montierte, waren die modernen
Maschinen der Schlüssel zum Erfolg. Das Verhältnis der Beschäftigten
zu modernen Produktionstechnologien war mehr als das eines
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Maschinenführers zu seinem Arbeitsinstrument. Es war ein symbo-
lisches Verhältnis. Die modernen Maschinen symbolisierten Fortschritt
und nicht zuletzt den Anschluß an den wírtschaftlíchen Standard des
Westens. Unsere Einwendungen, daß die Anschaffung teurer CNC-
gesteuerter Maschinen sich auch für den Unternehmer lohnen müßte
und daher möglicherweise zu Arbeiıtskräfteabbau im Betrieb führen
könnte, traf völlig ins Leere. Das "Weggehen" von Arbeitern, die nicht
mehr gebraucht wurden, wurde nicht als Problem wahrgenommen:
"Früher waren 22 Arbeiter in dieser Werkstatt. Jetzt sind es nur
noch 12. Wir arbeiten zuı zweit an 12 Maschinen, aber jetzt stehen
einige davon schon seit zwei Wochen still. Die Anzahl der
Arbeitenden wurde deshalb reduziert, weil die Produktivität des
Einzelnen stieg. Heute wird bloß weniger Handarbeit benötigt,
mehr Knöpfe, weniger Kurbeln. So viele Arbeiter werden nicht
mehr gebraucht, deshalb gehen sie weg."
(Matwej Studenkín, 3.1 1. 1993)
Die meisten Beschäftigten fühlten sich im Herbst 1993 auf ihrem
Arbeitsplatz sicher, weil sie den ganzen Tag etwas zu tun hatten und
sie sich keine flagranten Verstöße gegen die Arbeitsdisziplin zuschulden
kommen ließen:
"Ich habe keine Angst vor der Arbeitslosigkeit. Mir bleibt sogar
keine freie Zeit, ich bin bis an meine Grenze beschäftigt. Wie
könnte ich da arbeitslos werden?" (Valeri Tschistych, 9.11. 1993)
Die meisten Arbeiter, mit denen wir sprachen, sahen eine Gefahr,
den Arbeitsplatz zu verlieren höchstens für die Kollegen, die sie als
weniger fähig einschätzten als sich selbst. Dennoch wiesen alle auf die
Stellenanzeigen für Schlosser, Dreher und Technologen hin, die unten
in der Eingangshalle hingen. Tatsächlich wurden 1993 seit dem Joint
Venture keine Arbeitsplätze abgebaut, aber 50 Beschäftigte, vor allem
Arbeiter, wurden entlassen und durch qualifiziertere Kräfte aus der
Rüstungsindustrie ersetzt. Die Personalchefin erklärte uns, daß bei den
Entlassungen, die in den letzten beiden Jahren in den Werkstätten
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vorgenommen wurden, meist fehlende Arbeitsdisziplin und Alkohol-
mißbrauch am Arbeitsplatz der Grund war.
"Wir hatten Drückeberger und Säufer und unser soziales System
wies uns an, diese Leute zu überzeugen. Wir sollten sie mit
Disziplin und Strafe unter Druck setzen und wie Babysitter für
sie sein. Jetzt haben sich die Dinge geändert. Jetzt brauchen wir
nicht mehr für diese Leute zu sorgen und können sie
rausschmeißen, wenn sie schlecht arbeiten. Wir können
stattdessen Leute mit besserer Qualifikation einstellen, die
fähiger sind."	 (Shenja Wolochina, 27. 10. 1993)
Während die meisten Beschäftigten Alkoholismus und fehlende
Arbeitsdisziplin als Entlassungsgründe akzeptierten, sahen sie fehlende
Kompetenz oder mangelnde Professionalität als kleine Schwächen an,
die nicht von schlechter Absicht zeugten und die durch Anleiten und
Ausbilden behoben werden könnten. Wie eine Technologin meinte:
"Bei professionellen Fehlern kann der Leiter ja schimpfen...".
Obwohl die Arbeiter nicht direkt fúrchteten, ihren Arbeitsplatz
zu verlieren, waren sie doch durch das Gerucht verunsichert, daß der
gesamte Betrieb umstrukturiert und in ein Service Center umgewandelt
werden sollte. Manche Arbeiter hatten gehört, daß der Verkauf von
Ersatzteilen, die anderswo gefertigt worden waren, für den Betrieb
profitabler wäre, als die Eigenproduktion. Sie warfen daher der
Verwaltung vor, die Einigkeit des Betriebes zu zerstören.
"Die Stimmung in diesem Betrieb ist zerstört. Aile Fragen müßte
man direkt mit den Arbeitern diskutieren. Man muß Versamm-
lungen veranstalten und echte Őffentlichkeit herstellen. Aber
im Moment gibt es bei uns fast keine Versammlungen und die
Verwaltung bezieht sich nicht auf uns. Das beleidigt uns. Unser
Betrieb ist aber doch ein "Kessel für alle". Sein Geld ist für alle."
(Valeri Tschistych, 9. 1 1. 1993)
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Die Vorstellung, daß der Betrieb "ein Kessel fúr alle" sein sollte
wurde noch durch die neuen Privatisierungsbestrebungen genährt, die
während unseres Aufenthalts diskutiert wurden. Die restlichen 49%
der Anteile an VijsheINTEC mit insgesamt 3.000 Beschäftigten, die
1993 noch im Besitz der Stadt Moskau waren, sollten zu 51% von der
Belegschaft übernommen werden. Die Beschäftigten des Service
Centers hätten aber, selbst wenn sie Anteile erwerben würden, nur wenig
Einfluß auf die Entscheidungen der Aktionärsversammlung, da diese
ja die Interessen des Gesamtbetriebs betrafen. Oder wie es der Ge-
neraldirektor von VijsheINTEC ausdrückte: "Ivanov 10 wird nur einen
geringen Anteil haben..."
III. Die Welt der Papiere und die Marktwirtschaft
Im Verlauf unserer Forschung bei VijsheINTEC wurden wir von
der Beharrungskraft der planwirtschaftlichen Lenkungs- und
Leitungsmechanismen in der Verwaltung des Joint Ventures überrascht.
Obwohl INTEC der Direktion des Betriebes einen deutschen Berater
zur Seite gestellt hatte, der nun versuchte, den Mitarbeitern in der
Verwaltung die Organisationskriterien näherzubringen, die bei INTEC
weltweit angewendet wurden, blieb die planwirtschaftliche Logik in
den Verwaltungsmechanismen erstaunlich präsent.
Dies zeigte sich am deutlichsten an der Tatsache, daß die
Interessen der Arbeitgeber und die Interessen der Belegschaft durch
die gleiche Person vertreten wurden. So war die Leiterin der Abteilung
Arbeit und Gehälter, die unter anderem die Produktionsnormen für die
Fertigung festlegte, vor anderthalb Jahren als Vorsitzende des
betrieblichen Gewerkschaftskomittees wiedergewählt worden. Die
Verbindung dieser beiden Aufgaben war fOr sie kein Widerspruch, da
sie in der Logik der wissenschaftlichen Betriebsfúhrung der Plan-
wirtschaft davon überzeugt war, die Normen nach objektiven
widerspruchsfreien Kriterien festlegen zu können. Sie gebrauchte dafür
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technische Zeichnungen und Normlisten, ohne den Fertigungsablauf
selbst zu beobachten.
"Nachdem ich fünfzehn Jahre als Technologe gearbeitet habe,
kenne ich alle Produkte, alle Technologien und alle Normen ,und
indem ich sie vergleiche, kann ich jede Norm selbst festlegen."
(Anna Jegorowa, 27.10. 1993)
Nur in Ausnahmefällen ging sie in die Werkstatt, um mit
Stoppuhr und Kamera "zu sehen, wie sie arbeiten". Viele Produktions-
normen, die in Rubel gerechnet wurden, lagen zehn bis fúnfzehn Jahre
lang fest.
• Die Veränderungen, die in den letzten Jahren vorgenommen
wurden, dienten nach ihrer Aussage auch nur dazu, die Löhne an die
Inflationsrate anzupassen und nicht dazu, den Arbeitsdruck zu erhöhen.
Wenn die Arbeiter unzufrieden mit ihren Festlegungen waren, wurden
sie diskutiert und man suchte gemeinsam nach einem Kompromiß. Dies
hatte sich auch bis Herbst 1993 nicht geändert, obwohl der vom Joint
Venture Partner bestellte Berater immer wieder betonte, daß die
Produktivität der Fertigung gesteigert werden müsse. Die meisten
Arbeiter waren zufrieden, daß sie den Gewerkschaftsvorsitz führte. Sie
erwarteten nicht, daß die Gewerkschaft in ihrem Namen für höhere
Löhne und leicht zu erreichende Normen kämpfen würde. Sie waren
es seit den Zeiten der Planwirtschaft gewöhnt, daß die offizielle
Gewerkschaft die Aufgabe hatte, die Planerfüllung aktiv zu
unterstützen, indem sie ihre Mitglieder disziplinierte und ihnen gewiss ė
soziale Vergünstigungen zukommen ließ. Nach Ansicht von Anna
Jegorowa gäbe es nur wenige Stimmen unter den Arbeitern, die
behaupteten, daß ihre Rolle als Gewerkschaftsvorsitzende mit ihrer
Aufgabe in der Norm- und Gehaltskontrolle unvereinbar wäre.
Der Direktor der Materialwirtschaft zählte für die Beschaffung
von Halbfertigprodukten und Komponenten nach wie vor auf die aken
Kontakte, die auch schon zu Zeiten der zentralen Planwirtschaft bedeut-
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sam waren, als Materialengpässe und die unzureichende Feinab-
stimmung der Planpositionen durch Tausch und Schwarzhandel
ausgeglichen werden mußten. Die Kontakte, die es ihm erlaubt hatten,
Metall und andere Rohmaterialien zu besorgen, waren aber in den
letzten zwei Jahren durch den Zusammenbruch des Sowjetreiches und
der großen Staatsbetriebe unwirksam geworden und mußten durch
völlig neue Netzwerke ersetzt werden. Leonid Shilin brüstete sich uns
gegenüber mit seinen persönlichen Notizbüchern, die er seit 15 Jahren
führte und in denen er alle nützlichen Namen, Adressen und
Telefonnummern aufgeführt hatte. Diese Informationen und Kontakte
waren sein persönlicher Schatz, auf den er zu Zeiten der Planwirtschaft
seinen Einfluß im Betrieb gründen konnte. Es war damals entscheidend
gewesen, an die größtmögliche Menge von begehrten und raren Gütern
heranzukommen, um sie im eigenen Betrieb oder auch im Austausch
mit anderen Betrieben einzusetzen. Im Zuge der Perestroika und vor
allem seit den Privatisierungsgesetzen von 1992 wuchs die Anzahl der
Anbieter stetig und Kosten und Preise wurden für das erfolgreiche
Wirtschaften seiner Abteilung immer wichtiger.
Im Herbst 1993 kaufte die Materialwirtschaft die benötigten
Materialien gegen Vorkasse und für Bargeld, weil bei einer Ober-
weisung das Geld zu lange unterwegs gewesen ware, wegen der
Inflation an Wert verloren hätte und schließlich zum Kauf der benötigten
Menge Materials nicht mehr ausgereicht hätte. Leonid Shilin suchte
direkten Kontakt zu den Zulieferbetrieben und versuchte professionelle
Vermittler zu vermeiden, weil er sie für unzuverlässig hielt und weil
sie zuviel Unkosten verursachten. Seine Mitarbeiter und Abteilungs-
leiter, die nicht die gleichen Kontakte besaßen wie er, waren wesentlich
mehr auf Mittelsmänner angewiesen.
Als Leonid Shilin im Sommer 1993 in Urlaub fuhr, wandte sich
daher sein Stellvertreter und Freund an einen dubiosen Vermittler, dem
er auch Geld bezahlte, damit er ihm Metall besorge. Der Mann kassierte
das Geld, beschaffte die Materialien jedoch nicht, so daß die Produktion
ins Stocken kam. Der Stellvertreter mußte die Konsequenzen tragen
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und wurde entlassen. Leonid Shilín erklärte nun, daß es sich zunehmend
negativ auf ihn auswirkte, daß er seinen Schatz an Informationen und
Kontakten so gut gehütet hatte. Seine Mitarbeiter und Kollegen
"beherrschten die Information nicht", und er mußte daher ihre Aufgaben
miterledigen. Er sagte uns, daß er nun bereit wäre, seine Informationen
und Kontakte seinen Mitarbeitern und Kollegen zugänglich zu machen,
damit sie Gebrauch davon machten. "ich werde meine Notizbücher
veröffentlichen," meinte er.
Der Direktor der Materialwirtschaft löste sich nur langsam von
dem Prinzip, das in der Planwirtschaft Geltung besaß, daß derjenige
Macht hatte, der auf Netzwerke von Beziehungen zurückgreifen konnte,
die andere nicht hatten. Im planwirtschaftlichen Betrieb war es entschei-
dend die Außenkontakte zu kontrollieren, ohne sie notwendigerweise
mit Kollegen aus dem Betrieb zu teilen. Im Joint Venture Unternehmen
wurde es jetzt zunehmend wichtiger, daß die Abteilung als ganzes
effizient, das heißt für das Unternehmen kostengünstig, arbeitete. Das
Zementieren und Abschotten von persönlichen Netzwerken erwies sich
auch für den Direktor selbst als nachteilig, weil seine Leistung nicht
mehr nur an seinen persönlichen Kontakten, sondern zunehmend an
kruden Zahlen gemessen wurde, die von den Kosten des Material-
einkaufs zeugten.
Das finanzielle Kalkül war zwar im Betrieb auch zu Zeiten der
Planwirtschaft nicht gänzlich abwesend gewesen, aber es trug nicht
den Charakter der Profitmaximierung, sondern eher den der guten
"Haushaltung" mit den begrenzten aber sicher feststehenden Mitteln,
die dem Betrieb vom Staat zugewiesen wurden. Diese Einstellung war
auch noch im Herbst 1993 bei vielen Angestellten und Arbeitern
anzutreffen. Mitglieder der Belegschaft lobten die Direktorin dafür,
daß sie eine "gute Haushälterin" wäre, die alles sieht, "wie eine gute
Gastgeberin". Die Direktorin wiederum betonte die finanzielle
Unabhängigkeit, die der Betrieb vor dem Joint Venture gehabt hätte,
und die sie nun verteidigen wollte. Bis 1992 waren die 16 Zweigbetriebe
von Vijshe Kombinat, die die Aufzugswartungen durchführten, feste
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Abnehmer fŭr die von Vijshe gefertigten Ersatzteile. 1991, als die ersten
Kooperativen mit günstigen Angeboten begannen, der Fabrik
Konkurrenz zu machen, konnte es die Direktorin bei der Firmenleitung
von Vijshe Kombinat durchsetzen, daß Aufträge fŭr Ersatzteilfertigung
und Motorenreparatur nicht an Betriebe außerhalb der Firma Vijshe
Kombinat vergeben werden durften. Erst ab 1992 bemühte sich die
mechanische Fertigung zusätzlich um neue Auftraggeber und versuchte
ihren Wirkungskreis von Moskau auf Gesamtrußland auszudehnen.
Seit dem Inkrafttreten des Joint Ventures erschwerten sich die
Geschäftsbeziehungen zu den ehemaligen Schwesterfirmen, die nicht
Bestandteil des Joint Ventures geworden waren. Die Direktorin mußte
Gerüchte zerstreuen, nach denen ihre Fabrik die Aufträge ihrer früheren
Partner nun absichtlich besonders langsam und schlampig bearbeiten
würde. Tatsäċhlích wurde das Service Center von der Zentrale von
VijsheINTEC angewiesen, den Zweigbetrieben von VijshelNTEC zu
einem niedrigeren Preis Ersatzteile und Reparaturen in Rechnung zu
stellen als Betrieben außerhalb der Firma. Eine Profitmarge von 30%
wurde von der Mutterfirma vorgegeben. Das bedeutete, daß sich die
Preisgestaltung nicht an einem marktüblichen Preis orientierte, sondern
sich zusammensetzte aus Produktionskosten, dem Kostenwert und dem
feststehenden Satz von 30% Profit. Der Betriebsleitung von Vijshe
verließ sich bei ihrer Preisgestaltung nach wie vor auf die Vorstellung,
eine Monopolstellung zu besitzen.
Als im September 1993 die Löhne der Inflation angepaßt und
verdoppelt wurden, verdoppelte die Planungsabteilung auch die Preise.
Der deutsche Berater, erst seit wenigen Wochen im Amt, versuchte
gegen diese automatische Preisverdoppelung zu argumentieren:
"Das haben viele hier noch nicht so ganz verstanden, daß
irgendwann doch mal Konkurrenz da ist, daß ich nicht hingehen
kann und sagen von einem Tag auf den anderen: Ich erhöhe
meinen Preis um das Doppelte, weil die Inflation entspŕechend
ist und morgen wird er wieder auf das Doppelte erhöht.
Irgendwann wird sich das auch mal jemand finden, der sagt:
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"Moment doch mal! ich mache auch ein bißchen was mit der
Produktivität, ich erhöhe zwar meinen Leuten den Lohn auch
auf das Doppelte oder meinetwegen auch mehr. Aber ich erwarte,
daß sie das, was sie vorher in 1 0 Stunden gemacht haben, jetzt
in 5 Stunden machen. Und dann habe ich ja wieder etwas
zurückgeholt von dem, was ich ausgebe. "(Stolz, 25. 10. 1993)
Auf seine Nachfragen erhielt Stolz von der Abteilung Löhne
und Gehälter zur Antwort, daß sich die Produktivität seit der
Lohnerhöhung tatsächlich um 172% gesteigert hätte. Er prüfte nach
und stellte fest, daß in den Papieren nicht nur eine gesteigerte
Produktivität, sondern auch die doppelte Anzahl von gearbeiteten
Stunden ausgewiesen wurde:
"Ich habe mir den Plan für September angeguckt, weil ich gedacht
habe: Was ist denn da los, warum kommt der da auf 172%? Ich
habe mir dann pro Baugruppe die Einzelzeiten angeguckt. Aha,
da sagt er mir jetzt im September 8 Stunden, und fúr die gleiche
Baugruppe hat er mir einen Monat vorher oder im Plan noch
gesagt: 4, und ... Stunden! Und das habe ich nicht verstanden.
Und dann haben viele versucht, mir das zu erklären. Nach
irgendwelchen Normen oder dicken Büchern sagen die: Pro Teil
gibt es im Endeffekt einen bestimmten Satz Geldes, und diesen
Satz Geldes dividieren sie durch den Stundenverrechnungssatz
und kommen dann plötzlich auf neue Stunden. Und da sie das
eine drastisch erhöht haben, nur die andere Seite scheinbar nicht,
kommen also plötzlich erheblich mehr Stunden heraus."
(Stolz, 25. 10. 1993)
Der deutsche Berater traf auf "ein reines anderes Denken" bei
seinen russischen Gesprächspartnern, das nicht darauf abzielte, von
den Beschäftigten möglichst viel Produktivität für einen möglichst
geringen Lohn zu erhalten. in der Gorbachovzeit war im Betrieb der
Versuch gemacht worden, die Produktivität des einzelnen Arbeiters zu
heben, indem vom staatlich festgesetzten Höchstlohn - von den
Beschäftigten auch "gläsernes Dach" genannt - abgerückt wurde und
die Beschäftigten die Möglichkeit erhielten, bei einem verdoppelten
Produktionsausstoß auch den doppelten Lohn zu erhalten. Der absolute
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Lohnanteil an den Kosten eines Produktes blieb damit gleich.
Lohnerhöhungen erfolgten nach dem Prinzip, "wer viel arbeitet, soll
auch entsprechend mehr verdienen." Diese der Profitmaximierung
entgegengesetzte Herangehensweise wurde durch die
Organisationsstruktur der Verwaltungsabteilungen unterstützt. Während
die Produktionsnormen von der Abteilung Löhne und Gehälter nach
"wissenschaftlichen Kriterien" festgelegt wurden, erarbeitete die
technische Abteilung die Planung des Fertigungsablaufs. Dem
deutschen Berater waren diese Strukturen völlig fremd:
"Da gibt es eine Abteilung, ein sogenanntes technisches
Departement, was sich da um Methoden kümmert; um die Zeiten
kümmern sich andere.".	 (Stolz, 25. 10. 1993)
Verharrend in der Rationalität des planwirtschaftlichen
Wirtschaftens maß die Verwaltung auch 1993 noch die Produktivität
in Rubel und nicht in benötigter Fertigungszeit pro Produkt. Stolz
versuchte hingegen seinen russischen Partnern den Begriff der
Produktivität im marktwirtschaftlichen Sinne näherzubringen und sie
von der prinzipiellen Überlegenheit seiner Managementansätze zu
überzeugen.
"Es gibt einen großen Unterschied zwischen der sozialistischen
und kapitalistischen Ökonomie. In der letzteren kannst Du nur
jemand werden, wenn Du der Beste bist. Und in diesem Fall
hast Du eine große Chance, mehr Arbeitsplätze zu sichern, weil
Du die beste Produktivität hast, die besten Kostensätze und die
beste Qualität. Dann brauchst Du mehr Arbeitskräfte, weil Du
Deinen Marktanteil vergrößern konntest." (Stolz, 18.11. 19931 1).
Er stellte die Űberlegenheit des marktwirtschaftlichen Ansatzes
heraus und die Notwendigkeit den Ehrgeiz zu entwickeln, auch "der
Beste" zu werden, um am Erfolg des internationalen Konzerns
teilzuhaben zu können, den er, Stolz, bei VijshelNTEC verkörperte.
Er betonte den pragmatischen Ansatz der geschickten psychologischen
Manipulation der Beschäftigten, um sie zu höheren Leistungen anzu-
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spornen: "Ich habe das an einem Beispiel gesagt, wie das bei uns ist.
Das ist viel besser, wenn man eine Produktivität von nur 90 % ausweist,
dann hat man immer leichter emn Druckmittel, einem anderen zu sagen:
"Nun komm' mal, wir wollen ja wenigstens die 100 % schaffen."
(Stolz 25. 10.1993)
Stolz lud die Mitarbeiter der Verwaltung zu zahllosen Einzel-
gesprächen ein und versuchte auf ihren Führungsstil und ihre Geschäfts-
praktiken einzuwirken. Gleichzeitig blieb er aber persönlich distanziert
und damit auch isoliert. Das zeigte sich auch daran, daß er in den sechs
Monaten seiner Tätigkeit im Betrieb nicht einmal von einem Mitarbeiter
der Verwaltung nach Hause eingeladen wurde oder selbst einen seiner
neuen Kollegen eingeladen hätte. An Betriebsversammlungen nahm
er nicht teil, und auch bei seinen Rundgängen durch die Werkstätten
richtete er nicht das Wort an die Arbeiter. Wie ein Arbeiter bemerkte:
"Ich weiß, daß er als Konsultant eingestellt worden ist, aber ich
habe noch keine einzige Konsultation bekommen. Ich weiß, daß
er Will und Unordnung nicht gerne hat, aber das bedeutet ja
noch nicht, daß ich dadurch besser arbeite."
(Fjodor Perchunow, 9. 11. 1993)
Stolz' Versuche, der Geschäftsleitung von VijshelNTEC die
Strategien und Taktiken der marktwirtschaftlichen Geschäftsführung
näherzubringen, hatten zur Folge, daß die Angestellten der Verwaltung
es sich anġewőhnten, diese Ansichten zu reproduzieren, ohne jedoch
notwendigerweise ihre Praktiken zu ändern. In Gesprächen mit uns
gaben sie diese `offizielle' Sichtweise wieder:	 .
"iNTEC ist erst seit einem Jahr in Rußland. Deshalb muß man
erst einmal die Mentalitäten der Leute rumdrehen und sie zu
solchen Begriffen wie `profitabel' und 'unprofitabel' hinlenken."
(Pawel Mansurow, 4.11. 1993)
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Nur die Direktorin, die als einzige aus der Betriebsleitung bisher
die Möglichkeit gehabt hatte, andere INTEC Betriebe in Europa zu
besuchen, hinterfragte offen die Grenzen einer festgefahrenen
marktwirtschaftlichen Philosophie:
"Leute, die schon lange fir INTEC arbeiten, haben ein bestimm-
tes Muster fdr ihre Sichtweisen und Reaktionen. Sie reagieren
schnell, aber dies ist durch nichts anderes als durch diese Muster
bestimmt. Ich habe Angst, die Möglichkeit zum nicht standardi-
sierten Denken zu verlieren. Die Leute von INTEC haben ein
spezielles Wissen, eine Philosophie der Produktivität und eine
Philosophie der Lagerhaltung. Dies hilft ihnen, schnelle
Entscheidungen zu treffen. Aber ich brauche die Möġlichkeit,
meine eigene Sichtweise einzubringen. Ich muß alles in Einklang
bringen... Unsere Hauptaufgabe ist es, eine Richtung zu finden.
Wir könnten damit Anfang nächsten Jahres beginnen. Die Arbeit
mit INTEC bringt neue Aufgaben und Herangehensweisen mit
sich, aber... einige dieser neuen sind nichts anderes als vergessene
alte."	 (Katerina Selenzowa, 27. 10. 1993).12
Der Mangel an Freiraum für originelle selbständige Entschei-
dungen, den die Direktorin empfand, widersprach der Selbstein-
schätzung, die Stolz von seinem Beratungsstil hatte:
"Ich sage den Leuten immer, Du mußt dich um Deine eigenen
Dinge kümmern, und Du mußt Deine eigenen Entscheidungen
treffen. Du kannst sie von nirgendwoher erwarten."
Es war vor allem die Tatsache, daß Stolz im Betrieb Informa-
tionen sammelte und Analysen anstellte, ohne sich direkt und offiziell
an Entscheidungen zu beteiligen und Verantwortung zu übernehmen,
die seine Präsenz fdr die Belegschaft so unangenehm machte.
"Die Leute empfinden, daß Druck auf sie ausgeübt wird. Sie
mögen es nicht, daß der INTEC Spezialist überall herumläuft
und nur guckt. Das geht den Leuten auf die Nerven. Sie haben
das Gefdhl, als wenn über ihrem Kopf ein Stock geschwungen
würde."	 (Katerina Selenzowa 27. 10. 1993)
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Obwohl er offiziell nur der Berater im Hintergrund war, konnten
viele wichtige Entscheidungen, wie zum Beispiel die Einrichtung der
neuen Fertigungshallen und Investitionen in neue Maschinen, nur mit
seiner Zustimmung getroffen werden, da er Investitionen direkt mit
der Zentrale von INTEC abklärte.
Am letzten Tag unserer Forschung erfuhren wir von Stolz, daß
er ab Anfang 1994 stellvertretender Direktor und "rechte oder linke
Hand" der Direktorin werden würde. Die Direktorin begrüßte diesen
Beschluß:
"Ich hatte das Gefühl, daß er uns gegenüber nicht freundlich
gesinnt war. Aber vielleicht hing sein Verhalten ja mit seiner
Funktion zusammen, die ganzen Informationen zu sammeln und
sie irgendwohin zu schicken. Er war der Berater und hatte diese
Funktion zu erfüllen. Jetzt hat er zugestimmt, mein erster
Vertreter zu werden - das war gestern. - und die Verantwortung
für die Empfehlungen und für ihre Durchführung zu teilen "
(Katerina Selenzowa 27. 10. 1993)
Die Direktorin hoffte, daß sich Stolz als stellvertretender Direktor
stärker mit den im Betrieb arbeitenden Menschen identifizieren wurde.
Wenn er vor versammelter Belegschaft die Verantwortung fur
Entlassungen übernehmen müsse, würde es ihm schwerer fallen, den
Arbeitsplätzeabbau in der Produktion zu fordern und die Umwandlung
des Produktionsbetriebs in ein Ersatzteillager als anzustrebende
Perspektive darzustellen.
Nachdem Stolz monatelang "beobachtet und analysiert" hatte,
entschied er am letzten Tag unserer Untersuchung gemeinsam mit der
Direktorin über eine grundlegende Umstrukturierung der Verwaltung.
Die Abteilung Löhne und Normen wurde aufgeteilt. Die Planungsabtei-
lung wurde aufgelöst und gemeinsam mit der Buchhaltung in der
Abteilung Finanzen zusammengefaßt. Zusätzlich wurde ihr die
Lohnbuchhaltung zugeschrieben. Die Festlegung der Normen wurde
Aufgabe der Technologen, die nun mit in die Engineering Abteilung
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kamen. Normen sollten von nun an nicht mehr in Rubel, sondern in
Zeit gemessen werden und den technischen Mőglíchkeíten entsprechend
verändert werden. Die Umstrukturierung zielte darauf ab, das
feststehende Verhältnis zwischen dem der In flation angepaßten
Einkommen und der Produktivität aufzubrechen und damit mehr
Leistungsdruck auf die Produktionsarbeiter auszuüben.
Das entscheidende Kriterium kapitalistischen Wirtschaftens,
nämlich die maximale und optimale Ausnutzung der gekauften
Arbeitskraft zum geringst möglichen Preis, hatte bisher im Betrieb keinė
volle Geltung erlangt. Die Besclıaftigten gingen noclı von der Vor-
stellung auıs, daß eine höhere Produktivität auch eine entsprechend
höhere Bezahlung nach sich ziehen müßte. Der Betrieb war für sie
trotz aller Veränderungen naclı wie vor "ein Kessel für alle". Mit den
geplanten Umstrukturierungen wurde diese ın informellen Konsens
zwischen Betriebsleitung und Belegschaft die Basis entzogen und der
Weg freigemacht für ein antagonistisches Arbeitgeber
Arbeitnehmerverhältnis westlichen Typs. Bei den zu erwartenden
Interessenskonflíkten hielt der Arbeitgeber alle Trümpfe in der Hand,
während die Arbeitnehmer weder auffunktioníerende Gewerkschaften
noch auf eine wirksame Arbeitsgesetzgebung zurückgreifen konnten.
Notes
I Aus einem Interview mit Fjodor Perchunov vom 9.11. 1993. Anspielung auf
ein Marchen von Leskov aus dem 19. Jahrhundert, in dem ein schieläugiger
russischer Linkshänder "europäische" Meister übertraf, indem er einen von
ihnen gemachten winzigen stählernen tanzenden Floh mit Hufeisen beschlug.
Die Geschichte wurde zum Symbol für die Talentiertheit des russischen Volkes.
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3 Unter der Leitung von Birgit Müller, Institut fıír Ethnologie der Freien
Universität Berlin, in Zusammenarbeit mit Isabelle Cribler, Deutsch-
Französísches Zentrum für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung in Berlin, Elena
Mechtcherkina, Institut für Soziologie der russischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Moskau, Kiril Levinson, einem russischen Historiker, Andrej
Onikienko, Institut für Weltökonomie und internationale Beziehungen in
Moskau und Vladimir Choros dem Obersetzer und Spezialisten für russische
Umgangssprache. Larissa Kossova, Russisches Zentrum für
Meinungsforschung in Moskau wirkte an vier Interviews mit. Die
Forschergruppe dankt der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft fur die
großzügige Finanzierung des Projektes.
4Das Interview führte Birgit Muller mit Kirill Levinson.
5Das Interview führten Isabelle Cribler und Elena Mechtcherkina.
6Das Interview führten Isabelle Cribler und Elena Mechtcherkina im Ruheraum
der Elektromontage.
7Als "Limitschiki" werden die im Rahm ėn einer von der Stadt festgelegten
Quote (Limit) nach Moskau eingewanderten Bewohner aus anderen Gebieten
des Landes bėzeichnet, die sich ihr Recht auf Aufenthalt in Moskau (Propiska)
erwerben mußten.
8Das Interview führten Isabelle Cribler und Elena Mechtcherkina.
9Anspielung auf eine russische Redensart: über einen unfähigen, ungeschickten
Menschėn sagt man, daß er "die Hande am Hintern hat", das heißt, daß sie
ebenso ungeschickt sind wie die Beine.
1 °Ivanov, verbreiteter russischer Name.
1 I Das Interview mit Herrn Stolz vom 18. 11. 1993 führte Andrej Onikienko.
12Das Gespräch führte Larissa Kossova.
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Coal Mining Industry: 1945-1995
Huw Beynon
The British coal industry has been a central industry in the British
economy for the past two hundred years. Coal miners formed a pivotal
group in the working class in the critical period of its development at
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.
For five decades they formed a vital political grouping within the Labour
Party. The miners were involved in major national strikes notably 1912
and 1926 when they were joined for a time by other unions in a General
Strike. In the post war period their significance as a highly organised
section of the working class was expressed forcefully in the national
strikes of 1972 and 1974 (which provoked Edward Heath to call a
General Election), and in their year-long strike in 1984 which was the
longest ever national strike in Britain and which ended in their defeat.
Today, very few of them remain, and the strength of their trade union
has been broken. This ís a good moment for reflection upon their role
within British society. In doing this, 1 will draw upon the researches I
conducted with coal miners and their families in the North of England
during the seventies and eighties, and which present a number of
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The Miners in British Culture
This presence of the coal miners in British social and political
life has encouraged a view of them as "typically proletarian", as the
embodiment of "classic" working class attitudes often understood as
"the vanguard" of the working class or as "traditional workers". A story
told of the miners union leader A. J. Cook is probably apocryphal but
is worth repeating. In visiting the Soviet Union he was introduced to
his audience, by V. I. Lenin, as the man who represented a halfa million
British miners. After the meeting Cook corrected Lenin, informing
him that there were not a half million miners but three times that number.
"Why then", said the Soviet leader "hasn't there been a revolution in
Britain"? This is an interesting question and it serves to indicate that
these perceptions of the coal miner, while understandable, conceal a
number of important aspects of coal mining life; aspects which might
be seen as atypical of the working class in general.
In 1910 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the Fabian social researchers,
were to note that one in ten of all children in Britain were brought up in
mining homes [1]. The large number of miners, the nature of their
working conditions and the essential nature of their work (Britain was
virtually a single fuel economy until the middle of the 1950's), created
a powerful moral element within British socialist thought which was
perhaps best expressed by George Orwell. In 1937 he visited a coal
mine in Lancashire and, in his description, was exhausted by the time
he had walked to the coal face. He marvelled at the endurance of the
miners and wrote of how you could easily drive a car right across the
north of England:
and never once remembered that hundreds of feet below... The
miners are hewing out coal. Yet in a sense it is the miners who
are driving your car forward. Their lamp lit world down there, is
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The miners recognised this themselves. Most often it was
patterned into their social life through resentment. Living as they did,
in mining villages which were most often remote from urban centres,
their early political views, and those of their trade unions, were often
couched in terms of their social exclusion. To an extent this was also
celebrated through annual mining festivals and galas. On these occasions
and especially in the old coalfields of North England, miners and their
families would parade behind the elaborate banners of their lodges
which clearly operated as the dominant symbol representing their village
and their general aspirations. These occasions were significant in many
ways. They registered annual reunions of families and friends; they
also registered the absence ofminers who had been killed in the previous
year. In an industry notorious for its rates of accidents and fatality the
symbolic representation of that death and danger formed a critical aspect
of mining life. Miners joked about death, about cave-ins, and the danger
of life underground. Death and absence, however was sacred. In
Durham, for example, the banner of a lodge where a man had been
killed, has always been draped in black crêpe at the annual Gala.
The marvel of the occasion was captured repeatedly in
discussions I had with retired miners and their families in North East
England. In these discussions it became clear that "The Gala" was
being used almost as metaphor through which the past could be grasped
and historical change explained. Often, with these old people it seemed
as if"the past were simply an adjoining room" [3] and the Gala brought
it into the room with us. "You should have seen it Hinnie; it was a sight
to behold". As one man put it, eloquently:
"It stirred the insides of your soul and you didn't know whether
to laugh or burst out crying all day. it is part of our heritage. Part
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This eloquence, and the use of quite powerful imagery is not
uncommon amongst miners of this generation. For example I talked
with one man about the idea of "progress", and he replied that while
there had been progress made, "it has been a devastating kind of
progress". As these men talked they regularly re-enacted incidents,
and conversation, often with mimicry and to great dramatic and
emotional effect. Their lives have contained an almost intolerable
mixture of the mundane and the heroic, and these aspects are bridged
through "the crack" - the detailed and regular conversation and
discussion of daily life and past events.
Here then is a dangerous occupation carried out by men alone.
Its history is redolent with themes of masculinity, the separation (yet
unity) of work and family life, and the social isolation of many of the
villages, highly dependent upon mining for employment.
The State and the Union: Siamese Twins
These social and political elements came together clearly in 1945.
During the war, the miners had been told repeatedly of the
indispensability of their work. They have collaborated in production
committees to assist the "war effort". Many of them felt that they were
being badly used in this process and in 1944 there were many strikes.
Their sense of resentment had increased as children from London were
lodged in the mining villages as evacuees from the bombing. Every
mining village, or so it seems, had at least one account of a child who
expressed surprise at seeing miners above ground. In the nineteenth
century, there existed a widely held view that miners lived in
underground caves. The continuity here straddled the period when the
coal miners had emerged as the most highly organised group of workers
in Britain qualifying, on some criteria, as "labour aristocrat". The stories
were of great significance. They were told to me in my childhood and
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repeated to me again, across several coalfields, as a researcher in the
1980's: "That's what they thought of the miners".
In 1945, therefore, with the election of a Labour Government
with a landslide victory, the miners and their newly formed National
Union were determined that private ownership of the mines would cease
and their status in the reconstructed economy would be increased. To
this end, the union pressed for a Miners' Charter which related to the
general social conditions of mining life, and through this developed
their already deep involvement in local government and the operation
of the Labour Party.
As such public ownership was an important political event.
Perhaps above all else it symbolised the class compromise which was
to form the basis of post-war corporatism, and reconstruction in the
UK. It was also a significant popular occasion. These two facts were
brought together ceremonially on January 1st 1947 when, at every pit
in the country, a blue and white flag was raised up on a flagpole (usually
by the oldest miner in the pit) carrying the letters of the NCB (National
Coal Board); and a plaque was unveiled (usually by the youngest boy
at the mine). The plaque carried the message that the industry had been
taken into public ownership on behalf of the people. At Horden Colliery
in North East England, the lodge extended the ceremony by burying a
hatchet at the base of the flagpole. Lest one takes the significance of
this too far it is worth recalling that the miners at the nearby Easington
Colliery were instructed by their lodge chairman that a resolution to
"throw the manager down the shaft" was out of order! Nevertheless the
sense of the occasion is clear, and the significance of it for the miners'
union was established in the ways in which the NUM (National Union
of Miners) became involved in the construction of the administrative
apparatus of the NCB.
Nationalisation brought coal owner, managers and union officials
together as administrators of the industry. "The Board", as it became
known was established under the Nationalisation of Mines Act of 1946,
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and in its operation it called upon the support and assistance of a trade
union which had been formed just two years earlier. An amalgamation
conference held in Nottingham established the NUM, and to many of
the people involved in the industry it seemed that the union and the
Board were "like Siamese twins - they were both born of the same
period". As the Board developed so did the analogy take on a deeper
significance.
The first Director of industrial relation at the NCB was Ebby
Edwards. Edwards had been General Secretary for the Northumberland
Miners, and he believed deeply in the need for a national union. Both
previous attempts to establish such a union had foundered as regional
groupings and local interests divided miners from each other. In the
1930s (with the Miners' Federation of Great Britain seriously split) it
was Edwards who took the responsibility of national office and more
than any other held the Federation together. The 1944 Conference
therefore was for him a major achievement which affirmed his beliefs
and vindicated his commitment to national unionism. It was with
acclaim that he was elected as the first General Secretary of the NUM.
That he was persuaded to leave this post (the expression of his life's
work as a trade unionist) within a year to take up the position of Director
of Labour Relations in the newly formed Coal Board says much of the
ways in which nationalisation was understood. The more so when we
realise that this pattern of recruitment operated throughout the structure
of the new organisation. In every regional coal field leading trade
unionists resigned their positions and took office in the labour relations
and welfare departments of the NCB. The production managers were
recruited from the old private coal companies. In the North East the
man in charge of industrial relations was William Natrass, Labour
Alderman and previously lodge Secretary of the Crookhall lodge in
County Durham. In the late fifties this area was run by William Reid;
trained as a manager in the Fife Coal Company, son of the man whose
report set the framework for the post-war development of the industry
and who had advised his son, that "if the Reid's leave who will be left
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to run the industry"? Reid developed a cooperative relationship with
the NUM with the guidance of Natrass and the support of Sam Watson
the powerful general secretary of Durham.
These social arrangements took the new state corporation through
the difficult years of fuel shortage which accompanied post-war
reconstruction. By the 1950s they had become stabilised and this was
symbolically recognised in the appointment of James Bowman as
national Director. Bowman had previously been General Secretary of
the Northumberland Miners and Vice-President ofNUM. This so sealed
the social structure of the corporation that recalcitrant miners, on
unofficial strike, were often told by their union officials that they were
simply striking against themselves for "the Chairman of the Board is a
miner". In this they were affirming what Arthur Horner, the Communist
who succeeded Ebby Edwards as General Secretary of the NUM, had
told miners delegates at the 1948 Conference of the National Union:
they had to get away from this "class approach toward management"[5].
Siamese twins indeed. So powerfully were the union and management
joined together that after 1957 - when the dependence upon coal
dramatically declined - it was to Aif Robens the Labour MP for Blyth
in Northumberland, and Shadow Minister of Labour, that the
Conservative administration turned for Bowman's successor.
The Heroic Miner
The complex cultural apparatus which underpinned the
nationalised corporation solidified it into a significant political
bureaucracy. It administered the industry, regulated industrial disputes
and coordinated production for twenty years. In so doing, it drew upon
its roots within the culture and daily lives of the coal miners and their
families.
In the ten years that followed the war for example, the National
Coal Board successfully operated a system which saw coal production
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increase from 193 to 227 million tonnes. This was achieved through
some important changes in the social organisation of production, but
with little significant technical change in the production system. By
1957, British Coal mining was, by international comparison, still under
mechanised. Coal production rested heavily upon the skilled physical
effort of the face workers, and upon their commitment to the industry.
Evocative productionist language became common currency in this
period; specifically through ideas of power resting "at the point of the
pick" and more generally in society through reference to "the coal face"
as the place where the real work gets done. (An example of the
significance of this can be seen in the ways in which teachers and
university lecturers in the 1980's attempted to appropriate this rhetoric
through the idea of "the chalk face"). Miners themselves celebrated
the "big hewer", the "rippers" and the "colliers" who performed
superhuman feats underground. The Giıiness Book of Records, listed a
miner from Northumbia in this period as holding the record for the
most coal cut by hand in a shift. These activities were orchestrated by
the state corporation. In 1947, the NCB had seven film crews who
worked regularly at producing "NCB News" that was shown in the
local cinemas in and around the coalfields. These newsreels celebrated
the achievements of the miners, documented industrial accidents and
tragedies and successfully developed a powerful heroic view of the
miner and the coal industry.
This was a period of a coal monopoly, when Britain was a single
fuel economy, and when every ton of coal dug was needed and could
be sold. it was also the Stakanovite period in the British mines.
Production banners and medals proclaimed the achievements of men
and pits which - in the most primitive of conditions - broke records and
delivered the nation's coal. Here, in a state-owned industry, management
and union combined to celebrate the heroic worker. Here, the artifacts
of the industry the miner's lamp and pick became icons; enormous
effigies of miners stood centrally in the mining festivals that were jointly
organised by the union and the NCB.
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In the 1950's the heroic image of the miners was celebrated in
the miners' annual Galas. In these years the annual "Big Meeting" in
Durham became akin to a state celebration. The miners and their
families paraded their banners past their trade union and political
leaders, but on these occasions this included the Prime Minister, senior
managers of the Coal Board, and other dignitaries including the
Ambassador of the USA. Michael Foot, ex-leader of the Labour Party
spoke at the Gala on many occasions. When I interviewed him in 1982
he explained how:
"i started there in 1947. That is when I shared the platform with
Arthur Horner. It was strange because the Durham area emerged
as a Right wing within the union and the Labour Party, but I was
elected to go there regularly. The Durham Miners Gala is a fine
occasion today, taking place as it does in that beautiful city. But
in those days it was absolutely sensational. There were so many
lodges you see and they had to start bringing them in at half past
eight in the morning. The whole city throbbed with the thing
from early in the morning right through until you left. And you
left absolutely drunk with it - I mean that metaphorically because
there was very little actual drunkenness in my opinion - the music,
the banners and all in that beautiful city. It overwhelmed you
really. In those days it was, far and away, the best working class
festival that there was in this country. Far and away the best. It
was just marvellous".
The other side of the Gala, and the position of the miner in British
society was demonstrated in 1951. In that year a major explosion had
taken place in the Easington colliery, killing 94 men. In the village the
funeral marches took place day after day as more and more mens' bodies
were found in the ruins of the mine. On Gala Day the Easington banner
was draped in black and as is was carried through Durham people looked
at it and wept, or reached forward to touch it as a sacred symbol.
The parallels with the post-war experiences of the French industry
is an engaging one. There, in a similar settlement, the Socialist and
Communist parties were initially united behind a similar production
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drive in the nationalised industry. In this period it was often argued
that "to dig coal in the highest form of class consciousness" and that "a
miner only becomes a man when he sees his blood on the coal"[6].
These ideas therefore took shape in the context of state ownership and
they contrast with Belgium where, under private ownership, post-war
coal production was achieved through migrant workers. Here the heroic
image is absent, instead the miner is linked with notions of debasement.
However, in contrast to Britain, the heroic period was short lived in
France. The split between the Communist and Socialist parties over
the running of the coal mines led to the major confrontation of 1948,
after which 40,000 miners (many of them communist militants) left
the industry. In Britain, in contrast, and in spite of the run down of the
1960s these images were retained and redeveloped in the 1970's to be
finally destroyed in the aftermath of the 1984-85 strike.
Gender Relations
In their talk of the post-war period it is clear that, for miners
born before 1930, the 1950's were the good years. In this time state
ownership had counteracted the excesses of power associated with
private ownership, guaranteed the trade union (through Act of
Parliament) and stabilised the social life of the village. But this was
not to last, and in reflecting upon what has changed it is important to
point out that these social arrangements were powerfully organised
around a clear differentiation between the lives of men and women.
While the men and boys worked in the pit, the women and girls worked
in the home. Much of the work in the home involved them in directly
servicing the activities of the coal mine. Few of the collieries in Britain
provided washing facilities for their workers in 1945 [7]. These men
would travel home "black"; in the homes the women would be involved
in an almost continuous process of boiling water in kettles on coal
fires preparing the baths and washing the clothes of their husbands and
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sons. (The NCB did not provide or launder work clothes and overalls
for its workers until 1981!)
Not surprisingly therefore, the building of washing facilities and
showers at the collieries were cause for some celebration. In Durham
(where the NCB also owned the houses) the showers were also used on
Saturdays by the sons of the miners. The NCB owned the miners' houses
and these did not have bath rooms. The NCB indicated that it was
prepared to "modernise" these homes but that the miners would need
to pay a proportion of the cost. This would be measured as a proportion
of the coal which the miners were given each year as a part of their
wage.
These changes clearly affected the women more deeply. The
men had access to showers but they didn't. Bathrooms would ease their
work in the home and bring their standard of life to a level that was
normally expected. However, as women, they were not members of
the trade union and were unable to vote on the issue. In one of the
villages in Durham the (militant) miners' lodge voted against the
proposal insisting that the Board should pay for the improvements itself.
The Board refused. The women -excluded from this decision-making
process-petitioned the union meetings, marched and demonstrated
through the streets of the village and finally occupied the union office.
The decision was reversed. Interestingly none of this is recorded in the
union minute books, and it serves to illustrate the gendered bias in
many of the social arrangements which were sealed through state
ownership. This was to form an important part of the cultural dynamic
as these places changed.
Rundown
in the late fifties, in the face of a growing availability of cheap
oil and gas, the NCB entered into a process of rationalisation which
involved the increasingly rapid mechanisation of coal cutting and the
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haulage of coal in the mines and its delivery to the power stations. This
was achieved through the general introduction of a technology based
around long wall faces, conveyor systems and the shearer loader. This
technological system was one which saw coal miners producing coal
continuously with enormous increases in productivity. Allied with these
changes was the closure of the least productive mines. In this combined
process 400,000 miners were made redundant and another 100,000
were transferred to other coalfields in the country. It was a period of
economic change and social dislocation. In its most critical period
(1964-1969) ít was carried through by a Labour Government to whom
the miners had looked specifically for help and assistance in the election
of 1964. As part of these changes the government used state resources
to encourage new industries and administrative activities to be located
in the coalfields; significantly changing the structure of their labour
markets and providing increasing employment opportunities for women.
The detail of this period is complex. What is perhaps most
significant to register here, is that the restructuring was managed
effectively by the political bureaucracy of the Coal Board. In the two
key years of 1967 and 1968 (when all other industries experiencing
restructuring, encountered strikes and redundancy) no strikes occurred
in coal mining to challenge closures. With reluctance, the miners
supported this process of change. As a part of it, a rhetoric of"progress"
and "modernisation" was employed, which rapidly replaced the "heroic"
images of the 1950's. Here the emphasis was upon science (the
preferability of oil to coal), and a "new way of life" associated with
modern factories, new towns and the move away from the restrictions
of mining community life. The reactions of the miners to this was mixed
to say the least. In part they accepted the changes as inevitable, many
of them willingly left the industries. Many of the women appreciated
the opportunities presented in the changes for themselves and for their
sons. But there were deep tensions too. The changes were carried out
at great speed; often with little direct consultation with the people
involved. Often mines with enormous reserves were closed in ways
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which people considered to be wasteful. These feelings came to a head
in 1968 and were revealed in Durham on the Gala of that year. Once
again the Prime Minister was present as were cabinet ministers and
leaders of the NUM and NCB. On that occasion the men of the
Silksworth lodge in Sunderland lowered their banner as they stood in
front of the Labour Prime Minister. "It was" they said "to. show him
that he had lost our respect - we still had our dignity but we no longer
respected him as our leader". This resentment became expressed most
clearly through the idea that the miner (once the Stakanovite hero) had
become transformed into an "industrial gypsy". The racist social epithet
here is significant, as is its usage. It was employed by miners and the
NUM to register their opposition to what they saw as the debasement
of their occupation. This, together with an account of the conditions of
mining work and wages, was a central element in the development of a
successful national strike in the industry in 1972. On that occasion a
public inquiry decided that the miners were a "special case", and
recommended the full settlement of their claim.
In the period which followed the election of Harold Wilson's
Government in 1974, it seemed that the old corporatist system had
been re-established. Under the Plan for Coal, an investment programme
began which modernised many of the existing mines and established
new mines and complexes in the Yorkshire coalfield. Coal output
increased, and this pattern continued even after the rapid rundown of
manufacturing capacity and employment that took place after 1979. In
the mines themselves, a system of dual power was reactivated which,
in this period, brought clear benefits to the miners. Although a
disciplinary procedure existed it was very rarely used beyond the level
of the colliery as managers and union representatives dealt with such
problems through a mixture of "rough justice" and "common sense".
By common consent, men who would have been sacked in many other
industries retained their jobs on payment of a fine to a local miners'
welfare fund or charity. Early retirement and redundancy (while the
subject of negotiated disagreement on terms etc) were often handled
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flexibly and informally within the mine. (For example, there were
several occasions in the N.E. coalfields of miners who died while
employed in the mine, were made redundant post-humusly so that their
widows and families could benefit from enhanced redundancy terms).
So too with recruitment. Miners' sons were given preference for jobs
in the industry and often the lodge secretaries were involved in the
selection procedure. Gouldner in his study of gypsum mine in the USA
wrote of an "indulgency pattern", whereby management ignored or
bent the rules in the interest of industrial peace [8]. A similar process
was at work in the British mines in the late 1970's. Around it,
management often spoke openly of sharing a common mining culture
with the men who cut the coal.
From "Heroic Miner" to the "Enemy Within"
At the Home Office, things looked rather different. The
mobilisation of the miners in 1972 and 1974 was seen to raise
fundamental issues of law and order and national security. The
successful mass picketing of the Saltley coke works in the West
Midlands was viewed there as having the significance of a "minor
nuclear attack"[9]. it was clear in these accounts that the relationship
between the miners and the state had become problematic. in the post-
war period of reconstruction, the miners were integrated into the state
as a corporate group, and their position there was maintained
economically and ideologically as the National Coal Board placed the
popular culture of the miner on the national stage. In this period, coal
mining was essentially a labour intensive system linked to a monopolist
market. The arrangements were maintained through the most intensive
period of economic restructuring, at the end of which (under a Tory
administration, and under changed conditions in the energy markets)
the miners successfully organised two national strikes. These strikes
in 1972 and 1974 were the first national strikes organised by the coal
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the approach of the miners' union toward the government, and was
widely interpreted as representing a break with the corporatist tradition
and, in the tactics adopted ("flying pickets" etc), a direct challenge to
state power.
It is now clear that in 1974 two quite divergent views had
developed within the NCB and the major ministries of state. On the
one hand the rise in the oil price presented the possibility of stabilizing
the coal industry on the basis of advanced technology linked with a
long term planned growth in output and employment. It was this view
which was publicly presented in a new tri-partite Plan for Coal, in
1974 and 1976. This plan was deeply expansionist and productionist
in tone. This view was allied once again with positive images of the
miner - now less of a superman and more as the embodiment of a new
technical mining system.
The second view was radically different from this one however;
it saw the miner, and the new younger left leadership emerging in the
NUM as a powerfully destructive force. This view made common cause
with the worries in the Home Office. For these people the old model of
the forties and fifties could not be resurrected, nor was it desirable that
it should be. What was needed was a dramatic alteration in the
relationship between the institutions of mining and the state. The Home
Office's view in relation to this has already been noted; to this can be
added two other documents which have received some public attention.
The first, written by Wilfred Miron, Deputy Director for the Midlands
Area, pointed to the danger ofNUM organised on new Leftist principles.
Presented to the Director of the NCB in 1974, it pointed to the need to
develop a strategy oftechnical change which was politically determined
and aimed at affecting the social support achieved by the miners' union.
in this it argues that the investment strategy of the NCB (based on
public funds) should be directed toward the expansion of production in
new areas, and that the labour process should be constructed in a way
which marginalised members of the NUM. The second document,
written by a Tory shadow minister Nicholas Ridley has been given
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wider coverage. This is a document produced by the Tory Party in
opposition under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. Here the
emphasis is upon the regulation of the trade union power and the need
for the government to effect changes, both within the state, (via laws,
policing etc) and civil society, (notably the encouragement of "good"
owner lorry drivers) which will successfully undermine the capacity
of significant powerful groups within the working class to strike and to
disrupt the economy. The miners were seen as the most significant of
these groups; far from being heroic figures they had come to represent
the enemy within the state.
After the defeat of the Labour Government in 1979 senior
officials of the Board, unsure of their ability to obtain continuing
financial support for their industrial plans, occasionally connived with
the officials of the union to bring pressure on the Government. This
was short listed however. By 1984, things had changed decisively. With
the war in the South Atlantic over, the second Thatcher government
was supremely confident and registered this with the appointment of
Ian MacGregor as Chairman of the NCB in 1983. The miners in their
turn had elected the militant Yorkshire leader Arthur Scargill as their
national President. Both of these can be seen as important events. For
Mrs Thatcher, Ian MacGregor was a manager untainted by the history
of the NCB and the "cosy relationships" which she saw as characterising
industrial relations in that organisation. Her understanding of the culture
of this state organisation was such that she was convinced that it could
only be altered by the introduction of a powerful outsider; preferably
someone whose experience of industry had also been outside the UK.
(A similar policy was adopted with regard to the state owned automobile
and ship-yard industries.) The miners understood this also; they saw
clearly that the old ways were at an end. As such they looked for a war
leader and not a conciliator. Under his leadership the miners' union
took up an openly belligerent tone, eschewing its previous involvement
in joint cultural and social activities with the corporation; emphasising
the independence of the miner, and his militant past. In his speeches
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Scargill repeated summoned up ideas of "manhood", of past victories
and sacrifices, and the folly of "collaboration". Equally clear was the
determination of the Government to break the variety of social
apparatuses which had regulated production in the state sector. in 1984,
faced by a decision to introduce a programme of pit closures the miners
went on strike. The Chancellor, Nigel Lawson spoke of the strike as a
"worthwhile investment", and people were in little doubt about the
meaning of this statement. No attempt was made to avert the strike and
an enormous mobilisation of the resources of the State took place with
the aim of defeating the miners' union and ultimately returning the
industry to the private sector.
Tke Consequences of Defeat
The details of the 1984-85 dispute are complex and have, to
some extent, been documented elsewhere [9]. What is significant for
this paper is the implication of the strike for the production system in
the mines, and for the symbolic representations of the miners within
the British working class, and within the mining districts. In the early
summer of 1984 I talked with several car workers about the miners
decision to strike. Their reaction can but be described as a mixture of
admiration and disbelief. in their view, car workers would never strike
under the conditions that existed in the coal industry (the end of the
winter, high coal stacks) and it would be simply impossible to imagine
sustaining a strike for as long as the miners appeared to be entertaining.
These views intensified, as the summer passed and turned into winter.
In truth, few of the miners (and certainly not their leaders) imagined
that the strike would last a year, but its momentum was maintained, in
part, by a sense of historical continuity. Talk regularly turned to the
growth of the 1972 strike and how it had developed; and then to the
1926 General Strike in which their grandparents had been involved
"and it was worse for them". This sense of history was combined with
another powerful image of "backs to the wall".
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During the strike the miners through their lodges, and their linked
support groups produced badges which represented themselves, or their
achievements or a particular incident during the strike. The major
confrontation that took place at the Orgreave coke works was recognised
by an "Orgreave Veteran" badge. These badges became collector's items
and were actively sought and traded by miners who themselves became
"collectors". One badge, particularly sought-after, was that of a Maerdy
lodge in South Wales. This badge carried the motif "The last pit in the
Rhondda". The Rhondda Valley was, of course, for sixty years,
synonymous with coal as the major producing region of the South Wales
Coalfields. The slogan had an air of defiance but it also carried a sense
of tragedy - of an end of a way of life. This was at the heart of the
dispute, which also carried with it a dilemma, which became clearer
during the long hot summer months as young miners with flowing hair
and bronzed bodies talked of never feeling so fit or so well.
In a strike about jobs and about work, people were well aware
that the jobs they were defending were not the best. The women who
so solidly and bravely supported the strike would, at other times, have
told you that they didn't want their sons to go underground; that they
hoped that there would be "something better" for them. But, in the
absence of that, "there's always the pit". In this and in other ways "the
pit" had become understood as part of the collective property of many
mining villages. These places, these "holes in the ground" had become
part oftheir lives in a very detailed, and complex way. One man reflected
that before the strike, throughout his life he had
"needed the pit; I needed to work in it, i've been there most days
since I left school. But what I learned in the strike was that
didn't need it. That I could manage without it".
This idea was strengthened after the return to work under very
different social conditions. in 1985 the "mock bureaucracy" and its
related "indulgency pattern" was ended and a new "punishment centred"
mode was put into operation. A thousand men had been dismissed
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during the strike, and the return to work without them heightened the
sense of broken solidarity. In the mines, new production systems and
working contracts were introduced, as local agreements were abrogated
by a management operating with a dramatically different set of
priorities. Men talked then of the job being completely transformed,
not so much by technological changes (which were not insignificant),
but by the fact that:
"They have taken away the comraderie of the pit. It's all gone.
And without laughing and joking down the pit its a rotten dirty,
filthy. job. The only good thing about the pit was your maras
(mates) and that's gone".
Another Yorkshire miner expressed a similar view:
"I've worked in places before the pit. In factories and such like.
It was all "do this" and "do that" sort of thing. The good thing
about the pit was that you could tell the gaffer (boss) to fuck off
and get away with it. You weren't working under the screw all
the time. If its going to be like that its worth having".
Such statements were not unusual. In 1988 I talked with a lodge
secretary of one large colliery in the North East and asked him how he
had assessed the views of the men he represented. "It was", he said, "a
question of let's shut the bastard pit, so that we can all be away".
Intriguingly similar responses were found amongst steel workers, and
amongst ship yard workers. All employed in the state sector, all with
the background of a powerful occupational tradition, supported and
then broken by the state. In mining this process was accelerated.
Destruction and Renewal
In the ten years that followed the dispute, 150 collieries closed.
In 1983, 230 thousand men were employed in the mines, by 1992, the
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total had fallen to 40 thousand. As the industry was prepared for its
return to the private sector many more collieries were closed down; in
1994 just 10,000 coal miners remained working in collieries where
productivity rates had trebled. New face machinery had been introduced
and a range of sub-contracting arrangements developed which broke
up the organised solidarity of the underground miners fragmenting them
into contract workers, and mobile workers all operating under new
payment rules orchestrated through a new rhetoric of accounting and
cost per giga joule.
The transformation and run-down of British coal mining has
been dramatic, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the scale of it.
Also it would be easy to present the account in a tragic vein. Maerdy
has closed; there are now no pits in the Rhondda although there is a
Wild West Theme Park. Just one pit remains in Scotland and two in
the North East. Perhaps however, it is important to add a critical
perspective to this, and to reflect upon the psychology of dependency
built into the miners' view of needing the pít. Certainly there is an
enormous sadness in the mining districts. In discussing a closed colliery,
men often talked of "missing her" and all the attendant noises and rituals
associated with a productive mine. Nevertheless, these mines operated
through that back breaking effort which so deeply disturbed Orwell.
The mine too was "men's world" and this also tended to dominate
relationships on the surface. The drinking pubs in the mining districts
maintained "men-only" bars. During the strike Arthur Scargill
repeatedly appealed to the miners to "stand up and fight like men". It
was a last, and powerful, appeal to an image of heroic, masculine
worker, and it was flawed.
In the 1960's the coalfields changed. As the mines closed new
industries were attracted to the region by state grants. Many of these
employed women workers, and for the first time in many of the coal
districts, regular source of employment were available for women.
These factories and offices were unionised and some women became
shop stewards and union activists. In 1984 the role of the "miners wives"
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in the dispute has been widely reported. As a consequence of the state
legislation of 1982 the families of striking miners were deemed to be
in receipt of £15.00 strike pay and this was deducted from their social
security benefits. In the face of a great deal of real need, communal
kitchens were organised, food collections organised and food and
clothing distributed. The women were central to all these activities and
as the strike progressed it became clear that in many districts it was
they (and not the miners) who were holding the strike together. Also in
their activities they became increasingly critical of the form and
organisation of the union - its bureaucracy, its lack of imagination.
What these women mobilised has a powerful sense of community rights
which extended beyond employment. To an important extent this was
developed during the dispute as a coherent strand, often through the
involvement of children, and through linkages with other public sector
unions. Here a very different set of images was brought into play from
the ones suggested by the Triple Alliance of coal miners, steel workers
and railway men. This was resurrected in 1984 but it failed to operate
in any strategic sense during the dispute. The alternative failed also, in
that it did not prevent the defeat. But it has left a heritage.
The miners' union under the leadership of Arthur Scargill was
involved in a form of militancy designed to force the state to secure
employment in the coal sector. As such radicalism did not make a
break with the historical route of the unions in British politics which
was deeply statist, in perspective. The demand articulated by Scargill
was for the preservation of production and employment. It failed to
gain general support. The images which were most widely generalised
were those of communities in struggle for their continuity, and of non-
statist, autonomous activities of men and women in the mining districts.
This perhaps indicates the interlinkage of positive outcomes of the
dispute in terms of working class politics generally. In the context of
dramatically changed conditions of international production, and the
restructuring strategies of Conservative governments, working class
corporatist politics had come to an impasse. In a sense the miners
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strike represented its last fling, and the importance of the defeat was
far-reaching. Since 1985, however, there are signs that elements of a
more complex, environmentally attentive, less "productive" concerns
are emerging, both amongst the miners and generally in the British
Trade Unions. This came to the fore in 1992 as the Tory government
sounded the death knell of most of the remaining 50 coal mines,
announcing a comprehensive closure plan that would lead up to the
privatisation of the industry. There is little doubt that these coal mines
could have been closed without any opposition from the coal miners,
such was their level of demoralisation. That the programme was
announced in a major national press conference is of some significance.
Undoubtedly there was a strong element of hııbris involved in the action
of the President of the Board of Trade, Michael Heseltine. What was
also involved was the need felt by the Government to publicly and
symbolically register the ending of a particular tradition within British
society. And it brought its reward as 300,000 people marched through
London in torrential rain. People from all backgrounds representing
trade unions, small employers, gay activists; men and women from the
home counties and of middle England. I talked to many of them and
asked why they were there. Most common was the answer: "because
its morally wrong what they are doing to these people". To the very
end (and today there are only 9,000 coal miners working in the UK)
the miners were capable of mobilising this national sentiment in their
support. It was this which Raymond Williams identified as part of the
Resources for Hope [10]; the reworking of cultural traditions in new
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von Texuilarbeiterinnen aus der Niederlausitz
Petra Clemens
Textilarbeiterinnen, ihren Erfahrungen, ihren alltäglichen
Arbeits- und Lebenszusammenhängen galt meine Untersuchung, die
gekoppelt war an ein größeres sozialgeschichtliches Projekt, in dem
Entwicklungen in der Industriearbeiterschaft der DDR bis in die 1960er
Jahre am Beispiel einer Region analysiert wurden.
Die Region ist die Niederlausitz, ein Gebiet im Südosten des
heutigen Landes Brandenburg. In der DDR wurde die Niederlausitz
seit Mitte der 1950er Jahre zum "Kohle- und Energiezentrum"
ausgebaut. Unter diesem Blickwinkel war und ist sie air die Mehrzahl
der am Gesamtprojekt Beteiligten interessant. Meine Untersuchungen
konzentrieren sich jedoch auf die Textilindustrie als eine in der Region
ebenfalls angestammte Industrie, die in der DDR-Zeit eine quantitativ
bedeutsame Gruppe von Industriearbeiterinnen stellte und immer auch
Symbol bzw. Synonym fŭr industrielle Frauenarbeit war. Schon in der
Planungsgesellschaft der Vergangenheit genoß dieser Arbeitsraum von
Frauen keine ökonomische und soziale Bevorzugung, und mit dem
Einbruch von Marktwirtschaft in der Gegenwart wurde er schnell -
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Es gab, wenn man so will, noch eine Differenz in der Forschungs-
perspektive und -methode. Während im Gesamtprojekt Ansätze einer
politischen Sozialgeschichte und quantitative Methoden dominierten,
habe ich mich aufder Subjektebene bewegt, vor allem mit der Methode
der Oral History gearbeitet, aber auch konventionelle Quellen
historischer Forschung, also Archivalien herangezogen.
Als empirisches Untersuclıungsfeld wählte ich die Inkarnation
tuchindustrieller Produktion in der Niederlausitz, die "Tuchstadt" Forst,
eine kleine Stadt an der Neiße.
Mit der Produktion und dem Export eines speziellen Streich-
garngewebes für den Massenbedarf, dem Buckskin, lange Zeit Privileg
der englischen Tuchindustrie, hatte sie sich am Ende des 19. Jahr-
hunderts aus der regionalen Bedeutung gehoben. Die Stadt stellte Mitte
der 1920er Jahre nicht nur 42% der in der Niederlausitzer Tuchindustrie
tiberhaupt Beschäftigten, sondern übertraf damit auch alle anderen
deutschen Textilindustriezentren. Diese Industrie dominierte die Stadt
auch zu DDR-Zeiten. Ihre unzähligen alten Tuchfabriken aus dem 19.
und. ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts dienten als Produktionsstätten
bis 1990, elıe sie, an Handels- und Supermarktketten verkauft oder
verpachtet, zu Konsumtionstätten und Warenlagern wuırden.
In den "Forster Tuchfabriken" arbeiteten 1989 noch ca. 1900
Beschäftigte; 63% davon waren Frauen. Unter ihnen bildeten die 50-
bis 55jährigen Frauen das Gros und zugleich die letzte Generation
Forster Textilarbeiterinnen, die letzte in spezifischer und mehrdeutiger
Hinsicht.
Die Textilarbeiterinnen dieser Generation (Jahrgang 1936 bis
1941) stammten mehrheitlich auch noch aus der engeren Region, aus
der Stadt oder den umliegenden Dörfern. Und sie wuchsen in Kriegs-
und Nachkriegszeiten auf. Die Belastungen, Zwänge und Maßgaben
einer solchen Kindheit in zugleich regionaler und sozialer Randlage,
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trugen dazu bei, daß sie emn Erbe, das vor dem Krieg schon fast als
ausgeschlagen galt, noch einmal antraten und durchhielten: Arbeit in
der Tuchfabrik. "Knochenarbeit" war ihr Wo rt.
Diese Frauen, die in den 1950er Jahre in die Tuchfabriken
eintraten, gingen noch durch die "Tuchmacher-Lehrwerkstatt". Die
Betonung liegt auf Tuchmacher. D.h. sie waŕen die ersten Mädchen
und die letzten Lehrlinge, die noch eine Ausbildung in der Tradition
soliden Tuchmacherhandwerks erhielten, und zwar in Person der alten
Lehrmeister und in der Möglichkeit, die Tuchherstellung nicht nur in
ihren einzelnen Stufen, also dem Spinnen, Weben und Ausrüsten,
sondern noch in ihrer Ganzheit zu erlernen. Und bevor diese
Mittfünfzigjährigen zwischen Ende 1990 und 1992 durch Kurzarbeit
"Null", Vorruhestand und schließlich Entlassung ausgekehrt wurden,
hatten sie mit ihrem "Schliff' durch die Alten und ihren z.T. sehr
komplexen Arbeitsfertigkeiten viele Jahre den Puffer abgegeben in einer
Stoß- und Mangelproduktion. Sie wirkten in einer Produktion, die seit
Ende der 1960er Jahre ihre Lehrlinge überall in der DDR, besonders in
Agrarregionen zusammensuchen mußte, in der bald ganze Abteilungen
zu "Durchgangslagern" geworden waren und in der schließlich auch
die mit Frauen nicht mehr zu besetzenden Arbeitsplätze von aus-
ländischen Vertragsarbeitern und Vertragsarbeiterinnen eingenommen
wurden. Die "Forster Tuchfabriken", hinsichtlich der Beschäftigtenzahl
und der Höhe der Gewebeproduktion die Nummer Eins in der
Niederlausitzer Tuchindustrie, hatten das Letzte zu bieten im Hinblick
auf Arbeits- und Produktionsbedingungen in den mühsam zusammen-
gehaltenen alten Gebäuden.
So lebten die Textilarbeiterinnen hier nicht nur mit dem wohl
überall in der Textilindustrie und dort bei Frauen wie bei Männern
gleichermaßen verfestigtem Bewußtsein einer selbstverständlichen
gesellschaftlichen Hintenansetzung. Unmittelbar in der Lebenswelt der
Forster Textilarbeiterinnen gab es den Stachel deklassierender
Sterotype. "Ach, die aus der Tuchbude." Ein stereotyper Satz, den ich
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in der Stadt auffällig häufig von Dritten hörte, ausgesprochen als
schlichte Geläufigkeit, aber auch zur Absetzung und zur Herab-
würdigung, mit bildhaften Kommentierungen. Diese allerdings waren
nur auf Frauen gemünzt. Sie erinnerten mich in ihren Grundfigurationen
an alte, z.T. "schaurige Bilder" über Fabrikarbeiterinnen aus dem 19.
Jahrhundert (dumpf, ordinär, sich prostituierend).
Gewiß: Der Erfahrung sozialer Deklassierung setzten meine
Gesprächspartnerinnen den Stolz entgegen, Arbeit trotz dieser
Umstände ausdauernd und mit höchster Leistung vorgelegt zu haben.
"Wer in die Bude ging, mußte arbeiten können und flink sein", wurde
in einem Gruppengespräch das von mir eingeworfene Zitat "Wenn Du
gar nichts kannst, gehst Du in die Tuchbude" gekontert. im
Einzelgespräch kam die erfahrene Kränkung zur Sprache. so antwortete
eine Interviewpartnerin auf meine Frage, was sie mit dem Begriff
"Tuchbude" verbinde, sofort mit dem Verweis auf seine herab-
wűrdigende Bedeutung. Als "Menschen zweiter Klasse" wären sie
angesehen worden. Eine Formulierung, die ihr in dieser Ausformung,
wie mir schien, die neue Gegenwart in den Mund legte, denn sie fügte
sofort an: "Na, wie die DDR-Menschen jetzt überhaupt." Über dem
abschätzigen Bíld von der "Tuchbude" lag also auch eine sehr junge
Schicht.
Im Verlauf der Zeit, im Prozeß der letztendlich immer wieder
gescheiterten Modernisierungsversuche kam es, beginnend mit dieser
Generation zu Verschiebungen im Gefüge dessen, was als Arbeitsplatz
für Männer oder für Frauen angesehen wurde. Erstmals arbeiteten nun
auch Frauen als Meisterin oder Ingenieurin, die Rangfolge der
Geschlechter, die den Männern die "ersten" und attraktivsten Plätze
garantierte, wurde dabei jedoch nicht angetastet. Egal auf welchem
Arbeitsplatz, Berufstätigkeit war fUr diese Frauen eine Selbstver-
ständlichkeit, für viele eine notwendige Selbstverständlichkeit und eine
kontinuierliche Angelegenheit. Zugleich blieb die Haus- und Familien-
arbeit an ihnen hängen. Berufs- und Hausarbeit waren für diese Frauen
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eine doppelte Belastung, aber auch eine doppelte Erfahrung. Die Frage
wäre, ob und wie sie diese doppelte Zuständigkeit und Verantwort-
lichkeit in einem Betrieb mit Frauenmehrheit und ıııännlícher Vormacht
zur Geltung brachten. Und weiter, in welcher Art das in einer Gesell-
schaft geschah, in der die ökonomischen und sozialen Bedingungen
die Konkurrenz zwischen den Geschlechtern zwar abge śchwächt, die
politischen Strukturen ein demokratisches Aushandeln und Diskutieren
auch der geschlechtsspezifischen Machtverhältnisse aber nicht
zugelassen hatten.
Ich möchte im Folgenden ein Gruppengespräch und zwei
Einzelbiographien nacherzählen. Ober diese drei Gespräche vermitteln
sich Einblicke in die sehr unterschiedlichen betrieblichen Arbeitsräume
und wird vor allem auch der Frage nach Erfahrungen mit der
geschlechtspezifischen Arbeitsteilung nachgegangen.
Ende des Jahres 1990 war die alten Selfaktorspinnereí
geschlossen worden. Und bevor sie im Sommer 1991 geräumt wurde,
traf ich mich mit ehemals dort Beschäftigte zu einer Besichtigung und
zu einem Gespräch.
Die vier Frauen und der Meister hatten hier z.T. schon seit
Jahrzehnten gearbeitet, mit Spinn- und Krempelmaschinen, die wie
das Gebäude in der Mehrzahl noch aus den 1920er Jahren stammten.
Seit 1978 war ihre Verschrottung immer wieder angekündigt worden.
Nun erst, unter anderen Vorzeichen und mit bitteren Konsequenzen
für die Frauen, wurde Ernst daraus. Vorher waren die Maschinen immer
als Jonglierkapazität für die Planerfdllung stehengeblieben.
"Alle Mistpartien, die kamen zu uns, wollen wir ruhig sagen",
kommentierte eine Frau unter Zustimmung der anderen.	 .
"Mistpartien wollen wir nicht sagen, alle, die de nee schlechte
Laufeigenschaft hatten", rückte der Meister zurecht.
"Jeden Mist", die Frauen blieben dabei, hätten sie hier zu
Vorgarn und Garn verarbeitet und "wenns mit Schreien war".
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ihr wütendes und verzweifeltes Fluchen bei der Verarbeitung schlechter
Partien - "schöne" hätte sie auch gehabt, die Frauen wollten bei der
Wahrheit bleiben - schluckte der ohrenbetäubende Maschinenlärm. Wo
andere wegen der vielen hängenden Fäden "lang gelegen" oder "Kopp
gestanden" hätten, seien sie "halberwegen um die Runden gekommen",
durch Flinkheit und Arbeitseinteilung, eingeschliffen durch die Alten.
Und weil er uns so gestriezt hat und wir mußten so schnell, so
flott hintereinander arbeiten, dadurch sind wir eben so flink
geworden. Ich hab mir manchmal gesagt: Das war nie zu schade,
was wir gelernt haben, also wirklich. Denn die Alten haben uns
mehr rangenommen, wie jetzt hier so een junger Spinner. Also,
da hat man früher mehr gelernt als heute."
Diese Mitgift ließen sie sich nicht schlecht reden. Aber aus der
"Schinderei", wie sie die Arbeit unter solchen Bedingungen nannten,
machten sie dennoch keine Tugend.
Es war der Ehrgeiz des Meisters, daß keine der "Mistpartien"
als unspinnbar zurückging. Er baute solange an den Maschinen, bis die
Qualität des Garnes stimmte und die flinken Frauen mit dem Anknüpfen
"halberwegen" hinterherkamen. Liefeine Maschine gar nicht mehr Tief,
wühlte er mit dem Selfaktorsteller in der zusammengetragenen
Antiquitätensammlung bis ein Ersatzteil gefunden oder zusammen-
gebastelt war. Seit die Krempelmaschinen wegen Mangel an
Arbeitskräften nicht mehr zweischichtig laufen konnten, kam der
Meister sehr häufig anderthalb Stunden vor Arbeitsbeginn ins Werk.
Er schaffte Vorlauf beim Vorgarn. Dabei hat er, wie er sagte, "manchen
Finger riskiert", mannhaft und zwanghaft zugleich. Er säuberte die
Maschine, die durch alle Pausen und bis Punkt Feierabend lief, früh,
nachdem er sie in Gang gesetzt hatte. Das war verboten, half jedoch an
der ohnehin zugesetzten Zeit sparen.
Der Meister trug nicht auf, eher trug er etwas vor: Den Stolz auf
Arbeit, Leistung und Qualität trotz Mangel an allem. Damit war aber
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auch ein alter Streit zwischen ihm und den Frauen wieder auf dein
Tisch. Und die Frauen hielten es im Gespräch wohl ebenso, wie früher
im laufenden Betrieb. Síe blieben in beredet schweigender Reserviert-
heit oder konterten mal ironisch, mal mit nüchternen Einwürfen: ihre
Finger hätten sie behalten wollen. Haltet die Arbeitszeit eín, zitierten
sie unter Anspielung auf die vorn Meister zugesetzten Stunden einen
ehemals landläufig bekannten Appell, die reguläre Arbeitszeit
einzuhalten. Und für die schäbige Qualität der Ausgangsstoffe hatten
sie eben nur das eine Wort. Es gab aber auf Seiten der Frauen auch
vermittelnde Gesten. Ein Lachen, ein Tonfall in der Stimme, der
Abbruch eines Wortwechsels signalisierten, daß das grundsätzliche
Einvernehmen, das Abhängigkeiten einschloß, nicht aufgekündigt
werden sollte.
Der Platz, den die Frauen im Werksaal einnahmen, führte sie
wohl kaum in Versuchung in Arbeit trotz schlechter Bedingungen
soviel Eigensinn zu legen und solche Befriedigung zu suchen, wie der
Meister es vorgab (als Verhalten, als Norm, als Bíld). Befriedigung
schöpften sie wohl mehr daraus, Arbeit und Familie (gehabt) zu haben.
Versehen mit beidem und bedacht darauf, auch bei dieser Partie
"halberwegen um die Runden zu kommen", insistierten sie mit stiller
Eigenwilligkeit und ironischer Distanzierung, aber eben unausge-
sprochen und unausgefochten, auf eine andere Logik.
Eine andere Geschichte, eine Geschichte
von trauriger Bilanz.
Frau Bahlke, Jahrgang 1941, ist "vor der Wende abgehauen".
Die Wende war für sie die Umstellung der DDR-Mark auf DM. Síe
konnte den Anblick hamsternder Menschen und leergefegter Läden,
die die Szenerie vor der Währungsunion beherrschten, nicht mehr
ertragen. Merkwürdigerweise "flüchtete" sie in den Westen. Mit ihrem
Mann machte sie ein paar Tage Urlaub bei bis dahin ungekannten Ver-
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wandten. Am Tage der Vereinigung ging Frau Bahlke in den Garten.
In "ihrem Paradies" hat sie sich "abgeschirmť" - vor der Euphorie der
anderen und der Übermacht der eignen Ängste:
"Oh Gott, was kommt jetzt?!"
Als das Interview im Sommer 1992 entstand, war Frau Bahlke
in Kurzarbeit, aber nicht "Null", wie die Mehrzahl ihrer Kolleginnen.
Síe bediente die italienischen Webautomaten, das Modernste, was die
"Forster Tuchfabriken" zu bieten hatten. Die liefen in rollender Schicht,
wenn ein schmaler, kurzfristiger Auftrag vorlag.
Frau Bahlke ist "gelernter Tuchmacher". Gegen das Ansinnen
der Mutter, den fŭr Frauen so schönen und praktischen Beruf der
Schneiderin zu erlernen, hatte sie diese Ausbildung selbst gewählt und
sich nach einem Arbeitsjahr im ersten Frauensonderlehrgang zur
Webmeisterin ausgebildet. "Immer irgendwie zu begeistern fŭr was
Neues", hielt sie es mit den jungen Lehrmeistern und der "Neuen
Technik", die sie zunächst nur bei Besuchen auf der Leipziger Messe
und in sächsischen Tuchfabriken bewundern konnte. Außer den
Glocken des neuen technischen Zeitalters tönten in der DDR auch die
fŭr eine "Neue gesellschaftliche Stellung der Frau im Sozialismus"
(Frauenkommunique 1961). Und Frau Bahlke, kaum den Meisterbrief
in der Tasche, plante gemeinsam mit den jungen Freunden von der
FDJ einen Angriff auf die befestigste männliche Burg im Werksaal.
Sie bewarb sich nun fŭr eine reguläre Ausbildung zum Stuhlmeister
(Mechaniker). Die Werkleitung beschwor den Arbeitsschutz und lehnte
ab.
Frau Bahlke blieb Webmeisterin, aber nicht irgendeine. Sie
wurde eine, die viel selber an den Stühlen baute, von Kolleginnen mit
skeptischer Bewunderung bedacht:
"Ėrika, du bist unmöglich, was du alles kannst."
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00461236/fr/ 
oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00461236_v1 
Contributeur : Eliane DaphyTextilarbeiterinnen aus der Niederlausitz	 249
Und sie wurde auf diesem Platz eine Protagonistin "im Kampf
um die Beherrschung der neuen Technik" und hat auch in der
"sozialistischen Arbeit (gemeint ist die Brigadebewegung) kräftig
mitgemischt", wie sie formulierte. In dieser Rolle, so würde ich in
Kenntnis des gesamten Interviewtextes sagen, hat sie lange Zeit ihre
Substanz eingesetzt. Spät erst ist sie pragmatisch vorgegangen: Bei
weniger körperlicher Anstrengung bis zur Rente in der Weberei arbeiten
und gut verdienen können, hieß das Ziel dann nüchtern. Nun war auch
diese Perspektive abgestürzt.
"1960 hat die "Erste Forster" neue Webmaschinen bekommen,
das warn die CFG-Stühle, das hieß Großraumstühle. Das hat
mich ganz dolle begeistert und ich war eigentlich ein Mensch
immer für moderne Technik, immer fürs Neuste mit einzusteigen.
So daß ich dort eben als einzigste Frau diese Maschinen einlief.
Es gab viele Probleme... Wurde dann auch ausgezeichnet auf
Grund meiner hartnäckigen Arbeit, die ich da gemacht hab als
Aktivist. Später bekamen wir noch mal neue Webstühle, die hab
ich wieder eingearbeitet und da hab ich denn bis 86 gearbeitet,
also über 20 Jahre auf diesen Großraummaschinen. Dann hieß
das Problem: Die "Forster Tuchfabriken" kauft neue italienische
Webmaschinen, Pignone-Weberei. Frau Bahlke! Ja, Frau Bahlke
is dann wieder nach Cottbus gegangen, dort war eine
Webmaschine, und hat sich mal den Spaß angeguckt und hat
Riesenfreude empfunden. Und ich hab meinen Kollegen gesagt,
wir waren ja zum großen Teil alles Frauen:
Frauen, hier satteln wir noch mal alle um. Das ist nee Arbeit, da
schaffen wir unsere Rente. So. Und ich hab ooch meine Frauen
wirklich so beeindruckt und űberzeuġt, daß wir eben alle in die
Pignone-Weberei übergesattelt sind. So, und nun kam das eben
mit dem Umsturz. Und das hat uns allen ganz schön Kra ft und
Freude zerstört. Weil keiner weiß, bleibt der Betrieb bestehen,
werden wir noch gekündigt."
So lautete die längste, zusammenhängende Passage in der sehr
kurzen freien Erzählung von Frau Bahlke, mit der sie sich am Beginn
des Interviews vorstellte. Ihr hatte sie nur ein paar "harte" Fakten zur
Kindheit voran- und den Hinweis auf die drei studierten Töchter, die
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"nicht nur Knochenarbeit" machen sollten, hintenangestellt. Dann
schwieg sie. Auf meine Fragen, mit denen ich ein Gespräch am Laufen
zu halten suchte, antwortete sie knapp und kontrolliert.
Frau Bahlke schirmte sich ab, im Gespräch ebenso wie vor dem
Erleben (müssen) des Einbruchs neuer Realitäten und des Zusammen-
bruchs alter Verhältnisse und Konstruktionen, deren I-łinfálligkeit sie
so nicht gesehen hatte, in denen sie aber schon lange um einen ideellen
Antrieb gekommen und ihr in ihrer politischen Rolle (als Wettbewerbs-
und Parteiaktivistin in der Weberei) nicht viel mehr geblieben war, als
billige Tatsachen nicht zu bemänteln. Mit dem Blick nach vorn hoffte
Frau Bahlke, daß sie auf der schon vorher eingeengten Spur von
Leistungs- und Begeisterungskraft in der Arbeit doch weiterkäme.
Dort, wo weggeworfene Textilien und Abfälle aus den Tuch-
fabriken wieder zerpflückt und zerfasert wurden, wo Gesponnenes und
Gewebtes zerrissen wurden, fand sich Erinnerung als dichter Faden,
der aus der Vergangenheit auch ein Stück weit in die Zukunft lief.
Meine Gesprächspartnerin aus der "Reißwolle" verband in ihren
Iebensġeschichtlichen Erinnerungen das Schicksal eines Zöglings aus
einem Waisenheim zu Anfang unseres Jahrhunderts mit dem von
Kriegsgefangenen im Zweiten Weltkrieges, die Existenz afghanischer
Studenten in der DDR mit ihrer eigenen und diese wiederum mit dem
Waisenheimzőgling. So war sie im Stande und sicher auch in der
(glücklichen) Lage, ihrem Leben Bedeutung zu geben. Zugleich
erscheint in dieser Erzählung die "Reißwolle" als der Ort, wo Frauen
die gesellschaftlich gesetzte Unterschiedlichkeit in der Bewertung und
in der Zeitlogik von Berufs- und Familienarbeit unterliefen, fur sich
außer Kraft setzten. Was sie in ihrem Werksaal eigensinnig als einen
Zwischenboden, als ein Sicherungsnetz fur den Balanceakt zwischen
Beruf und Familie spannten, ging nicht "aufs Ganze", sprengte nicht
den Rahmen der Ausgestaltung einer "Nische". Trotzdem und deshalb
bleibt die Geschichte auch eine darüber, was sein soll.
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"Und an der Schneidemaschine, das ist noch nee Vorstufe zum
Reißer, da wird alles geschnitten, was länger als 40 Zentimeter
ist: Tuche, Kleidungsstücke, Enden, die aus der Weberei
zurückkommen, Zwirnenden und Spinnenden aus der Spinnerei.
Da wird alles kleingeschnitten...Da läuft ein Band lang und vorne
is een Messer, das hackt dann ganz schnell in gleichmäßige
Stücke. Von den Webenden hatten wir mal Wollwebenden, dann
anderes (Material). Jedes Webende hat sich anders verarbeiten
lassen. Und Spinnenden... Und Zwirnenden... Das geht nich alles
gleich gut, so ist das nicht. Aber das wurde eben geschnitten.
Und da war ich dann die letzten sieben oder acht Jahre an der
Schneidemaschine. Und da muß ich auflegen und dann vier
Stufen hoch, in nen Sack springen, eintreten, runter(treten), aus'n
Sack raus, wieder auflegen und so ging das den ganzen Tag."
Vielleicht bane Frau Gawlik (Jg. 1941) ohne meine Nachfrage
am Schluß unseres Gesprächs von dem, was in der Reißwolle ihre Arbeit
war und was dort überhaupt und an welchen Maschinen getan werden
mußte, kaum mehr gesagt als im freien Ten des Interviews am Anfang:
"Wir waren überwiegend Frauen. So viel Männer hatten wir
nicht. Wir hatten nur drei Männer und das kam nicht selten vor,
daß wir doch Säcke von 150, 200 Kilo zu transportieren hatten.
Und das ist natürlich im Laufe der Jahre immer schwerer
geworden (schwerer gefallen). Wenn man jung ist, merkt man
das nicht. Aber die ganzen Jahre..."
Frau Gawlik hat 30 Jahre in der Tuchfabrik gearbeitet, 19 Jahre
davon in der Reißwolle. Zum Zeitpunkt unseres Gesprächs ist weder
ihre Weiterbeschäftigung gesichert noch die Existenz der Reißwolle,
nunmehr ein privates Unternehmen. Aber erst am Ende des Interviews
kam Frau Gawlik auf die aktuelle Situation direkt zu sprechen. Davor
rekonstruierte sie ihre Lebensgeschichte ohne Zurückhaltung, ohne sich
als Privatperson abzuschotten, zeigte sich wenig irritiert von den
Unwägbarkeiten und Umwertungen der neuen Gegenwart. Was hinter
ihr lag, teilte sie in eine Zeit, die sie "lieber streichen möchte" und in
eine "schöne Zeit, die nie, nie wieder kommt".
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Nach Landwirtschaftslehre und Arbeit in der Glasindustrie kam
Frau Gawlik durch ihre Heirat 1961 von Dorf in die Stadt, nach Forst.
Die Ehe "zerfiel", wie sie es bezeichnete, nach drei Jahren. Als
alleinstehende Frau mit zwei kleinen Kindern geriet sie in einen Strudel
aus finanzieller Not, sozialer Mißachtung und sinkendem
Selbstwertgefühl. Sie wäre, wie sie sagt, "ooch lieber immer mit
einunddemselben Mann ins Bett gegangen, aber das hat nun mal nich
geklappt".
Was sich ergab, war ein drittes Kind, war das Stigma eines losen
Weibes und einer Arbeitsbummelantin, die die Krankheiten der Kinder
vorschob oder eingekackte Windeln bei Unpünktlichkeit. Was sich
abspielte, war das Abputzen durch den Meister, lautstark und vor allen
Kollegen in der Weberei. Die Weber, das waren damals mehrheitlich
Männer, und sie war zu allem noch eine Hilfskraft, die das Garn
aufsteckte. Was ablief, war ein Leben, wo oft kein Pfennig mehr im
Haus war. Nicht nur die Krankheitstage der Kinder, von denen damals
noch kein einziger bezahlt wurde, reihten sich aneinander. Frau Gawlik
erkrankte auch selber schwer und fur längere Zeit.
"Und dann die Kinder und kein Geld und niemand, wo man
hingekommen ist, da war eben keine T űr, die sich offgemacht
hat."
Die betriebliche Konfliktkommission saß über sie zu Gericht
und desgleichen "fúnf alte Butzelmänner, älter als Steinkohle" von der
Partei. Denen sollte sie erklären, warum sie als Tochter eines
Kommunisten seit Monaten keine Beiträge zahlte. Deren Starrheft
quittierte sie mit: "Das ist nich das Erbe unserer Väter!" Dabei hatte
sie wohl das Bild ihres 1951 verstorbenen Vaters vor Augen, das auch
heute noch in ihr ist: Ein Arbeiter in einer Munitionsfabrik, der in seinem
ausgepolsterten Buckel Medikamente fur die dort eingesetzten
Kriegsgefangenen schleuste - auch in Erinnerung an das eigene
Ausgeliefertsein als Waisenheimzőgling. Damals noch zu klein, um
zur Zeugin des Tuns ihres Vaters zu werden, war es das spätere Erzählen
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darüber, das Erinnern daran, worüber sie dieses Bíld aufnahm. "Das
hat", meinte Frau Gawlik, "irgendwie den Grundstein bei mir gelegt.
Ich wollte mit dem Eintritt in die Partei (1961, P.C.), wollte ich eben
so handeln wie mein Vater damals gehandelt hat. Aber es ging alles
schief." Sie wurde aus der Partei "gekantet". Aber auf die konnte sie
auch "verzichten".
"Die vier Jahre, wo alles aufn Haufund so klein war", die sind
es, die Frau Gawlik "vielleicht lieber streichen möchte" aus ihrem
Leben, nicht nur wegen der Last, die sie da zu tragen hatte,
sondern weil sie sich eben doch ein bißchen dafúr schämte. Aus
diesen Erfahrungen leitete sie aber auch die Maximen fur ihr
späteres Verhalten in der Arbeit her:
"Und ich hab auch, nachdem meine Kinder groß waren, immer
dank gesorgt im Betrieb, daß diese Mutter (Frauen mit mehreren
Kindern) auch verstanden wurden. Und nicht immer
abgestempelt wurden als lustlos, faul, hinterhältig und sind mit
den Kindern zum Arzt gegangen, um irgendwelche Probleme
zu verbergen."
Die Reißwolle, in die Frau Gawlik 1973 nach dem Verlust eines
Auges wechselte, wurde die Insel, auf der sie diese Flagge hißte, über
uralten Maschinen und in staubiger Luft.
Abgesprengt vom Hauptwerk lag sie, gut geeignet zur Unterbringung
alkoholabhängiger Männer als Hilfsarbeiter, letzte Möglichkeit fur
Frauen mit Kindern einschichtig arbeiten zu können, gewohnte
Umgebung fur die, die dort alt geworden waren.
Hier hatten Frauen die Arbeit und die Posten, das Sagen und das
Sorgen. Im Dreigespann, eine Polin als Meisterin, Frau Gawlik als
Gewerkschaftsvertrauensfrau, eine Mutter mit 6 Kindern als Gleich-
gesinnte, zogen sie es durch, daß niemand wegen Leistungsschwäche
auf Grund von Kindern, Suff, körperlicher oder geistiger Mattigkeit
ausgegrenzt wurde und "Fehler nicht hochgespielt werden". "Die
wurden eben eingebaut in unser Leben mit." Frau Gawlik hatte dazu
ein paar Geschichten parat und resümierte:
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"Wissen Sie, das war nee sehr, sehr schöne Zeit, nee Zeit, die
nie nie wiederkommt. Nicht deshalb, weil unsere Brigade
zerfallen ist, sondern ganz einfach, weil die Zeit jetzt viel zu
schnellebig und zu herrschsüchtig ist. Das war damals nicht der
Fall. Wir hatten für einander Zeit."
Die tragende Säule der lebensgeschichtlichen Konstruktion von
Frau Gawlik war Mitmenschlichkeit. Die machte sie nicht an Frauen
fest, hatte sie aber als Frau vermißt und gelebt. Sie suchte sie, als der
veränderte gesellschaftliche Kontext das in ihrer Arbeitswelt scheinbar
nicht mehr zuließ, in der Kirche. Sie vollzog ihren Wiedereintritt in
diesen Raum nach der Wende nicht zuletzt wegen ihrer Enkelin, deren
Vater Afghane ist. Noch vor der Wende hatte sie das Kind in einem
katholischen Kindergarten untergebracht, weil sie es da bedingungslos
angenommen wußte. Angesichts des wachsenden Fremdenhasses wollte
sie erst recht seine Begleiterin bleiben, eine, die zu Zweifeln keinen
Anlaß gibt. Síe meinte: "Man vergibt sich nichts, wenn man die Hände
faltet."
Ich erzählte Geschichten von Frauen aus einer Industrie, einem Ort,
auf den die Lasten einer dirigistischeπ Wirtschaft mit ihrem Mangel
und ihrer Favorisierung der sogenannten Gruňdlagenindustrien nach-
haltig fielen. Es sind Geschichten von Frauen aus einer Generation,
über die zu DDR-Zeiten das Bild vom Aufbruch durch Berufsarbeit
geleimt war. Dieser Generation war tatsächlich erstmals der Einstig in
qualifizierte Berufsarbeit möglich. Viele Frauen entwickelten auf
diesem Weg ihr Selbstverständnis, ihr Selbstbild stärker an „männli-
chen" Maßgaben in Hinblick auf Lebensleistung und Arbeitsleben.
Die Geschichte von Frau Bahlke ist ein davon. Die anderen Geschichten
sind Geschichten von solchen, die „zurückgeblieben" sind. Sie sprechen
vom Verharren in z. T. erbärmlichen Arbeitsbedingungen und sie
zeugen von einem stillen Beharren auf eigenen Bedürfnissen und
Vorstellungen als Frauen, die den Rahmen der kollektiven
Ausgestaltung einer „Nische" nicht sprengen. Von diesem Stoff ist
die letzte Geschichte. Trotzdem und zugleich ist sie auch eine von
dem, was sein soll.
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La modernίsation des ateliers de finition aux Usines
Peugeot de Sochaux (1989-1993)
Michel Píaloux
Je vais faire un récit de ce qui s'est passé pendant trois ans dans
certains ateliers d'OS de l'Usine de Sochaux (les ateliers de finition
dans lesquels travaillent environ 2000 ouvriers) et évoquer les diverses
tentatives qui ont été faites pour réformer une main-d'oeuvre déjà âgée
(beaucoup travaillaient dans l'Usine depuis une quinzaine d'années)
pour promouvoir un nouveau modèle d'organisation de travail (en
référence au "modèle" japonais), pour impulser une nouvelle "culture",
à la faveur d'une opération de délócalisatíon et de modernisation de
ces ateliers reconstruits à environ deux kilomètres. L'opération s'est
étendue sur trois ans, (on a construit successivement deux ateliers dits
d'habillage-caisse, couramment appelés HC1 et HC2), a connu des
vicissitudes diverses, et en gros a débouché sur un échec - ou sur un
résultat qui, du point de vue de la Direction, a été traité comme tell.
Ce travail s'est d'abord fondé sur l'idée qu'il fallait tenir
ensemble des considérations qui sont habituellement disjointes
(notamment dans la réflexion des économistes du travail, des
sociologues du travail et des experts en organisation ):
- d'une part celles qui touchent aux transformations économiques,
techniques, organisationnelles survenant dans les entreprises,
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- d'autre part celles qui touchent aux formes de conscience de
soi et de représentation de soi, que les agents construisent, et notamment
aux formes de conscience politique ou syndicale, aux stratégies de
valorisation de soi que les agents parviennent à conduire dans un espace
social qui ne peut jamais être circonscrit à celui de l'Usine.
I -Terrain, techniques et méthodes
L'Usine de Sochaux est la plus grande Usine de France : elle a
eu près de 42000 salariés en 1979 et en 1990 elle en a environ 20000.
La plupart des salariés de l'Usine pensent qu'elle en aura environ 15000
au début du 21 ème siècle. Parmi les salariés on compte 14000 ouvriers
environ dont 11000 sont non qualifiés et 3000 qualifiés. Le nombre
des E.T.A.M. s'élève à 5000 et celui des cadres à 1000.
Il n'est pas possible évidemment de faire une analyse même
résumée dė l'histoire de l'Usine et du Bassin d'emploi. Or la
connaissance de cette histoire est absolument indispensable à  la
compréhension des événements actuels. On pourrait en schématisant
beaucoup, distinguer quatre périodes depuis 1960 ;
- celle du "taylorisme triomphant" de 1960 à 1977/78 - qu'on
pourrait facilement décomposer en deux phases : avant 1968
("paternalisme") et après 68 (croissance très rapide et efforts de la part
de la Direction pour extirper l'influence des syndicats».)
- une époque de transition, de crise aiguë ; de 1978 à 1983 :
avant l'arrivée de Calvet la firme risque de "plonger". Des modifications
très profondes surviennent : absorption de Citroën, de Simca-Chrysler,
etc. L'endėttement est énorme. Mévente des véhicules. Les problèmes
de qualité se trouvent brutalement posés, etc.
- de 1984 à 1990, rétablissement et redémarrage sur de nouvelles
bases technologiques et organisationnelles, (rétablissement de la santé
économique de la firme), décision de transformer le site de Sochaux,
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robotisation qui va toucher d'abord l'emboutissage et les presses, puis
la carrosserie...
- les années 1999-93 : époque d'incertitude et de remise en
question : après la guerre du Golfe une "cassure" survient qui se traduit
notamment par la chute de la production, le licenciement de tous les
intérimaires présents sur le site et la recherche de nouveaux moyens
d'augmenter la productivité.
Quant à la transformation des structures du groupe ouvrier
quelques faits, parmi les plus marquants, doivent d'emblée être
soulignés :
- la diminution numérique et symbolique du groupe des
professionnels, des O.P. Ce groupe qui dans les années 50 et 60 jouait
un rôle essentiel perd de sa force. Le nombre des O.P. va passer de
6000 à environ 3000. Leur vieillissement s'est beaucoup accentué : le
pôle ancien de l'Outillage Central, un des "fiefs" des OP, s'est
progressivement déstructuré. Autrefois l'Usine produisait dės moteurs
et des machines outils, la disparition progressive de ces secteurs se
traduit par l'amoindrissement de la force d'un groupe professionnel
qui jouait un rôle capital dans la représentation que le groupe ouvrier
dans son ensemble avait de lui-même ; les O.P. se trouvent "laminés"
entre d'une part les O.S. et d'autre part les techniciens. Ce fait produit
un ensemble de conséquences en chaîne, par exemple, de nombreuses
possibilités de promotion qui s'ouvraient aux O.s. disparaissent.  Il n'est,
pour eux, plus guère possible de "monter" dans l'Usine (en passant des
"essais"...). Le modèle d'excellence sociale et professionnelle que les
O.P. incarnaient disparaît, etc.
- la montée des techniciens : ceux-ci sont de plus en plus
nombreux surtout à partir de 85/86 ; ils apparaissent en rupture totale,
par leur formation, avec les anciens professionnels. Recrutés d'ailleurs
d'une manière tout à fait différente relevant d'un univers mental et
social très différent ; ils incarnent de nouveaux modèles d'excellence
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professionnelle (et aussi sociale), fondés sur la possession d'un savoir
technique très différent de celui des anciens OP.
- le vieillissement des O.S.: leur poids va croissant dans l'Usine
même si cette croissance est contemporaine d'une dévalorisation
symbolique du groupe. La plupart d'entre eux ont été recrutés dans les
années 60 et 70, ils sont souvent d'origine rurale (au départ ils étaient
payés 30 ou 50 % plus cher que dans les usines environnantes. Un
problème central est celui de leur vieillissement). Un fait majeur est
aussi que l'Usine de montage cesse d'être une usine "complète" dans
laquelle les voitures construites parcourent toutes les étapes du
processus. L'effet de vieillissement se trouve d'ailleurs renforcé par la
suppression des deux classes d'âge extrêmes : les plus jeunes du fait de
l'absence d'embauche et les plus âgés du fait des départs en préretraite.
Pour les membres de ce groupe, l'avenir se rétrécit de plus en plus,
l'espace des possibles se réduit.
II - Le passage aux nouveaux ateliers
Le passage de l'ancienne finition (НСО) aux nouveaux ateliers
d'habillage-caisse, HCI et HC2 s'étend sur trois ans environ (depuis
le printemps 89 jusqu'au printemps 92) et s'opère sans que la production
s'arrête un seul jour. Deux mille ouvriers environ passent d'ateliers
archaïques, sales, bruyants - qui avaient été construits dans les années
30, modifiés dans les années 50 - ou les chaînes sont très rapprochées
les unes des autres et où le système de travail a longtemps été rigidement
taylorien, à des ateliers immenses, clairs, lumineux qui ressemblent
plus à un hall d'aéroport (ils sont peints en jaune et bleu) qu'à une
usine de type classique. Les conditions dans lesquelles ce "transfert" a
lieu changent considérablement dans le temps et plus précisément les
conditions dans lesquelles ces ouvriers sont sélectionnés, formés,
installés sur de nouveaux postes de travail, et les conditions dans
lesquelles de nouveaux "groupes de travail" sont mis en place. Au début,
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en 1989, les ouvriers qui partent à 1-iC 1 sont jeunes, ont été sélectionnés
par la maîtrise, ont souvent été choisis parmi les anciens intérimaires
qui viennent d'être embauchés en fixe. Deux ans et demi plus tard, en
1992, les derniers ouvriers qui partent à НС2 le font par petits groupes,
leur formation est assurée en une deıní-journée, ils sont beaucoup plus
vieux et "transportent" avec eux la plupart de valeurs et des systèmes
pratiques de l'ancien atelier de finition...
Un nouveau type de travail?
Ces nouveaux ateliers se distinguent des anciens sous trois
rapports :
- sous le rapport technologique. 11 y a des changements
significatifs : l'installation de robots ou de zones robotisées (ces robots
mettent par exemple en place les planches de bord, certaines vitres,
etc.) a fait disparaître certaines opérations particulièrement pénibles
mais il n'y a pas de véritable bouleversement technique. La Direction
avait annoncé en 1988 que 40% des postes de travail seraient robotisés.
En fait c'est seulement 20% qui le sont. Et autour le nombre de postes
dits de "préparation" hors-chaîne s'est accru. La ligne elle-même n'est
pas profondément transformée. Certaines modifications mineures sont
introduites par exemple introduction d'une "luge", introduction d'un
tapis roulant, etc.
- sous le rapport organisation du travail et de la production. Le
système de flux tendus flexibles qui existait déjà est amélioré. On en
connaît le principe : un nombre très élevé de pièces en provenance des
"équipementiers" sont apportées par une noria de camions jusqu'aux
ateliers de montage où elles sont immédiatement montées. il s'agit de
diminuer le plus possible les stocks, y compris celui des voitures en
cours de montage tout en étant capable de satisfaire aux à-coups de la
demande. On attend également que des "réactions en chaîne" se
produisent, qui affecteront l'état d'esprit et la disponibilité de l'ensemble
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des salariés. Le thème majeur est ici celui de l'introduction de la
"flexibilité" et de la "disponibilité".
- mais surtout í1 y a eu la volonté de la part de la Direction de
tirer parti de cette rénovation technico-organisationnelle, pour réformer
en profondeur le système d'attitudes des salariés. Ou plutôt pour
accélérer cette transformation parce que celle-ci avait déjà été lancée
dans les années 85/86. Le raisonnement de la Direction était du type :
les ouvriers de ces ateliers sont en train de vieillir, il faut lancer quelque
chose de très fort qui permette de transformer, à court ou à long tėrme,
les systèmes d'attitudes. Tout un dispositif s'est donc mis en place qui
au départ s'organisait - sur le papier - autour d'un stage de trois semaines
hors de l'Usine même, dans un château (Morvillars) situé à une
quinzaine de kilomètres de l'Usine de Sochaux.
L'idée de base était la suivante : les ouvriers doivent être
"extraits" des anciens ateliers un par un, regroupés en de nouvelles
"structures" (ou "modules" placés sous l'autorité d'un chef d'équipe
(les appellations sont changées) et d'un moniteur. Ces nouveaux
"modules" n'ont strictement rien à voir avec les anciennes "équipes".
Les ouvriers participent donc à ce stage puis sont réinstallés dans les
nouveaux ateliers. Au cours de ce stage ils ne reçoivent pas de formation
proprement technique mais sont invités à écouter des exposés à la fois
informatifs et moralisateurs. On leur explique notamment que leurs
conditions de travail vont être améliorées et n'auront que peu à voir
avec les anciennes. On leur demande également de signer une "charte"
dont les thèmes principaux sont : je serai toujours disponible, volontaire;
je comprendrai ce qu'il en est des besoins de mon entreprise ; je ne
ferai aucune déclaration qui puisse po rter atteinte au crédit de celle-ci,
etc.
Et on réinstalle les salariés dans le nouvel atelier où, en bref, le
travail n'a pas. fondamentalement changé, même si l'espace à été
réorganisé d'une manière toute nouvelle : les interdits sont nombreux
(notamment boire ou fumer sur les chaines) ; de nouvelles obligations
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(être habillé tous de la même manière, tutoyer les chefs), de nouvelles
règles de sociabilité, sont imposées, etc. il s'agit d'agir à la fois sur le
corps et l'esprit des nouveaux "opérateurs".
Sans entrer dans une véritable analyse je voudrais évoquer
quelques points qui me paraissent importants.
I1 faut évidemment replacer ces processus dans un cadre plus
large, celui de la stratégie des entreprises de "automobile. Il faudrait
repartir de ce qui se passe dans "ensemble des grandes firmes de
l'automobile, en France comme en Europe, des contraintes qui leurs
sont imposées et qui sont donc aussi imposées aux managers de chaque
unité de production. Plus précisément í1 faudrait repartir des conditions
dans lesquelles s'est diffusé le "modèle" japonais (toyotisme ?), des
conditions dans lesquelles un certain type de pratiques a tendu à
s'imposer (rôle des consultants...) pratiques qui A un moment en
viennent à considérées comme les seules vraiment efficaces. Les
économistes (cf. les théoriciens de la régulation) font bien comprendre
sous quelles contraintes travaillent les managers, comment la peur de
perdre des parts de marché tenaille les Directions, etc. D'autre pa rt le
schème de l'innovation organisationnelle est bien connu : le marché
entre dans l'Usine, "Taylor va au marché". Des changements capitaux
surviennent dans la demande, les modèles sont de plus en plus variés,
Ies firmes sont contraintes de réagir très vite A ces changements dans la
demande, etc. Si l'on se place du point de vue de l'entreprise, les choses
sont claires : pour se maintenir dans la compétition í1 faut d'une pa rt,
un autre type d'usine dans laquelle le rapport entre salariés, machines
et agents dė commandement se trouve réorganisé d'une nouvelle façon,
de telle manière que l'Usine devienne plus "réactive", plus capable de-
s'adapter extrêmement vite au marché ; d'autre part un autre type de
main-d'oeuvre, sensiblement différent sans qu'on puisse dire avec
précision quelle doit être l'ampleur de ce changement, qui doit être
concerné, mais il est clair que la main-d'oeuvre est perçue comme
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Toutes les innovations organisationnelles (flux tendus, absence
de stock, "lean production", management participatif) découlent de là:
un fait majeur est, notamment, qu'un nombre croissant de pièces, (70 à
80% ?), doivent être amenéeś d'entreprises externes et que de nouveaux
rapports doivent s'établir avec les sous-traitants et les équipementiers.
Il faut insister sur le fait que dans les ateliers de finition de
Sochaux ie mouvement de transformation des processus de travail était
engagé depuis plusieurs années, en gros depuis 84 ou 85. (C'est même
sur ces processus-là que j'avais focalisé mon attention après avoir
travaillé avec C. Corouge et c'est sur ce processus que j'avais rassemblé
de nombreux matériaux, aussi bien entretiens que documents). En ces
années-là de quoi s'agissait t-il ? Avant tout, de la mise en place de
l'auto-contrôle : les ouvriers devaient contrôler pour une part la qualité
de leur production et ne plus déléguer cette tâche aux "contrôleurs".
Enfin il faut insister sur ce point capital qu'a été  la présence au
cours des années 88/89 de très nombreux intérimaires dans les ateliers
de montage et tout particulièrement en finition. Ceux-ci vont rester IA
jusqu'en septembre 90. ils constituent une sorte de vivier pour le
management. Plus largement la Direction pense que ces intérimaires
(dont beaucoup ont été recrutés dans le Nord et l'Ouest de la France.)
ont un système de dispositions très différent de celui des anciens ouvriers
de Sochaux : elle va chercher à en tirer parti : elle va, par exemple,
tenter de recruter des moniteurs parmi ces anciens intérimaires.
HG] : flux tendus et disponibilité
Je voudrais reprendre le récit que j'ai esquissé plus haut. Cela
m'amènera à mettre "accent sur le fait que,. même si on regarde les
choses "de haut", les réactions et les attitudes des ouvriers à leur nouvel
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Au début, au printemps 1989, au moment du "démarrage" des
nouveaux ateliers tout se passe très bien. L'entreprise est servie par les
circonstances : on est, au niveau national et régional, dans une phase
de croissance forte. De très nombreux intérimaires comme je l'ai dit,
sont présents dans l'Usine. La Direction peut sélectionner parmi eux.
Chez les managers il existe à ce moment une croyance forte dans le
"participatif" (c'est le moment où les Directions du personnel sont
transformées en DRH, Directions des Ressources Humaines).
En septembre 1989, environ 300 salariés sont déjà présents dans
le nouvel atelier HC I. Mais íl ne s'agit pas de n'importe quels ouvriers;
ce sont des jeunes, "des battants" soigneusement choisis. Les ateliers
nouveaux fascinent et inquiètent à la fois. Au yeux de tous lės salaries,
ils incarnent le renouveau de l'entreprise après une période de très
forte inquiétude. Ces "élus" signent, sans la moindre réticence, la
"charte" que leur propose la maîtrise, s'engagent à être "disponibles",
etc. Il acceptent la polyvalence. La plupart apparaissent fascinés par la
perspective de la modernité, et également par les espoirs de promotion
professionnelle au niveau individuel et collectif que celle-ci doit
permettre. A ce moment les militants syndicaux pensent (et disent) :
"les salariés qui partent pour ces ateliers sont complètement perdus
pour nous".
Puis survient la grève de septembre/octobre 89. Partie. de
Mulhouse, elle gagne assez vite Sochaux. Événement impo rtant dans
l'histoire de l'Usine, elle est très populaire en France : on dit qu'il n'y
pas eu de grève aussi populaire depuis celle des mineurs, en 1963. Un
fait frappant est que les 300 ouvriers déjà entrés à  He 1 n'y participent
pas, alors que les ouvriers de l'ancienne finition et plus largement ceux
de la carrosserie non seulement y participent dans leur très grande
majorité mais en sont les éléments moteurs.
A partir de novembre/décembre 1989 surviennent les premières
difficultés à HC1. Dans un climat social largement transformé par le
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grève, le flux d'arrivants nouveaux en provenance de l'ancienne finition
continue à se développer. La Direction oblige au "volontariat".
Les problèmes techniques sont nombreux et entraînent des pannes
très longues, les nouvelles installations n'apparaissent pas fiables.
Problème du sol qui se déplace, problème de la température dans les
ateliers, problème des équipementiers et des fournisseurs qui ne se
sont pas immédiatement adaptés à la nouvelle situation, etc. La
conséquence est giıe des pannes très longues surviennent qui freinent
oui désorganisent le flúx de production.
Le début de l'année 1990 est marqué par le développement d'une
micro-conflíctualité giıi prend des formes nouvelles : insatisfaction
croissante des opérateurs, conflits pernıanents et multiformes qui
surgissent sans cesse. Des difficultés surviennent également dans le
fonctionnement des nouveaux "groupes de travail". Après une phase
de relative acceptation de ceux-ci, une sorte de refus larvé apparaît :
refus de se plier aux nouvelles exigences du groupe, d'accepter le
tutoiement, de vivre la "promiscuité" avec les agents de maîtrise. La
plupart des ouvriers éprouvent le sentiment d'être dépossédés de
l'espace dont ils se sentaient autrefois relativement maîtres : par
exemple problème des objets pėrsonnels, de la bouteille d'eau qu'on
ne peut conserver sur son poste de travail, du petit frigo qu'on a installé
à côté de son poste de travail, etc2.
Après des pannes très longues, de trois à quatre heures,  la
Direction essaie de solliciter des volontaires pour rester et rattraper le
temps perdu : presque toujours c'est l'échec. Dans les deux ateliers,
l'ancien et le nouveau il y a en fait un autre usage du temps et de
l'espace. Les militants après la grève apparaissent "regonflés" et
agressifs, ils lancent pendant les stages à Morvillars de véritables défis
aux agents de maîtrise qui sont souvent maladroitement relevés. Le
mécontentement lié à la gestion des primes collectives s'accroît
entraînant souvent de la discorde dans les nouveaux groupes de travail,
très préjudiciable à la qualité.
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En même temps beaucoup d'ouvriers éprouvent de la satisfaction
à travailler dans un espace plus propre, plus lumineux et dans lequel
certaines formes de travail particulièrement pénible ont été supprimées...
Cependant, globalement, la nouvelle organisation tend à être de plus
en plus nettement mise en cause. Les conséquences sont évidentes sur
la qualité des produits ; la détérioration de la qualité se traduit dans le
fait que des "contrôleurs" et des "retoucheurs" sont réintroduits (en
bout de chaîne) et que le poids du service de contrôle de la qualité
(autonomisé et géré depuis Paris) va rapidement croissant (en même
temps que de nouvelles techniques de mesure de cette qualité sont mises
en oeuvre : système du "démérite", généralisation des audits, etc).
Mars 90 : élection des D.P. (délégués du personnel). Forte
poussée de la C.G.T. qui surprend tout le monde, et d'abord les militants
qui avaient eu très peur d'être éliminés de ces ateliers (en Mars 91, la
C.G.T. enregistrera de nouveaux progrès )
Septembre 90 : à la suite de la récession liée à la guerre du Golfe
un événement capital survient, le renvoi des intérimaires qui va entraîner
une succession de mutations des anciens ateliers vers Ies nouveaux
ateliers, et notamment vers habillage-caisse...
En même temps, tout au long de l'année 90 et de l'année 91 la
Direction continue à faire venir un par un des ouvriers de l'ancienne
finition, en cherchant à constituer à chaque fois de nouveaux "groupes",
formés d'individus qui jusqu'alors n'avaient aucune relation de travail.
Les anciennes solidarités sont systématiquement rompues. Seulement
peu à peu ce sont des ouvriers plus âgés, plus proches du pôle militant,
de la culture militante qui sont envoyés vers le nouvel atelier. Les vieux
"militants" (et Ies vieux "hein-hein" au sens de Durand) ne partent que
les tout derniers, par peur de la "contamination" : la plupart des ouvriers
sont conscients que cette peur de ia "contamination" est très présente
chez les cadres qui gèrent la main-d'oeuvre...
C'est ainsi qu'on se retrouve à peu près dans la situation évoquée
dans Ies textes que nous avons publiés, S. Beaud et moi en 1993,
dans la "Misère du monde". La Direction tente, coûte que coûte,
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d'imposer de nouvelles formes de vie sociale, de vie de "groupe".
Le résultat est qu'il finit par exister dans les ateliers une
"ambiance pourrie" que les militants n'ont pas créée, même s'ils
tentent de 1"exploiter". Le fait majeur est l'existence de pannes
multiples et le refus larvé de la plupart des ouvriers de se plier
aux nouvelles exigences, à la nouvelle discipline. Le travail fourni
est considéré comme de mauvaise qualité : négligences, oublis...
11 faut "assurer le flux" coûte que coûte. C'est sur la petite maîtrise
(chefs d'équipe et moniteurs) que retombe pour une large pa rt le
poids de cette responsabilité. Cela va déboucher notamment sur
l'obligation de faire revenir toutes les 605 à Sochaux parce que
les défauts sont très nombreux, défauts qui concernent surtout
les faisceaux électriques (dans les nouvelles voitures la
multiplication de ces faisceaux est un fait frappant).
Le "peuplement" de НС2 : repli tactique
ou retour en arrière?
A la fin de 1991 et au début de 1992 c'est le début du peuplement"
du deuxième atelier, HC2. 900 salaries vont progressivement qui tter
l'ancienne finition pour se diriger vers НС2, atelier dont l'organisation
est absolument identique à celle de HCI.
Ici on pourrait parler (en se plaçant du point de vue de la
Direction) d'une sorte de reculade, de retour en arrière. En effet les
choses ne se déroulent pas du tout comme elle s'étaient déroulées au
moment du peuplement d'HCI. Tout se passe comme si la Direction
avait fait une sorte de bilan critique de ce que qui s'était passé dans le
premier atelier. Schématiquement elle s'aperçoit que si elle veut "sauver
les meubles" et obtenir un niveau minimal de qualité elle doit
profondément modifier sa stratégie, cesser d'imposer des méthodes
qui sont en train de produire un effet inverse de celui escompté.
Cependant elle sait bien qu'il est impossible de revenir en arrière, de
revenir à une forme d'organisation rigidement taylorienne. Elle va donc
effectuer une sorte de repli tactique imposé par les circonstances. Trois
ensembles de faits apparaissent ici significatifs :
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Le stage de Morvillars dont la durée avait d'abord été réduite à
une semaine est complètement supprimé. Suppression également de
toute référence à la charte. A la fin la "préparation" se réduit à une
demi journée de stage pendant laquelle la maîtrise fait visiter le nouvel
atelier à de petits groupes...
Les ouvriers quittent l'ancienne finition en groupes compacts,
en "équipes" d'une quinzaine de personnes, telles qu'elles étaient déjà
constituées dans l'ancien atelier. Et la hiérarchie veille
systématiquement à ce que tous les membres d'une "équipe" soient
présents. Autrement dit les anciennes équipes ne sont plus dispersées
mais transférées "en bloc". Mais cela se fait à peu près sans
commentaires, sans justifications : personne ne théorise cette pratique,
ne s'explique vraiment à son sujet...
Dans l'atelier une logique de "tolérance" s'établit, qui peut faire,
à certains égards, penser à celle de l'ancienne finition. Un certain type
de comportements qu'on avait, deux ans plus tôt, impérativement
prescrits est remis en cause. Les anciens interdits (ne pas fumer, ne pas
manger à son poste, porter les deux pièces de la combinaison vert fluo,
etc.) ne sont plus imposés de la même manière et dans une large mesure
ne sont plus respectés. On assiste à un retour des anciennes pratiques.
Par exemple on voit revenir les bouteilles de bière, de pastis : les
boissons alcoolisées sont consommées dans une demi-clandestinité.
Tous les témoignages confirment que "l'ambiance a changé", à certains
égards le "climat" de l'ancienne finition se trouve reconstitué. On
pourrait parler de l'établissement d'un nouveau "compromis" entre
Direction maîtrise et ouvriers.
Pourtant le travail se révèle de plus en plus pénible : i1 ne fait
pas de doute qu'il y a intensification du travail. Le même mot revient
dans la bouche de tout le monde, y compris des agents de maîtrise :
"les postes sont de plus en plus durs", "on tire sur les postes en
permanence" ; les ouvriers ont l'impression que des opérations sont
sans cesse rajoutées à celles qu'ils font déjà. D'autre part la pression
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sur les malades, la lutte contre l'absentéisme se fait très forte, les visites
à domicile se font plus nombreuses, etc. Tout cela oblige les moniteurs
à tenir de nombreux postes, à "courir partout", tout au long de la journée.
Sí les ouvriers peuvent se réinsérer dans l'ancienne logique taylorienne
les moniteurs, eux, doivent rester "disponibles"...
On constate également que des mutations de poste surviennent
continuellement. Sans cesse arrivent en finition des salariés d'autres
ateliers, qui sont le plus souvent des gens âgés - d'où des conflits qui
naissent autour de la question des primes, comme autour de l'affectation
à un poste plus ou moins pénible. A la limite tout se passe comme si le
management disait aux salariés : vous avez voulu rester dans un schéma
taylorien, vous allez y rester, mais vous devrez payer en conséquence...
On ne sera pas surpris de constater qu'il existe une forte tension
entre les exigences de la Direction nationale de PSA, telles qu'elles
sont formulées à Paris qui impose une amélioration de la productivité
de 10 ou 12 % par an et la Direction locale qui doit, avec les hommes
dont elle dispose, s'efforcer d'obtenir de la "qualité",'une qualité
minimale...
III - Démoralisation, désarroi et versatilité
Peut-on parler de victoire ouvrière ? Certainement pas, bien qu'il
y ait eu incontestablement un recul de la part du management. Il suffit
de penser à l'intensification très nette du travail... Peut-on dire que la
vieille "culture ouvrière", l'ancienne "culture d'atelier" a repris le dessus
face à un modèle culturel imposé, bâti en référence aux méthodes
japonaises de management? Oui et non. Oui, parce que les ouvriers ont
bien perçu le recul opéré par la Direction sur les questions d'autonomie,
de marge de manoeuvre au poste de travail, sur les formes. les plus
voyantes d'une imposition. Non, parce que cette victoire les ouvriers
ne l'ont pas assumée, et ne pouvaient l'assumer : ils voyaient trop bien
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quel était le revers de ia médaille : l'aggravation, sous une forme
"classique", des cadences de travail.
Ce qui m'a surtout et beaucoup frappé, c'est plutôt l'intensité
du désarroi des salariés (sur fond de peur), leurs oscillations leurs
revirements, leur versatilité. C'est au fond l'impossibilité, où ils sont
désormais, d'avoir - compte tenu de la forme que revêt la modernisation
de leurs ateliers - une position stable, liée à une argumentation qu'il
puissent vraiment assumer dans le temps. C'est la perte de repères
fixes, stables, d'objectifs clairs par rapport auxquels ils pourraient
notamment, envisager d'organiser une action collective. C'est aussi le
fait que cette situation d'indécision s'étend à presque toutes les sphères
de leur comportement. C'est le fait qu'il n'est plus possible par exemple,
pour l'observateur extérieur, de scinder ėn deux ou trois grands "blocs"
la population des salariés ( comme on pouvait encore le faire jusqu'en
85/86 ) sur des critères politiques ou para-politiques, c'est le fait qu'une
sorte d'inquiétude "existentielle" (en un sens large) est pa rtout présente.
Pendant longtemps il y avait eu clairement à Sochaux des
"peugeotistes" (10% ?) et des "antipeugeotistes" caractérisés (10% ?).
Entre les deux s'étendait une gamme d'attitudes complexes, de
nombreux ouvriers se déterminant tantôt en relation avec le pôle Peugeot
tantôt avec le pôle syndical. ii y avait également un système de coupures
franches : entre O.S. et O.P., entre agents de maîtrise et ouvriers, etc.
Au début des années 90, c'est l'ensemble de ce "système" qui tend à
se brouiller. Les anciennes références se fissurent, sont prises en défaut
par ceux-là même qui en sont les tenants. Certaines fidélités demeurent
mais on peut s'interroger à leur sujet. La peur face à l'avenir est de
plus en plus présente et oblige à un réajustement continu des attitudes
et à une sorte de reconstruction des identités. Chez presque tous les
salariés il y a au fond oscillation entre deux tentations :
- celle de jouer le jeu de l'Usine, d'accepter certaines des
propositions de l'Usine, de les prendre au sérieux (ou de ne p as les
rejeter trop vite) de ne pas refuser à priori, par exemple, l'implication
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dans les nouveaux "groupes". Et cela pour plusieurs raisons, à partir
de l'implication dans différentes logiques, mais au fond plus par peur
que par adhésion profonde.
- celle de se replier sur les modes (et les modèles) anciens de
résistance ouvrière, et notamment la solidarisation avec les délégués
(contestataires, revendicatifs, etc) qui, sur des points essentiels
apparaissent encore souvent comme la seule force de recours, dans
une situation où l'aggravation des conditions de travail est manifeste...
Et cette oscillation se retrouve chez presque tous. Elle dépasse
et transcende les anciens clivages politiques. Elle se retrouve également
chez beaucoup d'agents de maîtrise, etc.
Peut-on aller au delà de ce constat d'un désarroi généralisé? Sans
doute. On retiendra quelques points :
En fait, il faut mettre au centre de l'analyse la question de
l'hétérogénéité (passée et présente) du groupe. En se gardant de penser
qu'on peut raisonner à propos d'un ouvrier abstrait, "générique"
("flexible" ou "postfordiste"). Il faut au contraire d'emblée poser le
problème de la mor holo  íe du groupe ouvrier et de la spécificité des
conditions locales de formation de ce groupe dans une usine ou un
atelier déterminé. Il faut donc réfléchir aux conditions dans lesquelles
groupes et sous-groupes se sont constitués, sur des bases très différentes,
(nationalité, qualification, sexe, âge, etc.) ont réagi au monde, ont
construit des visions du monde, sont passés par des expériences
différentes, etc. Il suffit à cet égard de faire allusion aux problèmes de
"génération"...	 .
il faut procéder à de multiples retours en arrière, invoquer sans
cesse l'histoire. Analyser par exemple aussi bien l'Usine et les
changements techniques qui y surviennent que l'évolution de la firme
en tant que telle, que les migrations depuis des dizaines d'années ou
les changements qui surviennent dans le système de formation. De
multiples critères se composent entre eux pour déterminer l'existence
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de "sous-groupes" spécifiques. Il suffit de faire référence à des
"groupes" comme celui des O.P. ou celui des "imınigrés".
Il faut invoquer des registres d'explication, des logiques de
détermination qui concernent aussi bien l'intérieur de l'Usine (et on
retrouve tous les thèmes que développent économistes et sociologues
du travail : thèmes des changements survenant dans le système
technique, mais aussi thèmes d'une culture politique) que l'extérieur
de l'Usine : l'espace social au sens large, la manière dont le rapport
l'avenir s'y constitue (notamment dans le rapport au système de
formation), les formes complexes et différenciées d'habitat,
d'attachement au pays ou à la région.
Sans prétendre développer l'ensemble de ces points je mettrai
l'accent sur trois faits qui me paraissent essentiels :
- ce qu'il faut d'abord évoquer c'est l'existence dans ces grands
ateliers d'O.S. d'une certaine culture d'atelier qui a pour particularité
d'être nettement politisée, qui est un produit historique, l'héritage d'une
certaine histoire. Sous ce rapport l'atelier de carrosserie est
particulièrement caractéristique. Il se distingue nettement. d'autres
ateliers comme l'emboutissage ou la mécanique. D'emblée, on doit
marquer que cette politisation propre à un atelier est une sorte de réaction 
un ensemble de mesures que la Direction de l'Usine a imposées à
différents moments. Pour comprendre il faudrait sans doute distinguer
d'une part une politisation consciente qui peut s'exprimer en discours
clairs, structurés, chez les militants et ceux qui sont proches du pôle
militant, et ce qu'on pourrait appeler une infra-politisation liée
étroitement aux conditions de travail des O.S. dans ces grands ateliers,
"prise" dans ces conditions de travail...
Il va de soi que, si on voulait vraiment expliquer les formes
concrètes de cette politisation, il faudrait rappeler d'abord ce qu'a été
au long du temps la politisation des O.S. et notamment celle des militants
O.S., le rôle capital qu'ont joué les O.P. dans cette politisation (puisque
c'est autour d'eux que s'était longtemps façonné le système
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d'identification ouvrier dans l'Usine) ; mais aussi la manière dont cette
politisation peut revivre à certains moments et plus particulièrement  la
manière dont elle a revécu dans le contexte de l'après-grève de 89 (qui
pose bien le problème, justement, du rappo rt entre politisation et infra
politisation.)
Il faudrait insister sur la prégnance de cette culture politisée et
sur le rôle central qu'y jouent les délégués. Dans cette logique, on
serait notamment amené à mettre l'accent sur "impo rtance :
-des échanges qui se produisent entre délégués et ouvriers "de
base" : une sorte de "système" qui change dans le temps se trouve
construit, fondé sur des dons et des contre-dons. Échanges de services
et de gratifications symboliques soutenues par une représentation de
ce qu'est et de ce que doit être le "groupe" ouvrier,
-du mode de construction de l'estime de soi et des modalités de
la self-défense, au niveau individuel et collectif,
-du charisme des militants et des conditions qui ont longtemps
permis son apparition, et qui aujourd'hui la permettent de moins en
moins,
-des visions du monde et des schémas cognitifs qui soutenaient
le travail militant et qui aujourd'hui se trouvent atteints dans leur
principe, mais progressivement ( ces schémas cognitifs étaient reliés à
un ensemble de croyances bien spécifiques ).
On constate en bref que, au cours des années 85/93, l'autorité
symbolique des militants syndicaux a cessé d'être ce qu'ėlle avait
longtemps été, qu'elle ne fonctionne plus comme avant, bien qu'elle
fonctionne encore, -notamment parce que les militants sont des
personnalités fortes, des "figures" qui "en imposent", qui sont
respectées. Pour comprendre les traits particuliers de cette culture il
faudrait parler longuement du corps : de ce qu'est le travail, dans son
rapport au corps, de ce qu'est la fatigue, de ce qu'est le vieillissement,
de ce que sont les postures corporelles exigées par le travail en "chaîne".
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II faudrait également parler du rapport à la virilité : pendant longtemps
un corps fort a fonctionné comme ressource identitaire essentielle,
élément capital d'identification. Un aspect central de la
"démoralisation" des années 90 tient certainement au fait que le nouvel
espace de l'atelier ne permet plus à l'ancien rapport au corps de
"fonctionner" comme avant, de s'imposer "naturellement" comme
avant. La concurrence d'autres modèles de rapport au corps apparaît
dans l'espace même de l'atelier. L'aire de repos par exemple est un
lieu "dominé" par les agents de maîtrise et surtout les techniciens, dans
lequel l'ancien rapport au corps ne se perpétue que difficilement;
l'uniforme vert fluo ne peut se porter la même manière que le "bleu"
ancien, etc.
Ce qu' il faut invoquer en deuxième lieu c'est le sentiment qu'ont
la quasi totalité des ouvriers d'une dégradation très nette de leurs
conditions de travail (et d'existence) le sentiment qu'ils ont de ne plus
pouvoir changer grand chose à celles-ci. Et au delà, la perception qu'ils
ont d'une fermeture de l'avenir. L"infra-politisation" évoquée plus
haut ne peut se reproduire que parce qu'il existe, du fait de  la politique
de gestion des hommes (management, formation etc.) suivie par
l'entreprise, une sorte de "terrain favorable". A cet égard on peut insister
sur deux points :
-Ia faiblesse du niveau de salaire. Le sentiment d'un
appauvrissement absolu et relatif s'est considérablement développé ces
dernières années. La question du salaire semble particulièrement
importante parce que celui-ci apparaît comme le signe de la valeur
sociale que la société reconnaît au travail de ces ouvriers. Son
abaissement tend donc à être vécu comme une dévalorisation sociale
dans laquelle sont pris aussi bien les O.P., que les O.S. ou Ies agents de
maîtrise. Cependant beaucoup d'O.P. ont "des moyens de s'en sortir":
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-Ia pénibilité du travail et l'aggravation sous de nombreux
rapports des conditions de travail. L'organisation réelle du travail ne
tient pas les promesses qu'avait pu susciter un moment le discours
modernisateur. Parallèlement cette organisation du travail apparaît liée
à un système de pouvoirs dont le jeu a, ceпainement, été modifié
(réorganisation de la maîtrise, nouvelles tâches confiées au chef
d'équipe, apparition de la "figure" du moniteur, développement de
l'auto-contrôle, système de primes...) mais pas du tout dans le sens
d'un allégement des contraintes. Ce qui frappe en effet lorsqu'on entend
le discours ouvrier c'est l'accélération dans tous les secteurs de  la course
la productivité, la réduction de tous les interstices de la journée de
travail, l'accroissement de la pénibilité du travail et de l'usure des corps.
On peut penser à cet égard qu'on est en présence du développement de
logiques contradictoires, du point de vue même de l'entreprise : d'une
part développement de l'individualisation des salaires, des primes, de
la concurrence entre individus et équipes, (concurrence qui est vécue,
dans un contexte de vieillissement, comme un facteur décisif de la
dégradation de l'"ambiance"...) et d'autre pa rt, en même temps, appel
A la création d'une nouvelle "solidarité", A de nouveaux "rapports
sociaux", qui semblent exigés par le nouveau mode de production.
Mais le fait essentiel est sans doute qu'en dépit de toutes les
promesses faites A la fin des années 80, au moment où de considérables
changements techniques étaient introduits, la Direction ne propose rien
de sérieux en matière de formation ou de promotion interne, et surtout
rien aux ouvriers non qualifiés. Parce que Ies managers ont
fondamentalement "fait l'impasse" sur ceux-ci, ont implicitement
déclaré qu'ils devaient rester à leur place et être usés jusqu'à la corde,
la "mobilité interne" est réduite pour eux A presque rien. L'avenir se
ferme, la déception est multiforme, un mot revient souvent dans Ies
propos de ceux qui ont espéré quelque chose de la nouvelle usine: "on
a déchanté". Corollaire : on ne peut faire aucune confiance aux O.S.
On recourt au "marché externe" si "on a besoin de trouver de nouveaux
ouvriers professionnels, etc. Le sentiment de n'avoir qu'un avenir
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d'ouvrier ringard et inconvertible est de plus en plus largement présent
et se diffuse tout au Tong de ces années-là (sentiment, également, d'être
"pris pour un con"). Et ce sentiment va "irradier" sur la représentation
que la grande majorité des ouvriers a de ses conditions de travail. Et au
delà sur l'ensemble des conditions d'existence, sur la vision qu'ils ont
de l'avenir.
Il faut ajouter que cette conscience d'une fermeture de l'avenir
joue aussi chez les militants au niveau individuel, l'appréhension qu'ils
font de l'avenir collectif du "groupe ouvrier" apparaissant dans une
large mesure, "surdéterminée" par le rapport qu'ils ont à l'avenir de
leurs propres enfants.
Le sentiment de la fermeture de l'avenir se relie à la perception
qu'ont les familles ouvrières de la situation scolaire de leurs enfants de
la découverte qu'elles font peu à peu que cet avenir scolaire se présente
sous un jour très sombre. Symptôme éminemment significatif: la
plupart des parents ne veulent pas que leurs enfants entrent dans des
carrières ouvrières ou de technicien, la plupart reportent en quelque
sorte sur l'enseignement professionnel l'hostilité (ou la haine) qu'elles
ont elles-mêmes pour l'Usíne 3. En fin de troisième les enfants
d'ouvriers déclarent préférer les études longues même si la réussite y
parait très aléatoire. Ils les préfèrent aux études courtes de
l'enseignement professionnel dont ils pensent qu'elles vont les enfermer
dans un univers "ouvrier". Et le fait impo rtant, c'est que ce sont les
enfants d'O.S. vivant dans les "cités" qui refusent le plus clairement
cet engagement dans l'enseignement professionnel. On voit donc
fonctionner ici un de ces effets de cercle, de boucle qu'on peut repérer,
dans cette région, dans bien d'autres domaines de l'existence...
Le troisième point que I'on doit ici évoquer, conceme la question
des identitéś différenciées, des images de soi qui se sont constituées
dans différents sous-groupes pendant ces années-1à.  Il suffit d'évoquer
les identités de génération, de sexe, d'âge, etc.
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Les entretiens apparaissent ici comme l'outil essentiel de
l'analyse. Ils permettent de comprendre comment des dynamiques
complexes se sont mises en marche dans les différents sous-groupes et
comment des luttes autour de l'image de soi, de la défense de soi se
sont développées. Un problème crucial semble bien être ici celui des
modalités de la défense identitaire contre tout ce qui est ressenti comme
une atteinte aux manières de faire et d'être "anciennes" -qui apparaissent
souvent comme le seul recours, la seule référence à laquelle on puisse
utilement se raccrocher.
Il est à.peine besoin de souligner combien la connaissance des
modalités de construction de ces identités et des formes que prennent
les luttes qui se développent à leur propos importe à la compréhension
des problèmes techniques et économiques dans l'entreprise, et par
exemple à la compréhension de la question de la qualité des produits et
des processus de disponibilité des salariés...
L'imposition de mots comme "opérateur", "module", "ligne"
l'invocation de I"esprit de groupe" etc. tendent à être vécues, dans
certaines circonstances, par beaucoup d'ouvriers comme une véritable
agression symbolique. Plus largement le travail de conversion des
attitudes (qui parait "appelé" par les nouvelles exigences techniques)
tel qu'il est mené par les agents de maîtrise ou les cadres doit aussi être
considéré comme un aspect particulier d'un processus de
disqualification des anciennes manières d'être. Tout peut devenir enjeu
de lutte : le fait de fumer, d'écouter de la musique, de se reposer, de
manger, à un certain moment, d'une certaine manière, etc.	 .
Globalement, la restructuration des atėliers tend à imposer aux
salariés qui y travaillent des représentations d'eux-mêmes qui sont
presque toujours dévalorisantes. il faudrait mener ici des analyses de
type goffmanien sur les adaptations "secondaires", par rappo rt aux
adaptations "primaires"4.
On peut être tenté ici de mener une analyse en termes assez
généraux à propos du groupe ouvrier dans son ensemble. Seulement
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on s'aperçoit vite que les choses sont plus compliquées : on ne peut
présupposer que tous les ouvriers affrontent la même situation avec
des armes égales, la question des sous-groupes présents dans un même
espace doit être immédiatement posée, etc.
Et ici surgit à nouveau la question des générations, de l'opposition
entre jeuneset vieux. Mais, même à l'intérieur des "vieux", il existe de
grandes différences dans les systèmes de ressources et d'attitudes face
au monde. D'où l'importance d'une analyse des différences dans les
stratégies, dans les logiques d'action, différences qui doivent être
d'emblée mises au premier plan, en tout cas si l'on veut rompre avec le
discours économiste qui tend à réifier et à essentialiser des différences
propres à un groupe d'acteurs à un moment du temps.
IV - Délocalisation des ateliers: vers de nouvelles stratégies?
On pourrait arrêter là l'analyse. Et revenir pour l'approfondir,
sur la question du rapport entre générations. Mais il me semble
nécessaire d'infléchir "analyse dans une nouvelle direction, en mettant
plus nettement que je ne l'ai fait jusqu'ici (surtout par manque de
temps...) l'accent sur les stratégies de la Direction, et notamment Ies
stratégies de délocalisation des ateliers que j'ai seulement évoquées.
Dans les années 80 le problème de la délocalisatíoń s'est trouvé déjà
posé -les ateliers de professionnels avaient déjà été largement
déstructurés- mais í1 va prendre au début des années 90 et surtout à
partir de 92/93 des dimensions tout à fait nouvelles dans les grands
ateliers d'OS.
Des événements survenus entre 1989 et 1993 dans les nouveaux
ateliers (habillage-caisse, peinture, etc.), la Direction semble avoir
conclu :
- en premier lieu qu'elle devait renoncer à transformer d'autres
ateliers de Sochaux sur le modèle de l'habillage-caisse. L'échec était
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patent. Le "mixage" vieux jeunes, la dynamisation des vieux par les
jeunes avait échoué. Une opération de même type lancée dans tous les
ateliers risquait d'aboutir au même résultat.
- ensuite qu'il fallait dans les ateliers nouvellement (et
coûteusement) construits -puisque on ne pouvait licencier massivement
les vieux, pour des raisons sociopolitiques- "composer" avec l'ancienne
culture des ouvriers qui y travaillaient.
- enfin qu'il fallait, hors de l'usine de Sochaux, développer une
autre stratégie de delocalisation des ateliers, et de création de nouvelles
unités de production peuplées presqu'entièrement de "jeunes" non-
qualifıés (ou considérés comme tels), mais ayant subi une sélection
très sévère. Cette dernière stratégie paraît d'autant plus "réaliste" qu'au
même moment les équipementiers de "automobile (auxquels les
grandes firmes automobiles recourent de plus en plus systématiquement
dans le cadre de leur politique de flux tendus) développent eux-mêmes
(pour des raisons qui s'apparentent beaucoup à celles qui jouent dans
le cas des usines donneurs d'ordres) une politique de construction de
petites unités de production.
Finalement, i1 apparaît qu'on ne peut étudier ce qui se passe
dans les ateliers de Sochaux, surtout depuis 1988, la manière dont la
Direction y introduit des innovations techniques et organisationnelles
multiples sans évoquer d'une part la logique selon laquelle cette
Direction envisage la délocalísation de certains "services" ou de 
certaines unités, d'autre part la manière dont, dans ces nouvelles
entreprises (généralement de petite taille) et construites depuis 1992/
93 à peu de distance de Sochaux (25 ou 30 Km) le recrutement s'effectue
et la main-d'oeuvre est gérée, la manière dont notamment on y gère le
rapport entre différentes générations pourvues de qualités sociales bien
différentes.
Aujourd'hui, objectivement, une grande firme tend à penser les
problèmes de gestion de son personnel à l'intérieur d'un espace
beaucoup plus vaste qu'il y a quinze ans. Un élément capital de sa
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stratégie est la possibilité qu'elle a de délocalíser certains ateliers
lorsqu'elle voit que des résistances sociales (qui peuvent être d'origine
fort diverse) s'accumulent. Quant à l'argumentation donnée, elle peut
être d'origine très diverse même si fondamentalement, on délocalíse
au nom d'impératifs "techniques". En fait, íl faut bien voir que certains
"problèmes" qui se posaient au niveau de la grande usine vont tendre,
à se trouver simplement déplacés dans l'espace...
Tout cela a évidement des répercussions sur  la manière dont on
peut et doit construire un objet de recherche. Entre autres conséquences
: la réflexion sur le rapport entre "vieux" et "jeunes" déjà entamée à
propos de.l'usine de Sochaux, peut et doit être impérativement
poursuivie par une réflexion sur ce qui se passe ailleurs, dans des
établissements souvent juridiquement indépendants de Peugeot, mais
en fait "tenus", "contrôlés" par Peugeot, soumis à la logique imposée
par une firme qui y impose des manières précises de travailler, un
système de normes avec lesquelles ceux-ci peuvent de moins en moins
jouer.
A Sochaux, l'idée s'est peu à peu imposée dans le groupe des
managers et des cadres dirigeants au cours des années 92/93 qu'il valait
mieux essayé de s'accommoder de l'ancienne culture de résistance,
façonnée dans le cadre de l'organisation taylorienne du travail. Au
prix de quelques aménagements (et dans une logique de moindre mal..)
cette culture pouvait finalement paraître mieux adaptée "aux besoins"
de l'entreprise" que la culture "participative" d'inspiration japonaise
qu'on avait tenté d'imposer par la violence dans les années 89/93.
En mars 1993, Vardanega, ancien Directeur du personnel de
Sochaux dans les années 70, devenu responsable du personnel pour
"ensemble de PSA, tire dans l'Usine nouvelle deux grandes leçons
des événements survenus à Sochaux entre 89 et 93 :
Première leçon : il ne faut installer les "vieux" ouvriers que sur
des installations fiables. Techniquement à Habillage-Caisse les
installations n'étaient pas au point. D'où multiplication de pannes, ce
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qui a contribué à casser, dit-il, le moral des salariés. En même temps
les équipementiers chargés de la livraison des pièces sont mis en cause.
Peut-être est-ce une manière de ne pas faire peser des responsabilités
trop lourdes sur les responsables hiérarchiques de Sochaux.
"Aucun opérateur, déclare-t-il, ne sera jamais satisfait si les
machines et les robots ne sont pas fiables. 11 y a eu beaucoup de
problèmes au début pour cette raison, ce qui a décrédíbilisé
l'atelier aux yeux des salariés". Et i1 ajoute : "la prochaine fois
nous ferons en sorte de nous associer avec Ies fabricants
d'équipements dès le départ et de mieux prendre en compte les
contraintes réelles des ouvriers."
Deuxième leçon : il faut en même temps revenir à un encadrement
fort, il faut que les agents de maîtrise soient de "vrais chefs", il faut
prendre des distances avec tous les conseils fournis par des consultants
qui ne connaissent pas vraiment les ateliers.
"II me semble que des opérateurs même polyvalents et semi-
autonomes doivent pouvoir compter sur un encadrement fort. Il
n'y a pas de mystères : les vrais chefs ont des compétences de
management, doivent motiver les gens, ils ne sont p as seulement
des techniciens. L'habillage caisses a souffert d'un encadrement
trop faible."
Dans l'article qui accompagne cette interview, l'accent continue
à être mis sur les mêmes points : le manque de culture des OS, leur
archaïsmė mental qui resterait la question de fond ; la présence de  la
C.G.T. qui a repris de la vigueur en 1992 à la faveur des maladresses et
des échecs de la Direction (on ne dit rien de la grève de 89 qui paraît
complètement oubliée...) ; la précipitation de la hiérarchie qui s'est
lancée dans un programme de réforme des attitudes ouvrières sans avoir
assuré son terrain, sans avoir vraiment formé des  "chefs" pour faire
réussir son programme.
il est clair qu'en reprenant ce type de schéma, on se refuse à
examiner de près le problème du mode de constitution et de perpétuation
d'une "culture de résistance" dont on ne veut mesurer ni la force, ni les
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racines, ní les raisons pour lesquelles elle se survit, ni les conditions
dans lesquelles elle trouve sans cesse, d'une certaine façon, une nouvelle
jeunesse. On remarque aussi qu'on ne parle plus de ce qui avait été un
thème majeur des années 1988/89 : le recours aux "jeunes" pour
dynamiser les "vieux"...
Dans la zone proche de l'usine de Sochaux í1 apparaît désormais
possible de mener une stratégie de délocalisation systématique. On
essayera donc de faire éclater progressivement les grands ateliers.
L'éclatement de certains ateliers (ou de certaines pa rties d'entre eux),
par exemple la garniture ou la fonderie, est programmé à brève échéance
(1996 ou 1997 ?). Ces délocalisations qui se font à la faveur du
lancement de, nouveaux modèles permettront de réaliser des travaux
de montage très comparables à ceux qui se faisaient dans l'ancienne
usine à un moindre coût, dans des conditions sociales transformées.
En même temps -avantage subsidiaire- on s'attend à ce qu'elle contribue
à une déstructuration contrôlée de la culture des ateliers peuplés de
vieux ouvriers.
Les travaux de A. Gorgeu et R. Mathieu5 sur les équipementiers
de l'automobile et le développement des établissements dits de
proximité entre 88 et 93 apparaissent ici comme tout  A fait importants.
D'une part ils montrent bien que la plupart des tendances qu'on
repère dans le Bassin d'Empioi de Montbéliard se retrouvent sur tout
le territoire national (et quelquefois de manière plus affirmée encore)
et notamment dans toutes les zones ou coexistent une grande usine et
un tissu industriel hétérogène de type ancien. Parmi les plus
caractéristiques de ces tendances on évoquera : réorganisation du travail
manuel, (flux tendus, informatique, robots) ; recherche d'augmentation
rapide de la productivité ; tendance à mettre en place des systèmes de
gestion de la main-d'oeuvre très différents de ceux qui existaient avant;
tendance bien sûr à supprimer des emplois de montage et à les remplacer
par des robots, mais également tendance à délocaliser certains types de
production. Simultanément, on construit, à faible distance de l'usine
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de montage de nouvelles unités de production, de faible taille, où les
syndicats sont très peu présents, et qui sont peuplées de jeunes qu'on
considère comme plus malléables, plus disponibles, plus flexibles, plus
aptes à se mobiliser au service de l'entreprise.
D'autre part, et peut-être surtout, ils montrent que le sens
économique et social de ce qui se passe à Sochaux depuis 85 ne peut
être saisi que sur la basė d'une connaissance minimale de ce qui se
passe dans d'autres entreprises - celles qui ont déjà été construites,
celles qui sont en cours de construction. Autrement dit la manière dont
la Direction traite ses "vieux" à Sochaux, accepte de les laisser encore
un temps dans ses grands ateliers, nouveaux ou anciens, ne peut être
comprise indépendamment de la perpective qui s'ouvre à elle de monter
ailleurs des ateliers gérés d'une toute autre manière.
Conclusion
En conclusion, je mettrai l'accent sur la complexité des processus
qui se développent dans ces ateliers, sur le fait qu'il faut saisir
simultanément la logique de développement de plusieurs de ces
processus. Je mettrai également l'accent sur la nécessité de faire
intervenir l'histoire, de réintégrer la réflexion sociologique dans une
histoire, sur l'impossibilité de dissocier ethnologie, sociologie et
histoire. Mais une histoire qui prendrait en compte aussi bien l'extérieur
de l'Usine que l'intérieur, qui ne privilégierait pas seulement la question
des innovations techniques et organisationnelles telles qu'elles sont
habituellement saisies par l ės sociologues du travail et les spécialistes
de l'organisation, qui poserait d'emblée le problème des caractéristiques
structurelles des groupes et des sous-groupes de salariés présents dans
l'entreprise, des formes de l'individualité sociale telles qu'elles se
construisent dans l'Usine, et hors de l'Usine.
Je mettrai "accent sur tout ce qui se joue dans l'espace social et
notamment sur les efforts que font les individus pour se valoriser hors
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de l'espace de l'Usine. A Sochaux, la question des identités sociales et
politiques (des modes de constitution de ces identités, des modes de
politisation et d'identification, des logiques de reconnaissance et d'auto-
reconnaissance...) apparaît comme une question cruciale. Sa spécificité
est qu'elle se recoupe très largement avec celle des générations et du
rapport à l'École et à la formation. La manière dont un groupe social
existe, résiste, se défend au niveau identitaire doit être appréhendée
dans sa spécitcité. (cf. par exemple les problèmes posés par la grève
de 89 et la manière dont la mémoire de cette grève survit...).
Le progrès de la réflexion implique qu'on comprenne la manière
dont les différentes générations de salariés s'investissent dans leur
travail en atelier, le rapport qu'ils ont à ce travail, et aussi tous les
effets que cela a sur la "qualité" de la production ; qu'on comprenne
surtout qu'il n'y a pas de salarié abstrait mais.de multiples sous-groupes
organisés par de multiples différences. S'agissant du groupe ouvrier
Sochaux, on est renvoyé nécessairement au problème du travail 
politique qui fait exister ce groupe, au problème des croyances, des
utopies qui ont, pendant longtemps, fait exister ce groupe par
l'intermédiaire d"ёіites" (au sens large, politiques, et professionnelles)
qui, à certain moment, se dégageaient au sein du groupe et qui risquent
fort aujourd'hui ne plus apparaître.
On est également renvoyé au problème des formes de 
démoralisation qui, aujourd'hui, atteignent ce groupe. Ce qui est sûr
c'est que les changements techniques ou économiques ne font jamais
sentir leurs effets directement mais toujours à travers des médiations,
dont í1 faut essayer de reconstruire la complexité et qui mettent en j ėu
la diversité des groupes et des sous-groupes. On est aussi conduit à des
analyses qui sont à la fois proches et sensiblement différentes de celles
qui sont menées habituellement dans le domaine de la sociologie du
travail: plutôt que de mettre "accent sur la "démotivation" ou
I"агсhaïsme mental" des salariés, il me semble qu'on est amené à le
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Le problème est de comprendre comment, presque toujours dans
la souffrance, ces formes de "cohérence" se désagrègent. Le plus
souvent elles renvoyaient à des formes compliquées de défense de la
dignité, qui s'étaient construites dans le temps. Pour différents groupes,
à des moments différents du temps, la défense de la dignité avait pu
prendre des formes paradoxales et souvent antagonistes. On est alors,
en fait, renvoyé à des questions plus larges sur le groupe ouvrier, sur la
façon dont il a existé dans l'histoire et dont il continue encore à exister.
Il me parait clair qu'on doit adopter à ce sujet une perpective résolument
constructiviste en mettant "accent sur la façon dont, pendant longtemps,
un certain travail politique et éthique a contribué à faire exister ce groupe
et à, proprement, le construire, et sur la manière dont aujourd'hui, un
processus de déconstructíon qui est aussi un processus de
désobjectivation se trouve engagé...
Cependant, ce travail politique ne peut pas être autonomísé. Il
doit être pensé en relation étroite avec l'existence de certaines formes
historiquement constituées de division du travail, avec l'existence de
certaines particularités dans l'organisation matérielle et sociale du
travail. Et également en relation avec certains changements qui
surviennent au niveau de la société toute entière, dans son organisation
politique, etc. En tout cas, la question de l'héritage, de sa complexité,
des modalités de sa gestion ne peut pas être éludée6.
Ce qu'on voit aujourd'hui, dans le Bassin d'emploi de Sochaux-
Montbéliard, en travaillant sur les transformations d'un groupe
professionnel - celui des ouvriers -, en mettant l'accent sur la catégorie
des ouvriers non qualifiés (et sans s'enfermer dans la considération
des seuls ateliers, en prenant en compte simultanément la famille et les
formes de l'existence hors-travail), c'est le fait qu'il y a de moins en
moins de coupure tranchée entre deux fractions des classes populaires,
auparavant, depuis 50 ou 60 ans, clairement séparées 7. Le fait que la
peur, le sentiment de vivre sous la menace, la conscience d'une
vulnérabilité de plus en plus grande sont présentes dans le "groupe"
des ouvriers. C'est le fait que ce groupe tend à être structurellement
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pénétré par la crainte de déchoir, et qu'il a le sentiment que bon nombre
des anciennes "barrières" qui assuraient une protection ne tiennent plus
- barrières historiquement constituées qui, longtemps avait paru
extrêmement solides. Cette croissance du sėntiment de vulnérabilité,
de précarité, doit être considérée comme une sorte de fait objectif. C'est
elle qui agit sur la déstabilisation des identités, la déstabilisation des
points de repère8.
La question des générations apparaît alors capitale, dès lors qu'on
ne fait pas un usage naïf de ce terme de génération. Ce A quoi on a
affaire, ce n'est pas évidement à un problème de génération biologique
ou même démographique, mais plutôt A un problème de changement
structurel, de "métamorphose" d'un groupe. Celui-ci, dans sa
composition, sa structure interne, son rapport avec d'autres groupes
sociaux, les "visions du monde" de ses membres, le rapport que les
différents sous-groupes qui le composent ont A l'existence, A l'avenir,
etc., se trouve déstabilisé, pris dans un processus multiforme de
réorganisation ; ses différentes composantes, se réagencent de manière
tout A fad nouvelle et spécifique.
Le groupe ouvrier, structurellement,  A toujours été exposé A une
logique de transformation rapide, l'histoire le montre bien. Mais
aujourd'hui, le rythme des changements socio-techniques semble
s'accélérer... L'analyse des "problèmes" de ce groupe ne peut être faite
qu'en relation étroite avec ce qui se passe dans les ateliers, du coté de
la production, des formes concrètes de travail, de la réorganisation du
Bassin d'Emploi, etc. Mais on ne peut en rester ià.
Un des problème qui reste fondamental, structurel, est celui des
moyens, multiples et divers, par lesquels les membres de ce groupe
cherchent à s'assurer la défense d'une dignité, cherchent A se faire
reconnaître une valeur sociale... A partir du milieu des années 80, dans
le Bassin d'Emploi de Sochaux-Montbéliard, on entre clairement dans
une autre époque : la valeur objective des individus tend A se constituer
de plus en plus A l'École et par l'École. Le poids des autres moyens,
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des autres logiques tend à se réduire. C'est l'École qui tend à définir la
valeur des individus, leur chance d'avoir une profession, etc. Il s'agit
là d'une rupture très nette par rapport à une époque où la valeur des
individus tendait à se construire dans le cours même de leur travail,
dans le cours de leur vie professionnelle, sans parler des autres "scènes"
où cette valeur pouvait également se déployer. En travaillant d'une
certaine façon, en menant un certain type de vie professionnelle on
pouvait soit monter dans l'entreprise soit se faire reconnaître une place,
soit s'imposer comme une sorte de leader dans un milieu relativement
homogène. Pourquoi en était-il ainsi ? Très schématiquement parce
que, à cette époque, í1 y avait une "demande" au sens des économistes
de travail non ou peu qualifié : les ouvriers y compris les non qualifiés
offraient leur force de travail. Et la possibilité existait que celle-ci soit
utilisée. Or, des changements sont survenus, cette demande s'est d'abord
lentement, puis de plus en plus rapidement réduitė...
L'affaiblissement de cette demande et l'imposition de nouvelles
valeurs scolaires et "techniciennes" (au détriment des anciennes valeurs
scolaires...) font que les "vieux" OS "bloqués" dans l'usine,
objectivement et subjectivement, tendent à être de plus en plus perçus
(et à se percevoir) comme "inconvertibles", tendent à être de plus en
plus considérés -et d'abord par leurs propres enfants engagés eux-
mêmes dans la logique de la concurrence scolaire- comme des "pauvres
types", tendent à être de plus en plus socialement dévalorisés. Et c'est
contre cette dévalorisation (qui se matérialise au niveau du salaire)
que beaucoup se battent et esquissent des stratégies dans des conditions,
objectivement, de plus en plus difficiles.
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Notes
ICe travail au départ était une réponse à un appel d'offre du  Мinístère du
travail et des affaires sociales portant sur les problèmes du chômage de longue
durée. Le titre du projet que nous avions rédigé en 1989 en réponse à cet appel
d'offre était : "Changements dans le système de formation et attitude syndicale."
C'était d'emblée marquer que nous allions mener une réflexion dans de
multiples directions, assez différentes de celles qui sont ordinairement suivies
dans les études sur le chômage qui se centrent avant tout sur l'analyse du
fonctionnement du marché du travail et l'étude des caractéristiques sociales
des chômeurs. En fait nous avons abordé de nombreux thèmes : transformations
technologiques, problèmes de syndicalisme, analyse des formes de vie sociale
dans les quartiers et les cités, problèmes de formation au sens étroit et au sens
large, etc. Nous nous sommes cependant recentrés sur trois questions : d'une
part la réflexion sur une certaine catégorie d'ouvriers : les ouvriers non qualifiés
et peu qualifiés, ceux qui continuent à s'appeler eux-mêmes OS, sur la manière
dont ils étaient "impliqués" dans certaines transformations technologiques et
organisationnelles survenant dans certains ateliers : ateliers de "montage",
ateliers de "finition" ; d'autre part la question des changements qui surviennent
dans le système d'enseignement général, et professionnel et des conditions
dans lesquelles les nouvelles générations d'enfants d'ouvriers entrent dans la
vie professionnelle ; enfin la question de la transformation des attitudes
politiques (au sens large et au sens étroit). En témoigne le titre donné au
rapport final : "Ouvriers de Sochaux, l'affaiblissement d'un groupe" avec un
sous-titre : "hantise de l'exclusion et rêve de formation". Le mot
"affaiblissement" est certainement insatisfaisant, pour plusieurs raisons,
notamment parce qu'il suggère l'idée que les tendances vont toutes dans un
même sens, alors qu'il existe manifestement des contre-tendances. On aurait
pu remplacer ce terme par celui de "déstabilisation", de "désarroi", par un
mot qui évoque l'idée d'une perte des points de repères chez les salariés.
2Cf. in La Misère du Monde, le texte : "Le vieil ouvrier et la nouvelle usine".
3 Cf. ce qui a été dit plus haut du travail de S. Beaud
4Goffinan montre dans Asiles que pour comprendre ce qui se passe dans l'asile,
i1 faut connaître un double discours : celui du patient et celui du psychiatre ; íI
y a réinterpretation constante par l'institution, dans la logique de "institution,
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de tout ce qui peut pourtant être lu d'une toute autre manière, dans la logique
du patient...
5Cf. par exemple Gorgeu A. Mathieu R., 1993, "Deux ans de relations de
sous-traitance" dans Travail n° 28, printemps 93. On citera ici quelques extraits
d'une étude rédigée par A. Gorgeu et R. Mathieu à la  fin de 1992 sur le
développement extrêmement rapide d'établissements dits de "proximité",
construits par les équipementiers de "automobile à peu de distance des grandes
usines de montage de l'automobile.
"Dans les nouveaux établissements : le travail s'inscrit dans le cadre
de la polyvalence, la sélection drastique qui a accompagné le
recrutement a pour but de s'assurer du caractère souple de l'individu
ou de son adaptabilité. Il doit régner dans l'établissement un esprit de
convivialité, (...) en effet le personnel doit consentir à vivre autrement
: accepter la mobilité, accepter de travailler dans un collectif de travail,
accepter des horaires qui remettent en cause des loisirs ou qui empiètent
sur la vie privée(...). La différence est flagrante avec les établissements
anciens où la polyvalence se met lentement en place, car elle doit faire
place à beaucoup de réticences, sinon à des oppositions. Nous pouvons
constater le décalage profond, du point de vue mentalités et a ttitudes
au travail, entre le personnel de ces unités nouvelles et celui des autres
unités.
Dans les premières, les ouvriers n'ont pas d'expérience professionnelle,
c'est leur premier emploi, ils ont connu le chômage, on ont eu une
interruption d'activité très longue, cas de femmes ayant élevé leurs
enfants par exemple. Ils ont été immergés dans un univers sans
formation dans le travail et le prolongement de la vie privée.
Dans les unités anciennes au contraire le personnel ouvrier est plus
âgé, a une longue tradition industrielle marquée par le taylorisme et
connu des luttes . sociales importantes pour faire. aboutir leurs
revendications. Leur vie à l'Usine est totalement dissociée de leur vie
privée et ils ne veulent pas remettre en cause cette situation car cela
signifierait d'accepter la culture d'entreprise, accepter toutes les
contraintes pour d'abord être utiles à l'entreprise" (...).
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1 -un noyau stable de permanents avec un volet important d'intérimaires
qui n'est pas déconnecté de ce dernier,
2 -un recrutement au moindre coût qui n'exclut pas une sélection
drastique et des exigences contradictoires,
3 -une gestion de l'emploi à cours terme qui risque de poser des
problèmes à moyen et long terme..."
6On retrouve ainsi, à propos d'un travail de te rrain, nombre de questions posées
par R. Castel dans les deux derniers chapitres de son livre sur Lés
métaı» orphoses de la question sociale, (Fayard 1995). Et notamment le
problème de la constitution de ce qu'il appelle une "société salariale" dans les
années 50, celui de l'effritement de cette société, celui de l'érosion des
protections dont bénéficiaient les membres du groupe ouvrier. On ne peut pas
ne pas être frappé par la manière dont, aujourd'hui, reviennent dans ce groupe,
l'angoisse, la peur, le sentiment de vulnérabilité, y compris dans les rangs de
ceux qui sont encore du côté de la stabilité. On peut être d'accord avec R.
Castel sur le fait que cesse d'exister cette ligne franche de partage entre Ies
ouvriers précaires qui seraient placés du "mauvais coté" et d'autres qui seraient
solidement et définitivement protégés contre l'adversité. Un long séjour sur le
"terrain" montre que la distance tend considérablenıent à se réduire entre ces
deux groupes d'ouvriers...
7Est-ce si différent de ce que Marx appelait, autrefois, l'imbrication de l'armée
active et de l'armée de réserve,
$Conséquence : La question du "militantisme" semble ne pouvoir être abordée
qu'après qu'on ait mené ce type d'analyse sur les "ouvriers de base", qu'on
ait compris comment ceux-ci essaient de se sécuriser, etc. Bien sûr, les deux
types d'analyses ne s'excluent pas. Elle doivent être amenées simultanément,
l'une suppose l'autre. Il faut, en fait, critiquer les démarches qui autonomisent
la question du militantisme. Celle-ci ne peut être traitée que sur la base d'une
connaissance approfondie de ce qui se passe sous le rapport du travail,
notamment dans les ateliers. Il reste cependant que le traitement complet de la
question exige la prise en compte de ce qui se passe hors Usine : dans la
famille, à l'école, dans le quartier, dans l'espace social, et qu'il convient de
s'opposer à une réduction "politiste" du problème qui est trop souvent  le
"pendant" d'un réduction "économiste".
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